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Introduction
In the past decade there has been dramatic movement towards
greater use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)1 devices.
Modern federal civil rights statutes and regulations have always
provided for enforcement alternatives to formal litigation.2 In re-
cent years federal agencies have shown greater interest in employ-
1. Throughout this Article, dispute resolution is distinguished from other law
enforcement goals such as the eradication of discrimination. The term "dispute" re-
fers to an identifiable controversy between two or more identifiable persons or insti-
tutions. A "problem," such as the problem of racial discrimination, may be more
pervasive and elusive in scope and manifestations. For example, suppose a black em-
ployee is fired. The employer says the reason is the employee's pattern of frequent
tardiness and absence. The employee says the reason is the employer's racial preju-
dice. Thus, they have a dispute between them that needs to be resolved. The dispute,
however, may be a manifestation of a problem, the problem of pervasive, systemic
racial discrimination. If the employee was fired because of racial discrimination, it is
possible that other employees are receiving similar treatment due to racial discrimina-
tion. This problem also needs to be addressed.
2. This Article is structured around the dichotomy between formal and informal
procedures. Although it is misleading to separate the cadre of available procedures in
this way, as they form a continuum of "formalism" rather than separate, clearly delin-
eated stages, one cannot fully appreciate what we mean by "alternative dispute proce-
dures" without appreciating the processes to which they are an alternative. By formal
procedures, I mean what we commonly consider our traditional dispute resolution
techniques, specifically, our system of judicial litigation coupled with formal agency
adjudicative procedures. ADR techniques or procedures, then, are all those proce-
dures less formal than the traditional procedures used to resolve disputes. This Arti-
cle focuses on mediation, negotiation during agency investigation, and negotiation
after agency findings of discrimination.
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ing more varied dispute resolution mechanisms than their organic
statutes mandate or than what is set forth in the agencies' substan-
tive regulations. The use of such alternatives raises numerous
questions as to what procedures are appropriate in which circum-
stances. Do less confrontational, adversarial approaches improve
the quantity and quality of civil rights compliance? Can more jus-
tice, more extensive compliance with the law's requirements,
more relief for aggrieved complainants, be achieved through the
use of mediation and other informal mechanisms than through
the use of formal, postfindings negotiation? Are there some cases
in which at least an administrative law judge and perhaps a fed-
eral court should be involved? And as to those cases best resolved
through informal techniques, are there protections, either legisla-
tively, judicially, or administratively created, that might better as-
sure achievement of the desired goals?
This Article will analyze the various procedures used by the Of-
fice for Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education
(OCR) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to resolve discrimination complaints.3 By analyzing those
procedures in terms of a number of articulated values, this Article
will suggest approaches and procedures suitable to achieving the
purposes behind these nondiscrimination schemes. Part I reviews
historical and contemporary discrimination and the measures
Congress has taken to address such discrimination over the last
quarter of a century. Part I also surveys the ADR movement from
the 1976 Pound Conference to the present day, discussing the gov-
ernment's role in promoting ADR and the Reagan Administra-
tion's views on the use of informal processes. Part II discusses the
agency as an ADR device and describes and compares the proce-
dures used by OCR and EEOC. Part III organizes for exploration
the formal and informal procedures available to OCR and EEOC,
ranging from litigation and formal administrative adjudication to
mediation, negotiation during investigation, and conciliation after
agency findings. Part IV identifies a set of desired values and
goals for civil rights enforcement, including justice and statutory
intent; procedural fairness; expedience, efficiency and cost-effec-
tiveness; and finality and enforceability of the result. Part V sug-
gests the kinds of cases that are likely to come before the agencies.
Part VI explores whether, and the extent to which, the various
formal and informal procedures can achieve the identified values.
The Conclusion discusses recommendations for change and sug-
3. Some civil rights advocates argue that complaint processing is among the least
efficient or productive approaches to eradicating discrimination, especially discrimina-
tion against members of the underclass who rarely take advantage of such administra-
tive mechanisms. See C. Brown & J. Reid, Twenty Years On: New Federal & State
Roles To Achieve Equity in Education 108-09 (Jan. 1987) [hereinafter Brown Draft]
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review). My
intent is solely to examine the various methods used in the complaint resolution pro-
cess; I take no position on whether complaint resolution is the best means of eradicat-
ing discrimination, in specific instances or in general.
VOL. 55:482
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gests steps to be taken by each of the three branches of
government.
L Discrimination and Dispute Resolution: Background
A. Discrimination: An Unsolved Problem
1. History of Modern Federal Civil Rights Legislation
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964 Act)4 marked a
turning point in this country's political commitment to the eradi-
cation of discrimination against women and minorities.5 One hun-
dred years had passed since President Lincoln issued the
Emancipation Proclamation.6 Ten years had passed since the
Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion 7 declared that separate was not equal8 and that segregated
schools should be eliminated "with all deliberate speed."9 As
state, local, and private efforts proved grossly insufficient to
achieve nondiscrimination, attention focused on federal leadership
to help realize the promise of Brown.'0 The civil rights commu-
nity had grown impatient: marches, protests, and vigils were held
nationwide in the hope of actualizing the promise of equality.11
On May 2, 1963, the nation witnessed, on its television screens,
Bull Connor descending with billy clubs, police dogs, and fire
hoses on marchers led by Martin Luther King, Jr. in Birmingham,
Alabama.1 2 On June 19, 1963, President John F. Kennedy submit-
ted proposed legislation to Congress' 3 with a plea to set aside par-
tisan differences 4 and to enact what would become the 1964 Act.15
The various components of the 1964 Act responded to a series of
concerns, the nucleus of which was unequal treatment of persons,
in critical aspects of their lives, based on immutable characteristics
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
5. As used in this Article, the term "minority" refers to racial and ethnic minori-
ties. For a description of the social climate prior to and at the time of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, see C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE (1985) [hereinafter
WHALEN].
6. Proclamation No. 17, reprinted in 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I).
8. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
9. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
10. See WHALEN, supra note 5, at xv-xx.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2393.
12. WHALEN, supra note 5, at xviii-xix.
13. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 11,252 (1963); S. 1732, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 11,081-82 (1963); S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109
CONG. REC. 11,075-81 (1963).
14. See H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1963).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1982).
1987]
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  485 1986-1987
such as the color of their skin.16 Although the scope of the 1964
Act reached more broadly, Congress responded primarily to the
"glaring... discrimination against Negroes which exists through-
out our Nation. ' 17 Title VI prohibited discrimination based on
race, color, or national origin by recipients of federal funds.18
Even though Title VI applied to all recipients of federal funds,19
the primary impetus behind its promulgation was discrimination
against minority schoolchildren in the nation's public schools.20
Although all federal agencies were obligated to enforce Title
VI,21 Congress placed major responsibility for insuring compliance
with the Department of Justice (DOJ)22 and the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).23 In 1967 a separate Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) was created within HEW in response to
congressional pressure for centralized responsibility and more in-
tensive initiatives to enforce Title VI.24 Thirteen years later,
when Congress split HEW into the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Department of Education, the legislation
16. See id. § 2000a (Title II, Public Accommodations: prohibition against discrimi-
nation or segregation in places of public accommodation); id. § 2000b (Title III, Public
Facilities: civil actions may be brought by the Attorney General; government funds
and facilities will be provided); id. § 2000c (Title IV, Public Education: desegregation
of public schools); id. § 2000d (Title VI, Federally Assisted Programs: prohibition
against discrimination based on race, color, or national origin by recipients of federal
financial assistance); id. § 2000e (Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunities: prohi-
bition against discrimination in employment based on race, color, national origin, sex,
or religion); id. § 2000f (Title VIII, Registration and Voting Statistics: survey for com-
pilation of statistics to include breakdowns by race, color, and national origin); id.
§ 2000g (Title X, Community Relations Service: establishment of relations service);
id. § 2000h (Title XI, Miscellaneous Provisions).
17. H.R. REP. No. 914, surpa note 11, at 18, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2393.
18. Section 601 of the 1964 Act provides that "[n]o person.., shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the ben-
efits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). However, Section 604 explicitly
exempted discriminatory employment practices from the coverage of Title VI, unless
the primary purpose of the federal assistance was to provide employment. Id.
§ 2000d-3.
19. See Brown Draft, supra note 3, at 1-2.
20. See G. ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION vii (1969).
For a comprehensive analysis of the political and administrative struggle to imple-
ment Title VI, see generally id.
21. Section 602 provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity ... is authorized
and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with
respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders
of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the
objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection
with which the action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
22. Section 602 further provides that "[n]o such rule, regulation, or order shall
become effective unless and until approved by the President." Id. The President del-
egated this authority to the Attorney General. Exec. Order No. 11,764, 3 C.F.R. 124
(1974) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298, 300 (1981), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 app. at 23-24 (1982)).
23. See 1980 OCR FIRST ANN. REP. 7.
24. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 20, at 320-21, 328-32.
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creating the new Department of Education 25 provided specifically
for an Office for Civil Rights, headed by an Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights with responsibilities for reporting to Congress.26
OCR's authority extended to investigating complaints of discrimi-
nation, conducting periodic compliance reviews of recipients of
federal education funds, and attempting to secure voluntary com-
pliance of violations it found.2 7 If attempts to achieve voluntary
compliance proved unsuccessful, OCR would either commence
formal administrative enforcement proceedings to terminate fed-
eral assistance or refer the case to DOJ for appropriate federal
litigation.28
The eradication of invidious discrimination in employment was
the thrust of Title VII, the coverage of which extended to all per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States working for, or
seeking employment with, private employers of more than fifteen
employees.29 Title VII sought to eliminate, through the utilization
of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination based
on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '30
The administrative machinery to accomplish these goals was
vested in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which had the power to investigate complaints of dis-
crimination filed by an employee or initiated by a Commission
member, and to attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice by "in-
formal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."3 ' In-
itially, however, EEOC lacked any authority to institute civil
actions or otherwise to enforce its findings.32 If EEOC was unable
25. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 669
(1979) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1982)).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 3413(a), (b) (1982).
27. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1986).
28. Id. § 100.8 (1986).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). Originally Title VII applied to employers of more
than 25 employees. The number of employees was changed to 15 by the 1972 amend-
ments. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982)). Title VII was originally geared to
eradicating employment discrimination in the private sector. Section 11 of the 1972
amendments extended Title VII's applicability to government employees. Id., 86 Stat.
111 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982)).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2401. It is interesting to note that
the word "sex" was not originally in the Title VII bill. The contemplation of women's
equality in the work force was still a volatile subject, too volatile for Congress. Count-
ing on this and hoping to quash sufficient support for passage, Senator Howard Smith,
one of the bill's opponents, moved to add the word "sex" to Title VII's language. Sen-
ator Smith, however, was hoisted by his own petard when no violent reaction to the
addition was forthcoming and his filibustering effort only increased the resolve of the
bill's supporters. See generally WHALEN, supra note 5, at 115-16.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
32. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 287, 310.
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to resolve a finding of discrimination through informal processes,
its only recourse was either to issue a notice of right to sue to the
party who made the charge of discrimination, thereby authorizing
that person to commence suit under Title VII, or to refer the mat-
ter to the Attorney General for appropriate federal litigation.33 In
1972, amendments to Title VII transferred authority from the At-
torney General to EEOC to initiate civil actions in federal court to
enforce the provisions of Title VII if attempts at conciliation
failed.34
Although discrimination against women in the marketplace
may not have been a critical focus in 1964,35 it soon became appar-
ent that such discrimination was widespread. Debate surrounding
the Education Amendments of 197236 stressed the problem of sex
discrimination in employment in educational institutions that had
been left unaddressed by the 1964 Act.37 Title IX 38 was introduced
by Senator Birch E. Bayh in response to this concern39 and en-
acted as part of the 1972 amendments. It parallels Title VI in that
its provisions extend only to recipients of federal financial assist-
ance.40 By regulation, the procedures and practices used in the
enforcement of Title VI are incorporated into Title IX. 4 ' Unlike
Title VI, Title IX applies only to educational programs and activi-
ties,42 but its coverage exceeds that of Title VI in that it extends to
discriminatory employment practices.43 The United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights later observed that "congressional debate
[during the 1972 hearings] reflected an awareness that opportunity
for women was restricted throughout American education and,
further, that denying women equal educational opportunity also
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6 (1982). Although the 1972 amendments extended
coverage to public employees, authority to pursue litigation against public employees
remained with the Attorney General. Id. § 200e-5(f).
35. See supra note 30.
36. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 236.
37. H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2511-12.
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
39. 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
667, 674 (1979).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
41. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1986).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
43. For many years there was heated litigation on the issue of whether Title IX
was intended to incorporate section 604's exclusion of employment discrimination.
See supra note 18. This issue was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982). Although the gap in employment cover-
age may have been a strong motivation behind the adoption of Title IX, this gap was
eliminated by the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which extended its provisions to
public employees. See supra note 29. Thus, EEOC and OCR have concurrent jurisdic-
tion; the issue of who shall investigate which cases has been resolved through execu-
tive order and interagency understandings between EEOC and OCR. See Exec. Order
No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R. 263 (1979); Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1155 (1982), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
1930 (field notes issued Jan. 3, 1986 and Mar. 3, 1986).
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denies them equal opportunity in employment."44
One year later Congress responded to the concerns of another
previously disadvantaged minority group, the disabled. The Reha-
bilitation Act of 197345 expanded employment opportunities for
the handicapped. Section 504, modeled after Title VI and Title IX,
provided that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... - 46 In 1978, to clarify any doubt, Congress explicitly
provided that the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in
Title VI" were incorporated into Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.47
The Age Discrimination Act of 197548 extended similar, though
more limited, protection against discrimination based on age in
federally funded programs and activities.49 Unlike Title VI, Title
IX, and Section 504, however, the Age Discrimination Act refers
specifically to "conciliation" in providing that each funding agency
is to publish appropriate regulations providing for "investigative,
conciliation, and enforcement procedures."50
44. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENFORCING TITLE IX 1 (1980) [hereinafter EN-
FORCING TITLE IX].
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982).
46. Id. § 794.
47. Id. § 794(a)(2). As with Title IX, challenges proliferated as to whether Section
504 extended to discrimination against the handicapped in employment; the argument
was that the 1978 Amendment, id, intended to incorporate the Section 604 employ-
ment exclusion of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982). Many of those challenges were
successful. See, e.g., United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908, 910 (2d Cir.
1981). Again, as with Title IX, the Supreme Court rejected this limitation in Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1984), finding it completely inconsis-
tent with congressional intent to increase employment opportunities for the
handicapped in enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. But see Atascadero State
Hasp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985) (stating that the Rehabilitation Act does not
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the states).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1982).
49. For example, the Act excepts from its coverage any practice that "reasonably
takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal operation or the achieve-
ment of any statutory objective of such program or activity," and does not apply to
"any program or activity established under authority of any law which (A) provides
any benefits or assistance to persons based upon the age of such persons; or (B) estab-
lishes criteria for participation in age-related terms or describes intended benefi-
ciaries or target groups in such terms." Id § 6103(b)(1)(A), (b)(2).
50. Id. § 6103(a)(4). None of these civil rights statutes or provisions was self-
implementing. They required interpretation and development through the promulga-
tion of substantive rules and regulations to give particular application and force to
their intent. The process of enacting substantive regulations was generally a slow
one. The groups that had pressured Congress to enact the laws then had to pressure
the agencies to give flesh to the congressional enactments. HEW's Title VI regula-
tions were published in 1964, 29 Fed. Reg. 16,298 (1964); Title IX regulations in 1975,
40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975); Section 504 regulations in 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977);
and the general Age Discrimination Act regulations in 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768
1987] 489
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Thus, by 1979 a comprehensive set of statutes and regulations
was in place that prohibited discrimination based on race, national
origin, sex, handicap, and age in programs and activities receiving
federal financial assistance.51 In 1979 the President transferred
responsibility for enforcing the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA)52 and the Equal Pay Act (EPA)53 to EEOC
from the Department of Labor.54 Since 1979 there have been no
significant amendments to these statutes and regulations.55
2. Discrimination Today
One year after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson addressed an audience at Howard Univer-
sity about what he hoped the Act might achieve:
[I]t is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All of
our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.
This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil
rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity - not just
legal equity but human ability - not just equality as a right and
a theory, but equality as a fact and as a result.56
The position that discrimination is no longer the systemic prob-
lem it once was is not without its following,5 7 and movements to
eliminate certain institutions and requirements aimed at improv-
(1979). Many funding agencies still have not published final regulations. See L.
SINGER & R. SCHECHTER, MEDIATING CIVIL RIGHTS: THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT 8
(1986) (report to the National Institute for Dispute Resolution by the Center for Com-
munity Justice).
51. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Title VI in this Article should be
considered as referring as well to Title IX, Section 504, and the Age Discrimination
Act. The procedures used in implementing these nondiscrimination statutes are iden-
tical, except for the Age Discrimination Act, discussed infra note 434.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
53. Id. § 206.
54. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
1155 (1982), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978). Because the procedures used under these
statutes are not identical to Title VII procedures, references to Title VII should not be
deemed to refer to these statutes unless otherwise indicated. Certain EEOC statistics
discussed in this Article aggregate complaints received under the various statutes.
55. A bill to extend Title VII's coverage to include discrimination against the
handicapped was introduced in 1979, but eventually died. S. 446, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. 3053-55 (1979).
The creation of the Department of Education in 1980 did not affect the substantive
statutory obligations of recipients of educational funds. Any significant changes have
been the products of administrative policy and judicial decisions. E.g., Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
56. Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University (June 4, 1965),
reprinted in J. FRANKLIN & I. STARR, THE NEGRO IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA
226 (1967).
57. Note, for example, the Reagan Administration's opposition to racial prefer-
ence in private sector employment. Taylor, Mostly Unsuccessful Reagan Attack on
Race Quotas Goes to High Court, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1985, at B7, col. 1; see also Ad-
dress by U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, Dickinson College (Sept. 17, 1985),
quoted in Shenon, Meese Sees Racism in Hiring Goals, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at
A16, col. 4 ("The idea that you can use discrimination in the form of racially preferen-
tial quotas, goals and set asides to remedy the lingering social effects of past discrimi-
nation makes no sense in principle; in practice, it is nothing short of a legal, moral and
constitutional tragedy.").
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ing the situation of previously "protected" groups are wide-
spread; 8 yet there is ample proof that discrimination based on
immutable characteristics is still a terribly serious problem in this
country.5 9
There is no question that the 1964 Act and its progeny have
been responsible for major improvements in the plight of women,
minorities, and the handicapped in this nation.60 But the job be-
gun in 1964 has not been finished. The problems that remain are
generally more intractable and difficult to solve, partially because
they are less overt 61 and partially because they are integrally re-
58. There is currently substantial debate over whether Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-
1970)), which requires federal contractors to take affirmative steps to hire and pro-
mote women and minorities who are underrepresented in the workforce, should be
repealed or amended substantially. See The U.S. Constitution Was Never Color-Blind,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at A22, col. 3 (letter to the editor from Benjamin Hooks,
Executive Director, NAACP, criticizing proposal to amend Exec. Order No. 11,246).
The Chairperson of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr.,
said that he might favor abolition of the Commission when it comes up for congres-
sional reauthorization in 1989. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS UPDATE 8
(July-Sept. 1985) ("[Chairperson Pendleton] said that he questioned whether [the
Commission] would have any work left to do by 1989 .. ").
59. See, e.g., Wilkerson, Campus Race Incidents Disquiet U. of Michigan, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 9, 1987, at A12, col. 1; Face Facts About Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1986, at A34, col. 1.
60. For a discussion of the progress made in education, see Brown Draft, supra
note 3, at 2-3. As to progress in employment, see Blumrosen, Employment Opportu-
nity After a Reagan Victory in 1984, 18 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 581, 583 (1984); Elder,
Disabled View Their Gains, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1986, at C14, col. 4.
61. A Defense of the Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policies, NEW PERSP.,
Summer 1984, at 34, 37 (interview with William Bradford Reynolds, United States
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights); Address by Judge Bruce Wright, New
York Supreme Court, First Judicial District, at New York Law School (Apr. 20, 1985)
(stating that "what was once blatant has now become flagrantly subtle"). Although
Judge Wright's remarks related primarily to ongoing intentional discrimination,
other forms of discrimination of a more unconscious, though no less troubling, nature
persist. See generally, Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious racial
motivation as a product of cultural experience and therefore neither intentional nor
unintentional). For example, many so-called objective tests used for admissions to or
placement in educational institutions, hiring, and promotion, have been shown to be
culturally or racially biased, thus contributing to grossly disproportionate minority
passing scores. See Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 952 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (stating
that "[w]hile many think of the I.Q. as an objective measure of innate, fixed intelli-
gence, the testimony of the experts overwhelmingly demonstrated that this concep-
tion of I.Q. is erroneous"), modified, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984); Smothers, Coalition
Cites 'Cultural Bias' in Police Tests, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at B3, col. 6. Although
there may be no intent to make such tests biased, test writers tend to be white middle-
class individuals who may unknowingly incorporate into the tests their own biases
and preconceptions. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE ... BY
ALL THE PEOPLE 40 (1969).
Similarly, women and minorities fail to gain tenure at colleges and universities at
the same rate as their male counterparts. See Langland v. Vanderbilt Univ., 589 F.
Supp. 995, 1004 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), affd, 772 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1985). Again, there
may be no conscious, overt intent to exclude them; rather, tenure committees tend to
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lated to economic and class problems.6 2 Major discrepancies re-
main in the achievements of minorities and women as compared
to those of white males.6 3 Minority enrollment in institutions of
higher education is on the decline.6 4 The gap between the earning
power of women and that of men, which was nearly as low in 1977
as in 1939,65 has not been much further ameliorated 66 and is ex-
pected to improve only slowly for years to come.6 7 The debate
over Title VII and comparable worth may be viewed as an attempt
by its proponents to use nondiscrimination statutes to solve eco-
nomic problems undoubtedly tied to discrimination against wo-
be composed of primarily white males who are affected unconsciously by biases
against those who are different, or in favor of those who are similar. Cf. Lawrence,
supra, at 343 (stating that "[e]ven the most thorough investigation of conscious motive
will not uncover the race-based stereotype that has influenced [an employer's] deci-
sion"); Johnson, New York Judge Faces Dual Challenge, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 1,
at 51, col. 1 (comment of Judge Kathryn A. McDonald that much of the sex bias in
New York City's Family Court is unconscious); Pear, Court Cases Reveal New Inequal-
ities in Women's Pay, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1985, at Cl, col. 1 ("Federal judges and
other Government officials report that employers have found new, more subtle ways
to justify paying women less than men."); Study of Black Females Cites Role of Praise,
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at CIO, col. 3 (discussing a report concluding that teachers
unconsciously fail to encourage black females early in elementary school to become
achievers).
Recently, however, the incidence of eruption of violent manifestations of racial ani-
mosity has increased greatly. See, e.g., Freedman, New York Race Tension is Rising
Despite Gains, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, at 1, col. 1, 28, col. 1 ("Blacks say discrimina-
tion has not only continued but also in some ways has become more overt in the re-
cent past.").
62. Brown Draft, supra note 3, at 3-4 (stating that children of low-income minor-
ity families are substantially overrepresented in dropout rates, in not attending col-
lege, and in being misclassified as mentally or emotionally disabled); see also
Gamarekian, 40 Years Fighting for Rights, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1985, at A20, col. 6.
63. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice Brennan
stated that the gap between the number of minorities and the number of whites in
medicine in 1970 was wider than it had been in 1950; the percentage of blacks in the
country increased from 10% to 11.1% while the number of blacks in medicine re-
mained frozen at 2.2%. Id. at 369-70 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion added: "The position of the Negro today
in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal treatment.
Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful equality remains
a distant dream for the Negro." Id. at 395 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); see also id. at 395-96 (giving general statistics on discrepancies be-
tween blacks and whites). For other evidence of such discrepancies, see Blinkein,
Brown's Blacks: Racism and Resentment on Campus, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15 & 22,
1985, at 17, 18 ("The number of blacks receiving master's degrees has dropped from
20,345 in 1976 to 17,133 in 1981, a trend that is beginning to affect the number of black
Ph.D.s."). See generally Clauss, Keynote Address, Colloquium: Employment Discrim-
ination in the 1980's, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 225 (1984-1985).
64. Fiske, Minority Enrollment in Colleges Is Declining, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1985, at Al, col. 3 (stating that enrollment of blacks in four-year institutions rose from
3% in 1972 to 10.3% in 1976, but leveled off to 9.6% by 1982).
65. ENFORCING TITLE IX, supra note 44, at 1-2.
66. See generally 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE
FOR THE 80's: A CONSULTATION OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1984) (dis-
cussing the earnings gap between women and men); O'Hara, An Overview of the The-
ory of Comparable Worth, 22 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1073 (1985) (stating that women's
salaries are now 64% of men's).
67. Marton, Women's Near-Liberation, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1985, at A27, col. 4
("[B]y the year 2000, [women] will still lag behind, and ... will earn only 74 percent of
men's income.").
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men in the job market. 68 Although the 1964 Act and its progeny
may not be capable of solving all of the remaining inequities, the
gains of the past twenty years could vanish quickly without a
strong federal presence insisting upon equal treatment of women
and minorities.69
There has been no serious suggestion that the 1964 Act has be-
come obsolete and should be repealed. Continued commitment to
the goals of that Act and the nondiscrimination obligations it has
parented, however, require more than passive acceptance. It re-
quires continued attention to the adequacy of the enforcement
agencies' resources and to the procedures used by the agencies in
fulfilling their statutory mandates.70 This Article focuses on those
procedures, specifically on the less formal procedures used in the
enforcement of Titles VI and VII.
B. The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Movement
1. General Trend Towards ADR
The past decade has witnessed a massive movement towards the
use of ADR procedures throughout our legal system.7 1 Spurred by
inquiries such as the Pound Conference,7 2 lawyers, jurists, and
68. See, e.g., American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Washing-
ton, 770 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that reliance on a market-based sys-
tem in which jobs occupied primarily by women are compensated at a lower rate than
dissimilar jobs of comparable worth does not constitute a violation of Title VII).
69. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1984) (statement of EEOC
Chairperson Clarence Thomas) ("It is clear.., that the need for strong commitment
to the enforcement of equal employment rights is as compelling now as it ever was.
To a certain extent, it is even more compelling today as proving discrimination has
become more difficult and the issues have become more complex.").
70. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF EDU-
CATION, H.R. REP. No. 458, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1985). The Committee found
that despite insufficient resources and understaffing, which caused the agency to miss
court-imposed deadlines, see infra text accompanying notes 113-18, OCR had failed to
spend more than 7% of its appropriations ($20,152 million out of $272,064 million)
between fiscal years 1980 and 1985. Id.; see also Investigation of Civil Rights Enforce-
ment By the Department of Education: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1985) [hereinafter 1985
Hearings on OCR] (statement of Rep. Conyers) (stating that enforcement may be the
biggest problem encountered with civil rights since 1964).
71. See NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: REPORT OF THE AD HOC PANEL ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 1-2 (Oct. 1983) (prepared for the United
States Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Federal Justice Research
Program).
72. 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). Chief Justice Warren Burger convened the Pound Con-
ference to commemorate the 70th anniversary of Roscoe Pound's famous address, The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP.
395 (1906). In the conclusion to that address, Pound stated:
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scholars turned their attention towards what was perceived as an
overburdened court system, unable to respond to the legal dis-
putes of the less wealthy in our society. Many perceived that the
problems had become exacerbated since the 1906 speech by Dean
Roscoe Pound, in which he called for new solutions to our
overburdened, inefficient system of justice.73 Solutions were
sought that would provide accessible justice to those who could
not afford the cost of litigation.74 In addition to unclogging the
courts75 and affording remedies to those who otherwise had none,
many believed ADR procedures would increase the autonomy of
the disputants by placing control over the dispute in their hands
and deemphasizing the importance of both governmental control
and government-imposed norms.76 Putative reformers focused
much energy and attention on ensuring that the alternatives that
were developed would achieve the goals of justice and fairness, so
that whatever change they effectuated would be constructive. 77
[O]ur system of courts is archaic and our procedure behind the times. Un-
certainty, delay and expense, and above all the injustice of deciding cases
upon points of practice, which are the mere etiquette of justice, direct re-
sults of the organization of our courts and the backwardness of our proce-
dure, have created a deep-seated desire to keep out of court ....
Id. at 408-09.
The purpose of the Conference was to examine whether Pound's concerns had been
met and, if not, to determine what remained to be done. The Conference recom-
mended that there be further exploration of alternatives to traditional dispute resolu-
tion. See Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the
Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 280 (1978). It based this
recommendation on perceptions that courts were so overburdened that they could no
longer give requisite attention to individual cases and should be free to address mat-
ters of greater import, that other procedures might afford greater expertise in given
substantive areas, and that alternatives would be less expensive and less time consum-
ing. Id. at 280-81. A Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force was formed, which
recommended the increased use of mechanisms already in place (small claims courts,
arbitration, and administrative hearings) and the creation of one new approach,
neighborhood justice centers. Id. at 281. For a detailed description of neighborhood
justice centers, see D. MCGILLIS & J. MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS (1977).
73. See, e.g., Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspec-
tive, 70 F.R.D. 212 (1976); see also Smith, Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution:
Practices and Possibilities in the Federal Governmen 1984 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION 9.
74. See Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979). Legal services attorneys
saw the potential for freeing up legal services resources for litigation with wider po-
tential impact. See Singer, Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Effects
on Justice for the Poor, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 569, 569 (1979). Ms. Singer observed
that although there was little supporting data, it appeared that low-income disputants,
whose claims otherwise would not have gone to court, were taking advantage of many
alternative forums and procedures. Id. at 573. She also observed that alternative
mechanisms, such as arbitration, mediation, and small claims courts, were more expe-
dient than either judicial or formal administrative proceedings. Id. at 572.
75. See Chief Judge Urges Greater Use of Arbitration, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1985,
at A21, col. 1.
76. Dispute Resolution, supra note 74, at 907-08.
77. Chief Justice Warren Burger stressed this in his keynote address to the Pound
Conference by stating that "[t]here are [those], however, with a passion for reform,
which can be a valuable asset, but like all passions it needs to be regulated and chan-
neled if we are to avoid hasty and ill-considered change." Burger, Agenda for 2000
A.D. - A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 89 (1976). The Chief Justice
also stated that "[e]fficiency - like the trial itself - is not an end in itself. It has as
VOL. 55:482
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  494 1986-1987
Civil Rights
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
As the movement towards ADR has expanded in the private
sector, many have criticized federal, state, and local government
agencies as being overly laden with highly bureaucratized and
time-consuming procedures,78 and they have encouraged attempts
at reform and experiments using alternative procedures.7 9 The
Ford Foundation, for example, has funded experiments in media-
tion of environmental disputes.8 0 Congress has included provi-
sions for mandatory informal dispute settlement mechanisms in a
number of recent enactments.81 The agencies themselves, without
congressional compulsion, have perceived the need to reduce
backlogs, save resources, and avoid litigation 82 through resort to
less formal procedures. 83
its objective the very purpose of the whole system - to do justice. Inefficiency drains
the value of even a just result either by delay or excessive cost, or both." Id. at 93.
Other participants in the Pound Conference echoed these concerns. Professor
Frank Sander suggested that an issue that complicated dispute resolution among indi-
viduals and organizations was "how to find a way to equalize the vast disparity in
expertise and power between the individual and the organization, so that any dispute
resolution mechanism that is established will have the confidence and the trust of the
affected individuals." F. SANDER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT ON THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DISPUTES RESOLUTION, MAY 1977 at 17 (1978).
Responding to these concerns, Congress passed the Dispute Resolution Act of 1980,
28 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-10 (1982), to provide financial incentives to the states and the pri-
vate sector to explore innovative approaches to dispute resolution. Congress, how-
ever, has never funded this statute and therefore its passage ultimately was an empty
gesture. See J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 136-37 (1983).
78. See, e.g., Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History,
Needs and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1983-1984)
(stating that agencies have become slow, bureaucratized, and part of the problem that
they were designed to eliminate); Fuerst & Petty, Agencies Can Drown in Due Pro-
cess, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1985, at 25, col. 2 (positing that the due process revolution
has hurt those it was designed to help).
79. See Singer, supra note 74, at 571; see also Harter, supra note 78, at 1403; Local
Conciliation Plans Praised in Study by U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986, at A17, col. 5.
80. See, e.g., A. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION (1983).
81. For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires the FTC to promul-
gate rules establishing procedures for informal dispute settlement, which must be ex-
hausted prior to any litigation under the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1982). Other such
statutes are the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(1)(D) (1982) (arbitration), the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982) (arbitration), and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9612
(1982) (claim settlement procedures). See P. HARTER, POINTS ON A CONTINUUM: DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 31 (1986) (report
to the Administrative Conference of the United States).
82. Professor Stewart claims that regulatory disputes settle less frequently once
in litigation because of factors such as the complexity of the matters involved, the
amount in controversy, and the general unpredictability of the outcome. Thus, he
perceives the need for alternative solutions as acute. Stewart, The Limits of Adminis-
trative Law, in THE COURTS: SEPARATION OF POWERS 82 (B. Goulet ed. 1983).
83. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.601-.604 (1986) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion rules encouraging offers of settlement). The Supreme Court has held that the
agencies, and not the reviewing courts, are to determine what procedures are appro-
priate for what purposes, subject to the limited constraints of explicit congressional
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2. The Reagan Administration's Commitment to
Nonconfrontation
The use of less formal dispute resolution mechanisms has re-
ceived substantial impetus from the current administration.8 4
Along with improving the efficiency and reducing the expense of
government, the Reagan Administration professes commitment to
a nonconfrontational approach to regulation and dispute resolu-
tion. 5 Whether this takes the form of negotiated agency rulemak-
ing8 6 or informally resolved discrimination complaints,8 7 the
proffered rationale is that less confrontation will mean an amelio-
ration of the so-called heavy hand of government and greater ac-
ceptance by the electorate of ultimate results.8
3. Critical Concerns
Not surprisingly, the movement towards greater and more ex-
tensive use of ADR procedures has not gone uncriticized. Criti-
cism ranges from Professor Owen Fiss's virtually unqualified
dictates and due process. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-24, 542-45 (1978).
For a description of a number of informal approaches used at the federal level, see
Camper, Quiet Victories on the Mediation Front, 15 PERSP.: CIV. RTS. Q. 36 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Molotsky, It Sometimes Seems Like the Federal Tirade Commission,
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1984, § 4, at E5, col. 1. According to Molotsky:
Mr. Miller [then-Chairman of the F.T.C.] said the F.T.C. is doing a better
job because it is avoiding unnecessary litigation. "You spread your re-
sources farther by negotiating," he said. "Not everything has to go to
court." The problem now, Mr. Pertschuk [former Chairman of the F.T.C.]
said, is that too little goes to court. With conservatives in ascendance, he
said, "We have become a debating society instead of a law enforcement
agency."
Id.
85. See Smith, supra note 73, at 9. The former United States Attorney General
perceives litigation as causing unnecessary antagonism between government and pri-
vate parties, resulting in a public view of "the government as an adversary, rather
than a servant of the public interest." Id. at 11. He concludes with a plea for the
development of incentives and procedures to encourage increased use of ADR
throughout the federal government. Id. at 21-23; see also Reich, Regulation by Con-
frontation or Negotiation?, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1981, at 82 (suggesting that
business and government should limit the role of intermediaries in the regulatory
process); Perl, Corporate Experience Can Be Hazardous to Your Health, Wash. Post,
Sept. 8, 1986, at 33, col. 1 (national weekly ed.) (noting OSHA director's support to the
Reagan Administration's commitment to nonconfrontational approaches).
In spite of its encouragement of informal dispute resolution, the Reagan Adminis-
tration has nonetheless issued guidelines for executive departments and agencies that
restrict their discretion to enter into settlement agreements or consent decrees, par-
ticularly when the government is a defendant. See Department of Justice Guidelines,
54 U.S.L.W. 2492 (Apr. 1, 1986).
86. See Susskind & McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemak-
ing, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985).
87. See, e.g., 1981 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. ANN. REP. 77 (stating that "in accordance
with administration objectives" voluntary compliance was achieved in 98% of the vio-
lations found).
88. See Smith, supra note 73, at 10-11. But see Edwards, Alternative Dispute Res-
olution: Panacea orAnathema, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 668-69 (1986) ("It has also been
suggested that some of those people who promote ADR as a means to serve the poor
and oppressed in society are in fact principally motivated by a desire to limit the work
of the courts in areas affecting minority interests, civil rights, and civil liberties.").
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disapproval of alternatives to litigation 9 to the more cautious con-
cerns of those who fear that such alternatives will be applied to
certain controversies and problems that require a judicial airing.90
89. Professor Fiss has stated:
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judg-
ment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate ba-
sis. It should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique for
streamlining dockets. Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bar-
gaining: Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone
without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent
judicial involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, jus-
tice may not be done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is capitulation to
the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor
praised.
Fiss, Against Settlemen 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). Fiss is especially concerned
with the inequality of bargaining power that frequently exists between parties to a
negotiation, where the financial resources of an institutional litigant far exceed those
of the putative plaintiff. As to the argument that inequality of resources affects the
outcome of litigated judgments as well, Fiss responds:
Of course, imbalances of power can distort judgment as well: Resources
influence the quality of presentation, which in turn has an important bear-
ing on who wins and the terms of victory. We count, however, on the guid-
ing presence of the judge, who can employ a number of measures to lessen
the impact of distributional inequalities. He can, for example, supplement
the parties' presentations by asking questions, calling his own witnesses,
and inviting other persons and institutions to participate as amici. These
measures are likely to make only a small contribution toward moderating
the influence of distributional inequalities, but should not be ignored for
that reason. Not even these small steps are possible with settlement.
There is, moreover, a critical difference between a process like settlement,
which is based on bargaining and accepts inequalities of wealth as an inte-
gral and legitimate component of the process, and a process like judgment,
which knowingly struggles against those inequalities. Judgment aspires to
an autonomy from distributional inequalities, and it gathers much of its
appeal from this aspiration.
Id. at 1077-78 (footnote omitted); see also Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1672
(1985) (quoting McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 n.33
(citing a discussion McThenia and Shaffer had with Professor Milner Ball)) (stating
that ADR is "just another assault upon the activist state, 'another form of the deregu-
lation movement, one that permits private actors with powerful economic interests to
pursue self-interest free of community norms' ").
Professor Anthony Amsterdam also has criticized the use of ADR:
[Professor Auerbach] notes what many of us think who have closely
watched the past decade's flowering of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms advocated for, but not by, the poor and underprivileged:
namely, that the fertilizers of this flowering have been a hostile backlash
against the preceding decade's judicial development of legal rights of the
disadvantaged and a desire to deal with court-congestion problems by
dumping poor folks' controversies back in the ghetto where they came
from.
A. Amsterdam, Remarks at the 44th Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit (May 21-
22, 1984), reprinted in 105 F.R.D. 280, 291 (1984) (referring to J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW? (1983)); see also Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice is
in the Halls, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
119, 159 (R. Abel ed. 1982); Sarat, Informalism, Delegalization, and the Future of the
American Legal Profession (Book Review), 35 STAN. L. REv. 1217, 1227 (1983) (re-
viewing R. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982)).
90. See, e.g., Howard, Five Men in a Bar: Judicial Review in a Democratic Soci-
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Additionally, when the government is a party, a special set of con-
cerns arises.91
Unfortunately, despite numerous experiments during the past
several years, a dearth of empirical evaluation exists on the appro-
priate procedures for resolving disputes, particularly with regard
to the use of alternative procedures by governmental agencies. 92
Even among the most staunch advocates of ADR techniques, there
is general agreement that some alternatives are more appropriate
than others for resolving particular types of disputes and that
more study is needed to make such determinations. 93 Even in the
absence of empirical studies, however, if we can identify our de-
sired goals, we can begin to evaluate the appropriateness of vari-
ous procedures in reaching those goals.
It is against this backdrop of reform and criticism that this Arti-
cle analyzes the increasing use of less formal procedures in federal
civil rights enforcement by OCR and by EEOC. As an OCR attor-
ney for many years, I observed the movement towards less formal
approaches with cautious optimism and qualified approval. While
the mission of the agency had always been one of achieving non-
litigated solutions to civil rights compliance problems by educa-
tional recipients of federal financial assistance,94 recent years have
witnessed a deformalization of already relatively informal
procedures. 95
ety, in THE COURTS: SEPARATION OF POWERS 11 (B. Goulet ed. 1983) (keynote address
to the 1983 Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy); Edwards, supra note
88, at 676; Dispute Resolution, supra note 74, at 908-09 (1979).
91. For example, in the area of environmental mediation, some critics have articu-
lated concerns that private agendas supplant the public interest. See, e.g., Schoenbrod,
Limits and Dangers of Environmental Mediation: A Review Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1453, 1466 (1983). In the civil rights area, others doubt whether there can be success-
ful mediation against a backdrop of weak enforcement. See Camper, supra note 83, at
39 (stating that the selective enforcement of civil rights laws by the Reagan Adminis-
tration "encourages skepticism about the value of mediation in such a hostile
climate").
92. See, e.g., NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 25; PRO-
JECT ON EQUAL EDUC. RIGHTS (PEER), NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND
& SRI INTERNATIONAL, THE SETTLEMENT SOLUTION: ASSESSING MEDIATION AS A
TOOL IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS 120 (1980) [hereinafter PEER STUDY]
("No agency we visited had attempted to make a rigorous comparison of the benefits
obtained on similar cases handled in different ways .... ); see also L. SINGER & R.
SCHECHTER, supra note 50, at 2-3 (studying the use of mediation by the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service and concluding that due to problems with available in-
formation, the results were inconclusive). Although the study raises questions
regarding inequality of bargaining power, see infra text accompanying notes 371-72,
the suitability of using mediation in cases raising problems of systemic discrimination,
see infra text accompanying notes 278 & 313, and whether justice, or achieving the
goals of the statute, is a goal of mediation, see infra text accompanying notes 354-92, it
does not attempt to answer them. Furthermore, the authors failed to explore the
quality of the settlements reached, as well as what likely resolutions would have oc-
curred had the responsible agency conducted an investigation and made findings of
violation.
93. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 78, at 1402.
94. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d) (1986).
95. See, e.g., 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 2; see also infra text accompanying
notes 124-38, 152-56.
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II. The Agencies
A. Agencies as ADR Devices
One may view the creation of administrative agencies for resolv-
ing disputes as a forerunner of the ADR movement. 96 Agencies
are, indeed, an alternative to the frequently slow, overburdened,
and nonexpert judicial system. Even the formal adjudicatory pro-
cedures provided by the Administrative Procedure Act 97 are some-
what less formal than those used in federal court. If agencies
themselves can be viewed as alternatives to traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms, then what are the implications of having
alternatives to the alternatives? Might dispute resolution become
so distanced from ultimate judicial authority that it will lack the
respect of the parties necessary for success?
Although formal adjudication at the agency level may be less
formal than traditional judicial process, for purposes of analyzing
the movement towards use of informal procedures in civil rights
enforcement, formal agency adjudication is not significantly dif-
ferent than litigation.98 But among the other procedural alterna-
tives, the range of formality or informality is substantial.99
Given the burgeoning of administrative agencies over the past
fifty years,100 the increasing formalization of agency adjudicatory
procedures, 01 and the magnitude of the workload of many agen-
cies, 10 2 the agencies themselves, frequently under congressional
mandate or encouragement, 0 3 searched for alternatives to the for-
mal administrative hearing process for resolution of controver-
sies.104 The original (and still extant) mandate of Title VI of the
1964 Act requires enforcement agencies, upon discovery of non-
compliance with the law, to attempt to achieve voluntary compli-
ance prior to proceeding, through formal procedures, to
96. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 78, at 1393-95; Smith, supra note 73, at 16.
97. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 & 557 (1982).
98. See infra text accompanying notes 186-205.
99. See Sarat, supra note 89, at 1221.
100. See, e.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 7-8, 29-30 (2d ed. 1985) (outlining the growth of government agencies in a vari-
ety of areas); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 8 (3d ed. 1972) (acknowledging
the rapid development of administrative agencies during the New Deal era).
101. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970) (outlining minimum
procedural requirements to be followed prior to termination of governmental bene-
fits); see also Fuerst & Petty, Agencies Can Drown in 'Due Process; N.Y. Times, June
29, 1985, at 25, col. 2 (arguing that the use of informal proceedings would increase
agencies' effectiveness without adversely affecting the disposition of a case).
102. See, e.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 100, at 1-2 (referring to the
increasing responsibilities of administrative agencies).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
104. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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termination of federal financial assistance. 105 Thus the most im-
portant civil rights law ever passed by Congress embraced infor-
mal resolution of discrimination problems.10 6 It is under this
mandate that OCR has been operating since its inception.
Similarly, EEOC, under its original mandate, had the power
only to investigate and attempt to conciliate compliance
problems.10 7 It not only lacks any formal administrative hearing
mechanism for enforcement, or authority to issue judicially en-
forceable cease and desist orders, 08 but until the amendments
made to the 1964 Act in 1972,109 it lacked the power to bring suit
itself."10 Thus, EEOC was conceived as an agency entrusted with a
mission to achieve, if possible, informal resolution of discrimina-
tion problems."'-
Nonetheless, the lack of formality built into these statutory
schemes by Congress does not necessarily mean that the more in-
formal the mechanisms that are used, the better. This Article will
explore what limitations on informality might be appropriate in
the context of federal civil rights enforcement by OCR and
EEOC.112
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
106. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 364 n.38 (1978) (Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2182.
108. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
110. See H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 107, at 17, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2182.
111. See, e.g., Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent
Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 901
& n.77 (stating that federal courts have been hospitable to informal resolution meas-
ures employed as a means of dealing with employment discrimination problems); see
also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206-07 (1979) (holding that Congress
did not intend Title VII to prohibit voluntary affirmative action efforts by private
business).
112. A number of other federal agencies also are charged with enforcing nondis-
crimination laws. These include the Departments of Justice, Health and Human
Services, Housing and Urban Development, and the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance within the Department of Labor. They face the same choices regarding proce-
dures to be employed as do OCR and EEOC. In fact, many, if not most, of the issues
involved are not only pertinent to civil rights enforcement, but might be addressed
just as well to the enforcement of consumer, environmental, or other rights, which
traditionally do not enjoy the economic leverage of the interests to which they are
opposed.
Furthermore, I do not wish to suggest that the issues in civil rights compliance and
procedures are necessarily different at the state and local level. To the contrary,
many of these innovative procedures were first developed at the local level. Media-
tion was first used by the New York City Commission on Human Rights in 1975 under
then-Commissioner Eleanor Holmes Norton, who moved on to EEOC in 1977, bring-
ing procedural innovations with her. PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 6-7.
Nonetheless, the examination of the various procedures of OCR and EEOC is par-
ticularly appropriate for a number of reasons. They are lead agencies in civil rights
enforcement within the federal government. EEOC has lead responsibility among all
federal agencies for achieving equal employment opportunity in both the public and
the private sectors. See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 1155, and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978), as modified and implemented by Exec.
Order No. 12,106, 3 C.F.R. 263 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982); Exec.
Order No. 12,144, 3 C.F.R. 404 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982); see also
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B. A Brief Description of OCR Complaint Processing
Procedures
Since 1977, OCR has operated under a court-ordered consent de-
cree that dictates the procedures it uses in the investigation and
resolution of complaints of discrimination, as well as the
timeframes allocated to each stage of the process.11 3 The agency
must acknowledge complaints within fifteen days of receipt, 1 4
and complete investigations of complaints within the following
ninety days." 5 If OCR finds discrimination, it must attempt to ob-
tain voluntary compliance from the recipient within another
ninety days." 6 If efforts to achieve voluntary compliance fail,
Exec. Order No. 12,067, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1972) (giv-
ing EEOC responsibility for eliminating duplication, conflict, and inconsistencies in
federal EEO programs and activities). Although the Justice Department now has co-
ordinating responsibility for Title VI, IX and Section 504, Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3
C.F.R. 298 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982), the Office for Civil Rights
for the Department of Education, and its predecessor of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, see H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 11, at 2392, historically
played the major role in developing regulations - both general and specific - and is
responsible for more enforcement activity under these statutes than any other federal
agency. See Block, Enforcement of Title VI Compliance Agreements by Third Party
Benefwiaries, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 n.10 (1983).
EEOC pioneered the use of a variety of informal mechanisms for resolving discrimi-
nation problems at the federal level. It implemented its rapid charge processing sys-
tem on a pilot basis shortly after Eleanor Holmes Norton became Chairperson in the
summer of 1977. 1977-1978 EEOC 12TH-13TH ANN. REP. 3. The program was imple-
mented nationwide in 1979. 1979 EEOC 14TH ANN. REP. 2.
An exploration of OCR procedures, some of which were adopted from EEOC, raises
questions about the borrowing of procedures by agencies with different problems and
different missions. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 30. The study cites Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) and Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461
F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) to support the proposition that unlike EEOC, OCR's ma-
jor mission is to end system-wide discrimination by recipients of federal funds, not to
adjudicate individual complaints. See infra text following note 276.
OCR began using mediation on an experimental basis in June 1978, six months after
the consent decree was signed in Adams v. Califano, see infra note 113 and accompa-
nying text; PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 41. It implemented early complaint reso-
lution nationwide in 1981. 1981-1982 OCR SEcOND ANN. REP. 16. At the time of
nationwide implementation, it no longer had the backlog of cases that OCR had when
it first began the experiment in response to the Adams consent decree, and as the
EEOC had throughout the period 1977-1979. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 7-8,
187.
113. Consent Decree, Adams v. Califano (D.D.C. 1977) (No. 3095-70) [hereinafter
Adams Order] (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review). Although the
Adams Order also addressed OCR's conduct of compliance reviews, see id. 11 18-24,
we are concerned here only with the investigation of complaints.
114. Id. 15(a). Upon receipt of a complaint, OCR must first determine whether it
has jurisdiction - whether the complaint has been timely filed, and whether it al-
leges facts which, if true, would constitute a violation of one of the statutes that OCR
enforces. This includes a determination of whether the program or activity in which
the alleged discrimination occurred is one that receives or benefits from federal finan-
cial assistance. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
115. Adams Order, supra note 113, 15(b)(1).
116. Id. at q 15(b)(2).
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OCR has thirty days within which to commence administrative
enforcement proceedings by issuing to the recipient a notice of op-
portunity for a hearing before an administrative law judge,117 or to
refer the case to DOJ to commence suit in federal district court.118
Traditionally, a letter of findings (LOF) marked the conclusion
of the investigation. 1 9 Were a recipient found not to have violated
any of the applicable civil rights statutes or regulations, the LOF
would so indicate. 20 Were discrimination found, however, the
LOF would explain the basis for the finding and invite the recipi-
ent to come into compliance voluntarily to avoid the ultimate
sanction, termination of federal financial assistance.' 21 Some-
times, the compliance required would be obvious;122 in other situa-
tions, OCR might encourage the recipient to choose among a
variety of alternative remedies, with the agency always offering
technical assistance. 23
In recent years, however, two new "official" alternatives have
joined the traditional procedures in OCR's arsenal. The first,
known as early complaint resolution (ECR), is OCR's own brand
of mediation. 124 It is a purely voluntary procedure, offered at the
discretion of the particular regional office, but subject to certain
limitations. 125 ECR enables the recipient and the complainant,
prior to any investigation, to attempt to resolve the dispute be-
tween them, 26 regardless of whether or not the recipient is in fact
out of compliance with its civil rights obligations 27 and regardless
of whether any agreement reached between the parties would ac-
tually remedy a civil rights violation if it were found to exist. 28
An equal opportunity specialist (EOS), whose primary responsibil-
ities involve complaint investigation, serves as a mediator between
the parties. 29 OCR will conduct an investigation only if efforts at
117. See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(c) (1986).
118. See Adams Order, supra note 113, 1 15(b)(2); see also 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)
(1986). Such a referral may be for purposes other than termination of federal finan-
cial assistance. See Block, supra note 112, at 9.
119. See Adams Order, supra note 113, 1 11; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL 53 (1980) [hereinafter OCR, 1980 IN-
VESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL].
120. See Adams Order, supra note 113, 1 11; OCR, 1980 INVESTIGATION PROCE-
DURES MANUAL supra note 119, at 53-54.
121. Adams Order, supra note 113, 11 11-12; OCR, 1980 INVESTIGATION PROCE-
DURES MANUAL, supra note 119, at 53-55.
122. For example, if OCR found female students had been excluded from a class in
auto mechanics because of their sex, the remedy would be to admit them into that
class or program. If a wheelchair-bound student could not enter a building because
the door was not wide enough, the logical remedy would be to widen the door.
123. See 1983 OCR THIRD ANN. REP. at v.
124. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCE-
DURES MANUAL 18 [hereinafter OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL].
125. For example, it is not to be used for class complaints. Id. app. J at 2.
126. Id. app. J at 1.
127. Id. app. J at 5.
128. Cf. id. app. J at 9.
129. Cf. id. app J at 9.
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mediation fail.130
The other alternative to traditional procedures is known either
as predetermination settlement procedures 31 or pre-LOF settle-
ment procedures. 132 It is afforded to recipients after completion of
the investigation, but before issuance of the LOF. 33
ECR was commenced, at least on a pilot basis, during the Carter
Administration, 3 4 primarily in an attempt to help resolve the sub-
stantial backlog of complaints required to be eliminated pursuant
to the Adams Order. 135 Pre-LOF negotiation procedures were in-
stituted under the Reagan Administration in an explicit effort to
take a less confrontational approach to resolving civil rights com-
pliance problems. 3 6
In addition to these acknowledged procedures, OCR will fre-
quently resolve a complaint during the pendency of an investiga-
tion, through what it deems an "administrative closure."' 3 7 This
may occur for a variety of reasons, including the complainant's
withdrawal of the complaint or the recipient's agreement to make
the requested changes.138
130. Id. app. J at 1. The specialist who served as mediator would not, however, be
assigned to the subsequent investigation. Id. app. J at 9.
131. See Office for Civil Rights Final Annual Operating Plan for Fiscal Year 1984,
48 Fed. Reg. 57,588, 57,590-91 (1983).
132. See Office for Civil Rights Final Annual Operating Plan for Fiscal Year 1985,
49 Fed. Reg. 48,599, 48,600 (1984).
133. See 1983 OCR THIRD ANN. REP. 20 ("The pre-LOF negotiation phase ends
when a remedial action plan is agreed upon and signed by OCR and the recipient,
when the determination is made that negotiations have failed, or when the 90-day
investigation period ends."). In fact, the likelihood of an investigation being com-
pleted so as to allow sufficient time within the 90 days to attempt pre-LOF negotiation
is slim at best. The original Adams Order, see supra note 113, did not contemplate this
pre-LOF procedure. Attempts to have the order vacated or amended to accommodate
the new procedure have proved unsuccessful. On March 10, 1983, Judge John H.
Pratt of the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the government's
attempt, in response to a contempt motion filed by the plaintiffs, to vacate or modify
the Adams timeframes in a manner that would have facilitated the use of these new
procedures. Adams v. Bell (D.D.C. 1983) (No. 3095-70). On review from Judge Pratt's
order, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, on September 14,
1984, vacated Judge Pratt's order and remanded for a determination of whether the
plaintiffs had standing and whether the district court had jurisdiction over the matter.
Women's Equity Action League v. Bell, 743 F.2d 42, 44 (1984). The government's mo-
tion to dismiss the Adams case in its entirety, filed July 1, 1985, is currently pending
before Judge Pratt. See Kurtz, Civil Rights Documents Backdated, Wash. Post, Mar.
30, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
134. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 41.
135. Id OCR has offered additional rationales for ECR including facilitation of
continuing relationships, expedited resolution of disputes with minimal cost, and
maintenance of control over the process. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES
MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 1, 16.
136. 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 28.
137. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 45.
138. Id at 48-49.
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C. A Brief Description of EEOC Complaint Processing
Procedures
EEOC's procedures are even more complicated than those of
OCR, and a full explanation of all the variations goes beyond the
purposes of this Article.139 The 1964 Act sets up the basic frame-
work.140 Upon receipt of a complaint (or charge) under its juris-
diction, EEOC conducts an investigation to determine whether
reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge is true. 41 If no
discrimination is found, the charge is dismissed.14 The charging
party will be issued a notice of right to sue, authorizing him to file
his own suit should he choose to reject the findings of the Com-
mission.143 No private lawsuit may be filed without this right to
sue notice.144 EEOC must issue such a letter if it makes a no-cause
finding or, upon request of the charging party, if it fails to bring
suit itself within 180 days of the filing of the charge. 45 If cause is
found, EEOC attempts to resolve the discriminatory practice "by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.' ' 4 6
The remedy sought through conciliation will be the same remedy
that would be sought upon successful prosecution of the charge in
court. 47 If conciliation is successful, the terms of the agreement
are written and signed by the EEOC representative as well as by
the parties.148
If EEOC is unable to resolve the complaint through such means,
it may commence a civil suit.149 In the alternative, it may issue a
139. For example, although most cases prior to 1984 were routed through EEOC's
rapid charge process, see infra text accompanying notes 152-55, cases might have been
referred for EEOC's early litigation identification (ELI) processing. This may occur
because the particular respondent has been the subject of many complaints, or per-
haps because the issues by their very nature tend to affect large numbers of people. A
case may proceed through the "systemic charge process" if the respondent employs
more than 500 employees. For a good description of these alternatives, see U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PROMISES AND PERCEPTIONS: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ELIMI-
NATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 19-25 (1981).
Under the current policy, EEOC thoroughly investigates more cases than previously
and processes fewer cases through the rapid charge process. See infra notes 157-59 and
accompanying text.
Another complication to understanding the EEOC scheme involves the relationship
of state and local employment discrimination laws to the Title VII enforcement
scheme. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (d) (1982); Catania, State Employment Discrimi-
nation Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access to Federal Courts,
32 AM. U.L. REV. 797 (1983). This, too, is beyond the scope of this Article.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982); see EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 607
(9th Cir. 1982).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
142. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b) (1986); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 321-337 (Feb.
1985).
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(3), (e)(1) (1986).
144. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972); Cox v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1969).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1986).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (1986).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (1986).
148. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1986).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27 (1986). If the respondent is
the government or a governmental agency, then EEOC refers the case to the Attorney
General to commence suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.29 (1986).
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notice of right to sue to the charging party, authorizing that per-
son to commence an individual suit under Title VII.150 EEOC has
no authority or mechanism for formal administrative
adjudication.151
In 1979, in order to address its staggering backlog of unresolved
complaints,152 EEOC instituted what it called its "rapid charge
processing system."' 53 Modified mediation is the basic approach to
the rapid charge process. Early in the process, the parties partici-
pate in a fact-finding conference designed to help the parties clar-
ify the issues and explore the potential for a negotiated
settlement. 54 If rapid charge does not result in a resolution that is
mutually acceptable to the parties, the case may be referred for
continuing investigation, if that is necessary to reach a determina-
tion on cause.'5 -
EEOC's regulations allow for a predetermination negotiated set-
tlement at any stage of the investigation:
Prior to the issuance of a determination as to reasonable
cause, the Commission may encourage the parties to settle the
charge on terms that are mutually agreeable.... When the
Commission agrees in any negotiated settlement not to process
that charge further, the Commission's agreement shall be in
consideration for the promises made by the other parties to the
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(1), (e) (1986). In Moore
v. Devine, 767 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985), the circuit court held that a district court was
neither required to enforce, nor to address, a prior EEOC finding of probable cause.
Id. at 1551.
151. At the time of the congressional debates that preceded the enactment of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the committee bill, H.R. 1746, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 31,981-85 (1971), provided the Commission with authority to
issue judicially enforceable cease and desist orders, a scheme similar to that under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2145. The mi-
nority view, which would give EEOC the power to go directly into court itself, see
generally id. at 118-27, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2167-
76, ultimately prevailed. However, the proceedings in court would then be de novo,
rather than merely a review under the more limited substantial evidence standard of
agency factual findings. Id. at 59, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2137, 2168.
152. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMiISSION HAS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION 9 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 GAO REPORT].
153. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The procedures are detailed in
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 521-533 (Oct. 1984). See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1986) (con-
cerning negotiated settlement procedures).
154. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(c) (1986); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 529 (Oct. 1984).
155. Before the recent shift in policy, see infra notes 157-59 and accompanying
text, the vast majority of cases were processed through rapid charge. See 1977-1978
EEOC 12TH-13TH ANN. REP. 17 ("Only cases which need further evidence and investi-
gation before cause or no cause is found are referred to the [continued investigations
and conciliations (CIC)] unit. A relatively small number, about 15 percent, of all cases
is designated for CIC handling.").
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The current EEOC Administration has implemented a some-
what different approach to case processing from that of its prede-
cessors, which the Commission describes as a change in
emphasis.1 5 7 Fewer cases than previously will be referred for
rapid charge processing,1 58 while more cases will be fully investi-
gated, with an eye towards possible litigation.1 59 Normally, EEOC
will emphasize prefinding negotiated settlements only in cases
processed through rapid charge; it will settle prefinding cases re-
ferred for extended investigation only in special circumstances.160
Furthermore, EEOC will consider for litigation any case finding
discrimination that it is unable to conciliate successfully. 161
D. Generalizations About Procedures Used by the Two Agencies
Preliminarily, a number of observations may be noted about the
similarities and differences in the procedures used by OCR and
EEOC. Both agencies have a wide range of informal procedures in
their arsenals, ranging from having the complainant or charging
party withdraw the complaint to institutionalized mediation, to ef-
forts at voluntary compliance after a finding of discrimination is
made. Furthermore, both agencies also have the ultimate threat
of formal enforcement available to them if attempts at voluntary
resolution should fail. The mandate that each should attempt to
resolve any compliance problems through voluntary means comes
from the enabling legislation of both agencies.
There are also important differences between the agencies. The
enabling statutes for the two agencies have somewhat different fo-
cuses, which may suggest something about the procedures to be
156. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20(a) (1986). The negotiated settlement may sometimes take
the form of an agreement by the charging party to withdraw the charges in exchange
for some promise by the respondent. Id. § 1601.20(b) (providing that a claimant may
withdraw pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1986) in a settlement between the parties).
157. See OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, EEOC, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COM-
MISSION'S NEW CHARGE PROCESSING APPROACH 2 (Apr. 16,1984) [hereinafter APRIL 16
POLICY STATEMENT]. For text of the policy, see infra note 361.
158. APRIL 16 POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 157, at 2.
159. Id. at 3; see also Address by Chairperson Clarence Thomas, EEO Law Semi-
nar, Pittsburgh, Pa. (May 2, 1985). Congressional hearings were held in response to
concern about the new policy and its relationship to the civil rights policies of the
Reagan Administration. See EEOC Hearings on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Enforcement Policies Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportu-
nities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 EEOC Hearings] (remarks of Rep. Gunderson) (stating that the
Commission's new policies met with opposition because of the administration's lack of
credibility regarding its commitment to civil rights enforcement); see also id. at 3-4
(remarks of Rep. Henry) (suggesting that given public concern about the Reagan Ad-
ministration's commitment to civil rights legislation, the new policy understandably
has met with considerable skepticism).
160. 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note 159, at 13 (EEOC, GUIDANCE ON MODIFICA-
TION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE PROCESS (Exhibit A to prepared statement of
EEOC Commissioner Fred W. Alvarez)).
161. EEOC, STATEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1 (Sept. 11, 1984). Chairperson
Clarence Thomas described this as a major departure from prior practice. Address by
Chairperson Clarence Thomas, supra note 159.
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utilized. The language and legislative history of Title VII suggest
that the primary focus of this legislation was to resolve disputes
between employers and employees arising from discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, and national origin.162 The Title VI
scheme, on the other hand, suggests that the primary focus was
not the resolution of disputes arising from prohibited discrimina-
tion, but rather the eradication of discrimination itself.163 For ex-
ample, the very nature of the investigative process removes
control from the complaining party and vests it in OCR, both in
terms of how the investigation is conducted and, if a violation is
subsequently found, how it is to be remedied. The statutes that
OCR enforces have recently been interpreted to allow the alleg-
edly aggrieved individual to file a private right of action based on
the prohibited discrimination,1 6 4 but the individual's ability to con-
trol the process is limited to such private rights of action. 65
Individual control is not lost through EEOC's procedures. At
each step of the process, the charging party helps to fashion an
appropriate remedy. This may be inherent in the distinction be-
tween "compliance... secured by voluntary means," the language
from Title VI, and "conciliation," the language in Title VII.166 In
addition, the requirement that a charging party exhaust adminis-
trative procedures prior to bringing litigation, in contrast to the
right of the individual aggrieved under Title VI to bypass the ad-
162. See infra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 261-68 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
165. An exception to this is OCR's early complaint resolution procedures. See
supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. The individual's inability to obtain indi-
vidual relief in the administrative process, or through formal proceedings conducted
by the government to terminate federal financial assistance, was a primary reason for
the Supreme Court's determination that private rights of action to enforce these non-
discrimination laws were in fact the intent of Congress. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703-08 (1978).
166. Note the following passage from EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038
(7th Cir. 1982):
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments indicates Congress' com-
mitment to the legal force of conciliation agreements. Senator Javits in-
troduced the amendment substituting the present language of section
706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976), which calls for a "conciliation
agreement" in place of the language of the 1964 Act referring to attempts
to "obtain voluntary compliance," Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 260 (July 2,
1964), § 706(e), with the following explanation:
One problem is that the words 'voluntary compliance' are not words
of art such as are used in this field. The words I have used in the amend-
ment are 'conciliation agreement.' These are words of art, and they also
are executive words, in the sense that an agreement has to be entered
into, signed, sealed, and delivered; whereas 'voluntary compliance' is a
kind of amorphous proposition which may consist of a combination of
acts, letters, telephone calls, and so forth. So, in the first place, the
amendment is desirable in terms of precision.
Id at 1042.
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ministrative process should he so choose, also suggests that the
former scheme focuses more on the individual complainant than
does the latter.6 7 Another example is the focus on the use of com-
pliance reviews under the Title VI scheme to uncover discrimina-
tion. No such provision for compliance reviews exists under Title
VII.168
III The Alternatives
In general there are any number of ways to describe the contin-
uum of alternatives from most to least formal. 69 The range of
possible procedures available to EEOC and OCR runs from the
most formal - litigation resulting in judgment in federal court, 170
167. This is not to undermine EEOC's legitimate role as a law enforcement agency;
nonetheless, the interests of the individual employee are emphasized in the Title VII
scheme. See 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note 159, at 25. Representative Martinez,
while questioning Commissioner Alvarez concerning EEOC's new policy to seek com-
plete relief in all cases in which cause is found, stated:
People are getting strung out and sometimes ending up with nothing
when they could end up with something if the wording wasn't so rigid....
One of the things that we have to understand is that, unlike a criminal
case, where a complaint has been lodged by an individual, then the ...
Justice Department ... is required by law to pursue whether that person
wants to withdraw that complaint or not.
That is not the case here, which is for the satisfaction of that person who
has been discriminated against for relief from that discrimination. It
should be up to the victim to say when enough litigation is enough, despite
how the EEOC feels about it.
Id.
168. EEOC does conduct compliance reviews under its other jurisdictional statutes,
the Equal Pay Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1620.19 (1986), and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, id. § 1626.15. See also 1981 EEOC 16TH ANN. REP. 3 (discussing the results
of EEOC's 1981 compliance review procedures under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act and the Equal Pay Act).
169. See, e.g., Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305,
338 (1971) (stating that the various processes that contribute to social ordering are
legislation, adjudication, administrative direction, mediation, contractual agreement,
and customary law); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 134 (1974) (noting adjudication -
connoting actual judgment, litigation, appended settlement systems, exit reme-
dies/self help, and inaction - "lumping it"); Susskind & Madigan, New Approaches to
Resolving Disputes in the Public Sector, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 179, 180 (1984) (describing
unassisted negotiation, facilitated policy dialogue, collaborative problem solving, pas-
sive or traditional mediation, active mediation or mediated negotiation, nonbinding
arbitration, binding arbitration, and adjudication); see also NATIONAL INST. FOR DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 5. Obviously, all of these characterizations have
intended application far broader than what I have undertaken to describe, that is,
they are descriptions of either all "social ordering" or all dispute resolution. The de-
scriptions are not limited to characterizations of relevant procedures in federal civil
rights enforcement.
170. It is an open question whether Title VII cases may be brought in state court.
See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479 n.20 (1982). Compare
Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that federal courts
have exclusive Title VII jurisdiction) with Greene v. County School Bd., 524 F. Supp.
43, 44-45 (E.D. Va. 1981) (holding that federal courts have concurrent Title VII juris-
diction). There is no indication in Title VI that federal court jurisdiction is exclusive,
see 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)(2) (1986), and state courts have from time to time assumed
jurisdiction over such cases. See, e.g., Rowe v. Pittsgrove Township, 153 N.J. Super.
274, 379 A.2d 497 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 172 N.J. Super. 209, 411 A.2d 720
(1980); McDonald v. Hogness, 92 Wash. 2d 431, 598 P.2d 707 (1979); cf. Board of Educ.
v. Ambach, 90 A.D.2d 227, 458 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1982), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 758, 457 N.E.2d 775,
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- to the least formal - mediation. 171
A. Formal Procedures
The formal procedures under our scheme are court litigation -
disputes that are resolved through consent decrees and those that
proceed to final judgment - and formal administrative
enforcement.
1. Litigation in Federal Court
The most formal of available procedures is litigation in federal
court. In OCR's enforcement scheme, litigation is used infre-
quently. 72 For example, during fiscal years 1981 and 1982, OCR
referred only two cases to DOJ for federal litigation.173 Those
were cases OCR was unable to resolve voluntarily and for which
they chose not to commence administrative proceedings; 74 this
does not reflect all the private litigation brought under the stat-
utes that OCR enforces. 75 Litigation is available under the Title
VI scheme not only to OCR (if it fails to resolve a matter volunta-
rily through less formal mechanisms and chooses to refer the mat-
469 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1984) (claiming jurisdiction under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973). Nonetheless, this Article is limited to a discussion of federal courts; I do
not suggest that federal litigation is more (or less) formal than state litigation.
171. From certain perspectives, mediation may not in fact be the least formal. Be-
cause both rapid charge and ECR are governed by fairly elaborate procedures, see
supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text, this may suggest they are in fact more
formal than is the informal resolution of a complaint during the pendency of an inves-
tigation, which frequently results in an agreement by the complainant to withdraw
her complaint in exchange for some change by the respondent. See supra note 138
and accompanying text.
172. See 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 21.
173. See 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 29-30. OCR referred only one case to
DOJ in calendar year 1980. 1980 OCR FIRST ANN. REP. 27. OCR referred seventeen
cases in fiscal year 1983, 1983 OCR THIRD ANN. REP. 32, and three cases in fiscal year
1984, 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 32.
174. See 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 21 ("Historically, very few investigations
result in termination of funds or referral to DOJ. Most cases are voluntarily settled
by negotiated compliance agreements. No recipient had funds terminated during FY
1984.").
175. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (establishing a
private right of action under Title IX); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463
U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (establishing a private cause of action under Title VI); Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 (1984) (establishing a private right of
action to redress employment discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973). A recent lower court decision held that Title IX affords no direct rem-
edy to victims of employment discrimination; the sole remedies available are those
under Title VII. Storey v. Board of Regents, 604 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (W.D. Wis. 1985);
cf. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984) (stating that plaintiff cannot circum-
vent limitations on remedies under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1461, by resort to Section 504); Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforce-
ment of Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5
REV. LITIGATION 219, 279 (1986) (concluding that complainants who file private causes
of action have little chance of obtaining relief).
1987] 509
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  509 1986-1987
ter to DOJ rather than to proceed to formal administrative
enforcement) but also to individuals who choose to pursue a pri-
vate right of action instead of the administrative process.176
Title VII requires an individual to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing suit, and to obtain a notice of right to sue
from EEOC in order to proceed. 177 If EEOC fails to resolve a mat-
ter through its informal mechanisms, having unsuccessfully at-
tempted conciliation, it can either issue a right to sue notice or
commence suit in federal court.178
The incidence of litigation brought by EEOC is far more sub-
stantial than that brought by DOJ on referral from OCR.179 Yet
here too, most actions have been brought by individuals. s0 One
significant difference between the two agencies is the exhaustion
176. Although the cases cited in supra note 175 suggest that there is no exhaustion
requirement before an individual can file suit under Title VI, Title IX, and Section
504, the lower courts have differed in their conclusions. Compare Smith v. United
States Postal Serv., 742 F.2d 257, 258 (6th Cir. 1984) (requiring exhaustion under Sec-
tion 504) and Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (ruling
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required) with Whitaker v. Board of
Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that exhaustion is not
necessarily a prerequisite to a private suit under Section 504).
177. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
178. Regardless of who brings suit or whether EEOC finds probable cause, the
court will hear the case de novo. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
44-45 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973).
179. In fiscal year (FY) 1980, EEOC filed 200 Title VII cases and a total of 326
under all three of its jurisdictional bases; in FY 1981, it filed 229 and 368; in FY 1982,
101 and 164; in FY 1983, 82 and 195; and in FY 1984, 130 and 310. OFFICE OF PUB.
AFFAIRS, EEOC, EEOC LITIGATION ACTIVITIES 1976-1984 (1984). Although these
numbers demonstrate the greater incidence of litigation by EEOC as compared to
OCR, the decrease in filings under the Reagan Administration has generated substan-
tial criticism. See, e.g., 1985 EEOCHearings, supra note 159, at 59 (statement of Nancy
Kreiter, Research Director, Women Employed Institute) ("This administration's lack
of commitment to strong enforcement can also be seen in its litigation record. In the
first half of fiscal year 1985, 109 cases were filed in court by the EEOC, 40.8 percent
fewer on an annual basis than in fiscal year 1981 when 368 cases were filed. This year,
[1985], only 91 cases were approved by the Commission for litigation, a decrease of 50
percent on an annual basis compared to fiscal year 1981 when 364 cases were ap-
proved."). Recently released statistics suggest, however, that filings have risen sub-
stantially. See Williams, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Harnessing
the Horses on Job Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, § 1, at 54, col. 3 (stating
that the agency filed 444 lawsuits in 1985 and 526 in 1986).
180. During the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1985, 8,082 employment dis-
crimination cases were filed in federal district courts nationwide. 1985 DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 140 (Table 19). Contrast this with the
310 cases filed by EEOC in fiscal year 1984. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, EEOC, supra
note 179. EEOC's relatively recent change in policy may have a significant impact on
the ratio of government to privately filed litigation. See supra note 161 and accompa-
nying text. The following excerpt from a letter written by Chairperson Clarence
Thomas to Representative Augustus Hawkins on April 23, 1985 is interesting in this
connection:
In the past, the victims of unlawful discrimination were largely ignored
by the EEOC. Even when the Commission found that discrimination had
occurred, only rarely did it commence litigation - individual or class ac-
tions - to secure relief for the victim(s). In the overwhelming majority of
cases, the Commission decided that the violation was not 'litigation-wor-
thy,' and the victim was left no better off than if the EEOC had never been
created. Last September, however, the Commission adopted a "Statement
of Enforcement Policy," which provides, in essence, that the Commission
considers all unlawful discrimination 'litigation-worthy,' and will bring in-
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requirement under Title VII, so that individual lawsuits are
brought after the less formal administrative processes have been
attempted and have failed to resolve the charge.
Before the 1972 amendments, EEOC lacked authority to bring
suits in its own name. EEOC's choices upon unsuccessful attempts
at conciliation were either to issue a notice of right to sue to the
charging party or to refer the case to DOJ. The 1972 changes were
intended to place the decisionmaking authority as to whether to
proceed to litigation within the hands of the agency with the ex-
pertise on employment discrimination.1
8 1
OCR is still plagued by lack of control as to which cases will
proceed to litigation. Numerous cases referred to DOJ in past
years have never been acted upon.18 2 Thus, one overriding prob-
lem with litigation by OCR is the lack of decisionmaking authority
as to whether litigation is to be pursued.
Litigation as a procedural category may be divided further.
There is litigation that results in judgment and litigation that re-
sults in negotiated settlement, which, in most civil rights litiga-
tion, takes the form of a consent decree, at least where prospective
relief is involved.18 3
If litigation is commenced by or on behalf of the agency, there is
substantial probability that the case will be resolved before judg-
ment. If the case is resolved between the parties without any judi-
cial imprimatur, then the negotiated solution is in most respects
no different than if the parties had reached such a resolution
before filing suit, except that additional time has passed and addi-
tional costs have been incurred. If, however, as is the more com-
mon case, the matter is settled pursuant to a consent decree signed
by the judge, then it will borrow some features from judgment and
dividual or class actions, as appropriate, to secure relief for each and every
victim of such discrimination.
Critics of the current administration, however, remain doubtful. See 1985 EEOC
Hearings, supra note 159, at 58-60 (statement of Nancy Kreiter).
181. This new authority does not apply, however, in the case of employers who are
governments, governmental agencies, or political subdivisions. As to those entities
EEOC still makes referrals to DOJ for violations of Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27
(1986). A 1981 report by the General Accounting Office on EEOC found that DOJ
routinely refused to file suit on such cases and recommended that Congress amend
Title VII to authorize EEOC to sue directly when DOJ fails to act within forty-five
days after referral. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
EEOC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 24 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 GAO REPORT].
182. See H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70, at 3. Of the 24 cases referred to DOJ by
OCR between 1981 and July 1985, the committee found that 16 remained idle, 5 were
returned to OCR, 1 was involved in a pending suit, and 2 were resolved by consent
decrees. I&!
183. See Schwarzschild, supra note 111, at 894-95.
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some from a negotiated settlement.18 4 It is beyond the scope of
this Article to examine thoroughly the comparative merits of a
formal judgment versus those of a negotiated consent decree. 185
2. Formal Administrative Proceedings
As stated earlier, EEOC has no formal administrative proce-
dures. Congress made a deliberate choice that enforcement
should be through the judicial rather than the formal administra-
tive process.18 6 OCR, on the other hand, has the choice of either
referring an unresolved compliance finding to DOJ to file suit, or
to commence administrative enforcement by issuing a notice of op-
portunity for hearing to the respondent. 8 7 As with litigation, very
few cases actually end up in administrative enforcement proceed-
ings.18 If OCR decides to proceed through administrative en-
forcement, the matter might also be resolved between the agency
and the respondent prior to a recommended decision by the ad-
ministrative law judge, or conceivably at any other stage of the
process. However, any resolution would have to remedy the dis-
crimination that was found and bring the respondent into compli-
184. See Local No. 93 of the Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.
Ct. 3063, 3074 (1986).
185. Although most filed cases do not go all the way to judgment, the filing of a
lawsuit frequently may be necessary to facilitate the use of other dispute resolution
mechanisms. See NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 11; see
also Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in
Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Inter-
ests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163.
186. See supra note 151.
187. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.8(a), (c), 100.9(a) (1986). The House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations has recommended that OCR develop guidelines for deciding which
enforcement procedure is appropriate for particular cases. H.R. REP. No. 458, supra
note 70, at 32-33. "Referring matters to DOJ that [it] does not consider worthy of
enforcement is a pointless and inefficient exercise." Id. at 33.
188. Between 1971 and 1980, OCR commenced a total of approximately 57 adminis-
trative enforcement actions; only one resulted in fund termination. 1980 OCR FIRST
ANN. REP. 27. In 1980 it commenced one such action, which was subsequently settled.
In fiscal years 1981 and 1982, OCR commenced administrative enforcement proceed-
ings against four recipients; only one of those resulted in fund termination. 1981-1982
OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 29-30. In fiscal year 1983, OCR commenced two administra-
tive enforcement actions. 1983 OCR THIRD ANN. REP. 32. In fiscal year 1984, OCR
commenced administrative proceedings against 21 recipients; there were no fund ter-
minations. 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 21, 32.
The House Committee on Government Operations made the following
observations:
The two methods of enforcement are rarely used by the OCR. From 1981
to July 1985, the OCR found 2,000 violations of law, but issued only 27
notices of opportunity for hearing, and referred just 24 additional cases to
DOJ. A large majority of violations are corrected voluntarily at one of
four stages of the investigative process.
H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70, at 3. Similarly, the House Report stated: "'After
the 1983 Adams order set deadlines for securing compliance in pending cases, the
OCR took 23 cases to administrative law judges and referred 18 cases to the Depart-
ment of Justice. That order generated more enforcement proceedings than had oc-
curred in all of the previous decades.'" Id. at 7 (quoting Investigation of Civil Rights
Enforcement by the Department of Education: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985) (statement
of Julius Chambers, Director, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund)).
VOL. 55:482
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  512 1986-1987
Civil Rights
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
ance with Title VI.189
The procedural safeguards of the OCR administrative hearings
are basically the same as those provided for formal adjudication
under the Administrative Procedure Act.190 They provide for no-
tice,191 the presentation of both evidence and argument, 92 cross-
examination, 93 an impartial decisionmaker, 9 4 and a decision with
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 95 An administrative law
judge presides over the hearing 96 and renders an advisory opin-
ion,197 which becomes final if it is not appealed by either the gov-
ernment or the respondent. 98
The parties at the hearing are the government and the recipi-
ent(s) of federal assistance; 99 complainants have no right to par-
ticipate as litigators in these proceedings. 20 0 Either party may file
exceptions to all or part of the administrative law judge's decision,
in which case the reviewing authority201 will review the adminis-
trative law judge's decision and issue its own decision there-
after.20 2  The Secretary of Education provides another
administrative level of appeal beyond the reviewing authority.203
After the final decision of the Secretary, judicial review is avail-
able.20 4 As with virtually all review of formal administrative ac-
tion, the court's role on review is limited to ascertaining whether
substantial evidence supported the Secretary's decision, or
189. Nevertheless, OCR may not always fulfill its legal obligation to correct any
violations of law it finds. See H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70, at 11-18, 33. The
Report stated:
Thirteen of the 27 administrative enforcement cases begun between Janu-
ary 1, 1981, and mid-1985 were settled and closed. In most of the cases -
22 of 27 - enforcement started in response to an Adams court order. The
subcommittee's examination of the settlements found that many of them
did not adequately address the issues raised by OCR's investigations.
Id at 13. The Committee recommended that "OCR should develop guidelines which
require that violations of law be corrected before any settlements are accepted." Id. at
33.
190. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 100.9 (1986).
191. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.9(a), 101.51 (1986).
192. Id §§ 101.72-.78.
193. Id. § 101.79.
194. See id § 101.61.
195. Id- §§ 101.102, .104.
196. Id- § 101.61.
197. Id- § 101.102.
198. Id- § 101.104(a).
199. Id. § 101.21.
200. Id. § 101.23.
201. Id. § 101.103 (" '[R]eviewing authority' means the Secretary, or any person or
persons (including a board or other body specially created for that purpose and also
including the responsible Department official) acting pursuant to authority delegated
by the Secretary to carry out responsibilities under § 100.10(a)-(d).").
202. Id- §§ 101.103, .104.
203. Id. § 101.106.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 100.11 (1986).
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whether the decision was in some way inconsistent with law.205
B. Informal Procedures
1. Mediation
Mediation is the first stage in attempted resolution of a com-
plaint or charge; it may or may not be the most informal.20 6 The
theory of mediation is that the agency will explore with the par-
ties any basis for a resolution with which both parties can live,
irrespective of whether the agency would subsequently make a
finding of discrimination or, if the agency did find discrimination,
what the remedy for that violation would be.20 7 Each side gives up
something to receive something. 20 8 The complainant relinquishes
the right to pursue claims against the institution; the institution
agrees to some change or restitution. The enforcement agency
agrees not to pursue the complaint or charge further.20 9
The mediation practices of OCR and EEOC differ markedly.
The difference can be understood as two points along the contin-
uum between passive and active mediation.2 10 OCR's process is al-
most completely passive. The goal of early complaint resolution
(ECR) is to facilitate an agreement between the two parties to re-
solve the dispute between them.21 ' ECR is completely separate
from the investigative process;2' 2 if ECR is unsuccessful, the case
will be reassigned to a different equal opportunity specialist (EOS)
to proceed with the formal investigation. 2 3 Matters discussed at
ECR sessions remain confidential and do not become part of the
investigative file.21 4 If ECR is successful, OCR requires the com-
205. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (Administrative Procedure Act).
206. See supra note 170.
207. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at
1; EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 547, 553 (Mar. 1987).
208. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 4.
209. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at
7-8; EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 547, 553 (Mar. 1987).
210. See Susskind & Madigan, supra note 169, at 182. The authors describe the
distinction as follows:
Traditional (or passive) mediation is much like collaborative problem
solving;, both processes try to generate solutions (not just statements of
concern) and rely heavily on the assistance of a "facilitator" or "media-
tor." Passive mediation is, however, quite different from active media-
tion. In the former, the mediator is only concerned with process issues,
working hard to ensure that the process is fair and unbiased in the eyes of
the parties at the table. The active mediator, in contrast, is concerned with
the process and the quality of the outcome. The active mediator works
hard to ensure that the process is fair, unbiased and open to all parties
affected by the outcome, whether or not they sit at the negotiating table.
In addition, the active mediator seeks to ensure that the outcome is (1)
viewed as fair by the community-at-large, (2) reached in as efficient a man-
ner as possible, and (3) remains stable after the parties leave the bargain-
ing table.
Id. (citations omitted).
211. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 1.
212. Id. at 5 (stating that the mediator is not to conduct fact-finding or make efforts
to determine the merits of the complaint).
213. Id. at 9.
214. Id. at 7.
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plainant to withdraw the complaint.215 OCR will neither endorse
the terms of the agreement nor be a signatory to it.216 OCR will,
however, encourage (but not require) the parties to put the agree-
ment in writing.217
EEOC's rapid charge process, on the other hand, is integrated
into the investigative process. It commences with a fact-finding
conference,218 one purpose of which is to allow the parties to de-
velop an appreciation of each other's positions, "which in turn pro-
vides a realistic atmosphere conducive to serious settlement
discussions."219 To facilitate this process, the EOS who presides
over the fact-finding conference will attempt to resolve disputed
factual issues.220 If attempts at settlement are unsuccessful at this
juncture, "the facts developed at the conference may be sufficient
to allow an early decision that the case does not have merit or that
reasonable cause should be found. '221 If the information gathered
up to that point is insufficient to make a determination, then the
same EOS who conducted the fact-finding conference is to obtain
whatever additional information is required to make a finding of
cause or no cause.222 If a negotiated resolution is reached, the spe-
cialist will require the parties to put the terms in writing, and usu-
ally the agreement will be signed by a representative of the
Commission as well as by the parties.2 23
One question that arises in comparing OCR's passive approach
to mediation with EEOC's relatively more active approach2 24 is
whether one should prefer the agency to know more about the
case before it encourages a negotiated settlement, or, instead, to
know as little as possible. The less the investigator knows of the
merits, perhaps the greater her ability to explore impartially a
compromise with which both parties can live; otherwise, she might
be influenced by whether the merits of the case should dictate a
result more favorable to one party than another. Need we be any
more concerned about the amount of discretion vested in the in-
vestigator in one procedure as opposed to the other?
215. I& at 8.
216. 1i at 9.
217. Id. at 8.
218. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 529 (Oct. 1984).
219. 1977-1978 EEOC 12TH-13TH ANN. REP. 17.
220. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 531 (Sept. 1984).
221. 1977-1978 EEOC 12TH-13TH ANN. REP. 17; EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 532
(Sept. 1984).
222. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 532 (Sept. 1984).
223. See id. f 1262 (Mar. 1979). EEOC will not be a party to an agreement that
contains any unlawful provisions or that appears to approve of an employment prac-
tice EEOC has not investigated. Id. f 548 (Mar. 1987).
224. But see APRIL 16 POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 157, at 2 ("The Commission's
role in the process is primarily that of a facilitator.").
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2. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance Before Findings
OCR does not promote publicly a policy of encouraging negoti-
ated resolutions during the pendency of the investigation.225
Nonetheless, many occur. If, during the investigation, a recipient
agrees to some change that satisfies the complainant and meets
"minimal OCR compliance standards," the complaint may be
closed as a predetermination settlement.226 The change may have
been a spontaneous gesture by the recipient or may have been sug-
gested by the OCR investigator. It is difficult to know whether
investigators encourage complainants to accept what the recipient
is offering, perhaps suggesting either that they would do no better
should OCR ultimately find a violation, or that the information at
that time suggests a likelihood of OCR's finding no violation.227
EEOC may continue its attempts to negotiate a settlement
throughout the investigatory process.228 It will encourage the par-
ties to settle at any time before EEOC makes a compliance deter-
mination. 229 The nature of EEOC's negotiated settlement process
is basically the same as the process that occurs during the fact-
finding conference; in contrast, OCR's approach to negotiating a
resolution during its investigation differs markedly from its ECR
procedures.
3. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Informal
Findings
OCR's relatively recent innovation, first called "predetermina-
tion" and now called "pre-LOF," attempts to achieve settlement
before the issuance of formal findings.230 Its intended purpose was
to improve OCR's performance under its Adams timeframes 231
225. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 49.
Little or no mention is made of such a procedure in OCR's annual reports or annual
operating plans.
226. Id.
227. Under OCR policy and procedures, the investigators lack the discretion to
make these determinations on their own; attorneys, supervisors, the regional director,
and sometimes even headquarters, must be involved in the process. An investigator
may have an incentive to encourage complainants to withdraw because if they do, the
investigator need not prepare an investigative report, and the case can be closed ad-
ministratively. See id. at 45 (stating that predetermination closure can occur only
before submission of investigative report to regional director).
228. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 542 (Mar. 1987); see 1977-1978 EEOC 12TH-13TH
ANN. REP. 20.
229. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 545 (Mar. 1987). Revised policy, however,
would suggest less emphasis on settlement for cases assigned to extended investiga-
tion. See 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note 159, at 13.
230. See 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 28. According to OCR, the new proce-
dure was first used in 1981 to resolve intercollegiate athletics complaints. "After suc-
cessfully resolving compliance problems found during several investigations, the use
of the procedure was expanded in October 1981 to cover complaint investigations and
compliance reviews where the law and policy are clear on the issues involved." Id
231. It is less than clear how it improves performance under the Adams Order
timeframe requirements, given that OCR must issue an LOF no later than the 105th
day after receipt of the complaint. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18 for a
discussion of the Adams Order. See also OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MAN-
UAL, supra note 124, at 59.
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and "to minimize unnecessary confrontation between OCR and re-
cipients of Federal assistance. ' 232 OCR's procedures require that
before any negotiations to remedy discrimination occur, the re-
sponsible staff must conclude the investigation and prepare an in-
vestigative report demonstrating that there exists a legally
supportable finding of discrimination.233 However, the agency
only sends an LOF to the recipient officially apprising it of the
violation after it has offered the recipient the opportunity to dis-
cuss the violation with OCR officials, in an attempt to resolve the
violation without the stigma or publicity that frequently attends
the issuance of a violation LOF.234 If attempts to resolve the mat-
ter at this juncture succeed, OCR issues a "Compliance LOF. '2 35
This letter contains OCR's findings, the steps the recipient has
taken or has agreed to take to remedy any noncompliance, and
notification that a finding of compliance is contingent on the recip-
ient's completion of the remedial action.236 If attempts to resolve
the compliance problems at this stage are unsuccessful - or if
such attempts cannot be completed consistent with the Adams Or-
der timeframes - then OCR issues a violation LOF, as described
below. 237
EEOC has no similar procedure. Once EEOC has completed the
investigation, negotiated resolution is generally inappropriate.238
If a matter before EEOC proceeds to a cause determination,
EEOC's procedures require that the Commission attempt to re-
solve the charge through persuasion and conciliation, as discussed
below.2 39
4. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Formal Findings
If OCR determines that a recipient is out of compliance and pre-
LOF negotiations are unsuccessful or there is insufficient time
under the Adams Order timeframes to attempt pre-LOF negotia-
tions, then OCR will issue an LOF, citing the recipient for viola-
tions of applicable laws and regulations. This letter sets forth
general guidelines for developing a remedy and offers assistance
232. 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 28.
233. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 50-53. If
OCR determines that no discrimination has occurred, then it issues a no violation
LOF. See id. app. Q at 1.
234. 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 20.
235. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 58.
236. Id at 55-56. The requirements that the recipient must meet are not intended
to differ from those that would obtain once a violation LOF is issued. See supra text
accompanying note 121.
237. Id. at 59.
238. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 542 (Mar. 1987); 1985 EEOCHearings, supra note
159, at 13.
239. See infra text accompanying notes 244-47.
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to the recipient in its remedial efforts.240 The remedy sought by
OCR must be sufficient to cure the violation, although the recipi-
ent may be able to choose from among a range of alternatives that
will bring it into compliance. Note that OCR need not afford the
complaining party any say in what remedy it will accept.241
Although the complainant might pursue other legal remedies if
she is dissatisfied with the negotiated resolution, OCR will none-
theless close the case once the recipient has agreed to take steps to
meet all regulatory requirements. 242 Any remedy agreed upon
must be in writing, with appropriate specificity; it might consist of
an exchange of letters between OCR and the recipient.243
Once EEOC has made a determination of cause, it is statutorily
mandated to attempt to resolve the discriminatory violation
through "informal methods of conference, conciliation and per-
suasion."2 " EEOC, through its conciliation procedures, will en-
gage the participation of the charging party.245 In fact, there can
be no conciliation agreement unless the charging party con-
sents.246 If conciliation efforts are successful and EEOC obtains an
agreement that both resolves all compliance problems and is satis-
factory to the charging party, the agreement will be reduced to
writing and signed by the parties and by a designated EEOC
representative. 247
For both agencies, these attempts to resolve compliance
problems by informal means are mandated by statute.248 Recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance are on notice that failure to re-
solve such matters at this juncture will result in formal
enforcement proceedings. 249 EEOC has stated that it will consider
240. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 59, 64.
241. Id. at 66.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 65.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2O0Oe-5(b) (1982). Although EEOC is obliged to seek nothing less
than full compliance at this juncture, see supra text accompanying note 147, the Com-
mission currently recognizes a degree of flexibility. See 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra
note 159, at 23. Regarding the new policy of seeking "full relief," Commissioner
Frank Alvarez stated:
But we do recognize that we have a statutory and a practical obligation to
conciliate cases, and the remedies policy itself contains very flexible lan-
guage about conciliations, because we have an obligation to both from a
statutory standpoint and an operational standpoint.
So it is not an inflexible policy....
In settlements... they need to keep their eye on those issues, but en-
gage in reasonable compromises with the opposing party, between what
the most we could ask for and the least we could get. And that is what the
conciliation process is all about.
Id.
245. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) h 1263 (Mar. 1979), 1265-1266 (Nov. 1979).
246. Id. 1262 (Mar. 1979). However, in some circumstances EEOC will close a
case in which the respondent has offered what the agency deems to be a satisfactory
resolution of the violation, whether or not it is acceptable to the charging party. See
id. S 255 (Sept. 1984).
247. Id. T 1262.
248. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200Od-1, 2000e-5(b) (1982).
249. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 66.
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for litigation any case that is not resolved by conciliation.250 In
either case, a respondent might face a private right of action by
the complaining party.251
IV. The Values
The process of determining which procedure is preferable in a
given case or kind of case is complicated because different proce-
dures will be preferred for different reasons. There are a number
of competing values at play, each of which may be desirable in and
of itself, but any two or more of which may not be consistent with
one another.2 2 Thus, no one procedure is likely to serve all values
satisfactorily. It is essential, therefore, to identify the values in-
volved in choosing among procedural alternatives in federal civil
rights enforcement. This Article examines the different proce-
dures used by OCR and EEOC in terms of (1) justice and statutory
intent; (2) procedural fairness; (3) expedience, efficiency and cost-
effectiveness; and (4) finality and enforceability of the result.253
The preference for a particular procedure might well vary with
the value hierarchy of the affected party; the procedure that
might be preferred by a given complainant, might not be preferred
by the respondent, or the agency, or - to the extent it can be as-
certained - the public. This may suggest a need for some choice
among the available procedures.254
250. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
251. If conciliation is unsuccessful and EEOC decides not to proceed to litigation, it
will issue a notice of right to sue to the charging party, enabling that party to file her
own lawsuit. See supra text accompanying note 150.
252. See, e.g., NATIONAL INST. FOR DIsPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 30 (ob-
serving that the absence of a constraint to decide according to preexisting rules may
be advantageous when seeking resolution of a dispute at hand, but may operate as a
disadvantage when seeking to set a precedent for the resolution of large numbers of
claims).
253. Naturally there are other ways of characterizing the relevant values than the
categories used in this Article. See NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra
note 71, at 16-17 (establishing criteria for assessing resolution mechanisms: accessibil-
ity, protection of rights of disputants, efficiency, fairness, finality and enforceability of
decision, credibility, and expression of the community's norms of justice); Sander, Va-
rieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111, 113 n.7 (1976) (suggesting the follow-
ing criteria for determining the effectiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms: cost,
speed, accuracy, credibility, and workability); see also Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
837, 845-59 (1984) (stating that "valued features" for analyzing different models of
reconsideration or review include (1) litigants' autonomy, (2) litigants' persuasion op-
portunities, (3) decision makers' power, (4) diffusion and reallocation of that power,
(5) decisionmakers' impartiality and visibility, (6) rationality and norm enforcement,
(7) -ritual and formality, (8) finality, (9) revisionism, (10) economy, (11) consistency,
and (12) differentiation among disputes). The choice of values used in this Article,
while not likely to be controversial, is a subjective one.
254. See Singer, supra note 74, at 577.
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A. Justice and Statutory Intent
To determine whether an alternative to formal litigation or en-
forcement serves the cause of justice,255 we first must define "jus-
tice. ' 256 In the context of civil rights enforcement, justice might
be defined as the achievement of a discrimination-free society. To
a progressive, justice might require rectification of historical ineq-
uities in the treatment of minorities, women, the handicapped,
and the aged. A more conservative individual might assert that
justice cannot be defined in the abstract; one must look to the
goals of Title VI, Title VII, and other relevant civil rights statutes.
In other words, one might equate achieving justice with achieving
statutory goals.
From the latter perspective, strict compliance with the law will
best serve the interest of justice in most circumstances. But, even
those who generally equate justice with conformity to the letter of
the law will recognize certain circumstances in which strict com-
pliance may not ultimately achieve the desired goal. If there is
strong majoritarian resistance to full compliance with the law, a
compromise solution - even one falling short of full compliance
- might be preferable. For example, in a New York City transit
case concerning access to certain subway stations by the physically
disabled, the parties reached a settlement that provided that some,
but not all, subway stations would be made accessible. 25 7 Strict
compliance with state law would have required all new and mod-
ernized stations to allow full access by those in wheelchairs. 258
However, city officials deemed the accommodations for the handi-
capped to be needlessly expensive. 259 Had the case gone to judg-
ment, majoritarian pressure might have persuaded the legislature
to repeal this progressive legislation. For those seeking increased
access, the settlement providing for some accessibility might have
come as close as possible - given the political realities - to
achieving "justice."
On the other hand, if one's view of justice is less flexible, as is
the view of Professor Fiss, then any compromise is inherently less
just than attaining the ideal.260 In the subway case, if the ideal is
physical access to all subway stations - because that is what the
255. See Edwards, supra note 88, at 684 (stating that "the overarching goal of alter-
native dispute resolution is to provide equal justice to all").
256. Scholars and philosophers have devoted tomes to defining justice. Cf. Rosen-
feld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social
Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. REV. 769, 779-82 (1985) (discussing individualism, justice,
and contract as means to achieving justice). That is not my purpose here; rather it is
to explore the relationship between certain procedures and justice as described by
scholars such as John Rawls. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE 85-87 (1971).
257. See Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 117
Misc. 2d 343, 458 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Daley, Subway Access for the Disabled
Voted by M.TA., N.Y. Times, July 26, 1984, at B3, col. 6.
258. See 117 Misc. 2d at 353, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
259. See Daley, supra note 257, at B3, col. 6 (quoting the mayor and a member of
the transit authority); see also 117 Misc. 2d at 351, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 820 (discussing
dispute over cost of accommodations for the handicapped).
260. See Fiss, supra note 89, at 1085-86.
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statute provides - then justice is only achieved, in the view of
Professor Fiss, when all subway stations are accessible. Compro-
mise would not be just.261 If the legislature repealed the require-
ment for total accessibility, then, arguably, it would be just for
subway stations to be inaccessible. Thus, whether one defines jus-
tice in absolute as opposed to relative terms, objectively as op-
posed to subjectively, may influence one's preference for certain
procedures.
1. Statutory Intent
Regardless of one's position, an understanding of the legislative
intent behind Titles VI and VII is essential in evaluating how vari-
ous procedures serve the goal of justice. Although Congress en-
acted both Title VI and Title VII to eliminate discrimination, the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 suggests that the
acts had somewhat different focuses. Title VI focused primarily
on achieving system- or program-wide nondiscrimination, whereas
Title VII focused primarily on redressing individual violations.
a. Title VI
The legislative history and language of Title VI suggest a two-
fold purpose: taxpayers should not support institutions that dis-
criminate and individuals should be protected from discrimina-
tory conduct by recipients of federal assistance.26 2 However, the
rights established under Title VI are distinct from the remedies
enacted to redress those rights. Although Title VI establishes the
right to be free from racial discrimination in programs receiving
federal funds, its administrative machinery does not guarantee
any individual remedy for the infringement of that right. The
only remedy Title VI specifically provides is termination of fed-
eral financial assistance. Thus, in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago263 the Supreme Court's analysis of this dichotomy between
right and remedy led it to conclude that Congress intended to cre-
261. Cf. McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664-65 (1985)
("Fiss comes close to equating justice with law.... We do not believe that law and
justice are synonymous.... Justice is what we discover - you and I, Socrates said -
when we walk together, listen together, and even love one another, in our curiosity
about what justice is and where justice comes from.").
262. Senator John 0. Pastore indicated that "the purpose of title VI is to make sure
that funds of the United States are not used to support racial discrimination." 110
CONG. REc. 7062 (1964). Representative John V. Lindsay stated, however, that
"[e]verything in this proposed legislation has to do with providing a body of law which
will surround and protect the individual from some power complex. This bill is
designed for the protection of individuals." Id at 1540. See generally Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.36 (1979) (quoting comments of Pastore, Lind-
say, and others).
263. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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ate a private right of action.264
In fact, the threat of losing federal financial assistance provided
a deterrent to ensure that recipients of federal funds would com-
ply voluntarily in virtually all cases in which the agency found a
violation.265 Congressional debates on the 1964 Act contain nu-
merous assurances that termination of funds would not be too
drastic a remedy, because it would provide an incentive for volun-
tary compliance. 266 By providing that the agency must attempt to
achieve voluntary compliance, Congress intended to limit the pos-
sibility of administrative recklessness in terminating assistance.267
The thrust of Title VI was not to terminate funds to federally as-
sisted programs, but rather to end discrimination in those
programs.26
b. Title VII
The voluntary compliance component of Title VI was intended
to avoid what many in Congress perceived as the draconian rem-
edy of fund termination; in contrast, the voluntary compliance
component of Title VII was intended as a means of redressing a
violation of the aggrieved party's rights.269 By providing for Title
264. Id at 703; see also Whitaker v. Board of Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99, 109 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (holding that plaintiff may initiate an action under Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 without exhausting his administrative remedies because the process
did not provide an adequate remedy to vindicate his rights).
265. Note the recent testimony of Julius Chambers, Director of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund: "There has been bipartisan anathema to employing even the threat of
fund termination by initiating the administrative enforcement process when volun-
tary negotiations fail. But it is only the willingness to use the stick of Title VI that
makes the carrot - voluntary compliance - effective." H.R. REP. No. 458, supra
note 70, at 6-7 (quoting Investigation of Civil Rights Enforcement by the Department
of Education: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Op-
erations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1985)).
266. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (comment-
ing that the agency's attempts to ensure voluntary compliance are among the
"number of procedural restrictions" placed on its authority to cut off funds); id. at
1520 (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("The title requires that an effort be made to secure
compliance by voluntary means before any enforcement mechanism is invoked."); see
also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 25, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2487, 2512 ("Section 602 prescribes that assistance must not be
terminated unless efforts to end discrimination by voluntary means fail.").
267. See 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("the authority
to cut off funds is hedged with a number of procedural restrictions" including, among
others, administrative adoption of a nondiscrimination requirement, attempts to
achieve voluntary compliance, thirty-days notice, a hearing, and judicial review); see
also H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 266, pt. 2, at 25, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2512 (preaching that care must be taken by federal administrators
"to not punish the innocent along with the guilty").
268. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("[T]he pur-
pose of Title VI is not to cut off funds, but to end racial discrimination.... In general,
cutoff of funds would not be consistent with the objectives of the Federal assistance
statute if there are available other effective means of ending discrimination."); see
also id. at 1520 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 1538 (remarks of Rep. Rodino); id. at
7101 (remarks of Rep. Ribicoff); id. at 8920 (remarks of Rep. Williams). The oppo-
nents of Title VI never mentioned the voluntary compliance component, while the
proponents of it promoted its inclusion to counter the fear of possible arbitrary action
by the executive and concern that the act would be used as a punitive tool.
269. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 590 (1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (emphasiz-
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VII's conciliation process, Congress intended to resolve compli-
ance problems to the satisfaction of the charging party.270 EEOC
need not proceed to court enforcement whenever it finds discrimi-
nation; it has the option of giving the charging party a notice of
right to sue.2 7 1 Furthermore, the charging party retains a key role
in the process, since no conciliation agreement can be approved
without her consent. If she withholds consent to an agreement
that EEOC finds an adequate remedy, the agency will issue a no-
tice of right to sue and proceed no further.27 2
At the time of enactment, employment discrimination was gen-
erally viewed as a series of isolated events, due primarily to the ill
will of some identifiable individuals or organizations.2 7 3 Thus, a
scheme that stressed conciliation rather than compulsory
processes was thought to be a more appropriate resolution of the
problem.2 7 4 During the 1972 debates, however, many observers
perceived employment discrimination as a far more complex and
pervasive problem than had been thought previously, and believed
that the emphasis on voluntary compliance had proven detrimen-
tal to the success of the statute.27 5 Thus, the 1972 amendments
increased the weapons in EEOC's arsenal for eradicating employ-
ment discrimination. For the first time, EEOC was granted the
right to bring litigation in its own name to redress violations of the
Act that it was unable to conciliate successfully. Nonetheless, the
agency's focus has been on dispute resolution, rather than on sys-
temwide eradication of discrimination.2 7 6
ing the importance of the charging party's right to pursue a claim even if the Commis-
sion found no cause).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 245-46.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982); see also 118 CONG. REC. 1068 (1972) (statement
of Sen. Javits) (supporting an amendment that would give an aggrieved party, who
does not enter a conciliation agreement, the right to sue).
272. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(c) (1984) (preserving the right to proceed in court); id.
§ 1601.28 (setting forth the procedures for the issuance of a notice of right to sue).
273. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2143-44.
274. Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2137, 2143-44.
275. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 64, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2462, 2511-12 (on H.R. 92-318); see also Oversight Hear-
ings on the Federal Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity Laws: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Oversight Hearings]
(prepared statement of Prof. Herbert M. Hill) (citing structural defects in the law and
serious organizational problems in EEOC, resulting in haphazard enforcement efforts
in the early 1970s).
276. An examination of recent annual reports supports this observation of the
agency's emphasis. Note, for example, the Annual Report for fiscal year 1981:
Through the Commission's compliance and litigation activities, victims
of employment discrimination received nearly $112 million in monetary
benefits, the largest amount in the Commission's 16-year history.
Most of these settlements were achieved through the Commission's no-
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Thus, the emphasis of the legislative history of Title VI is quite
different than that behind Title VII - as to both the original act
and the 1972 amendments. In addition to an entirely different fo-
cus as to what remedy was available in both instances, the thrust
of the mandate is different. Under Title VI, the statute requires
- and the courts have echoed the requirement 277 - that the
agency proceed to terminate federal funding if compliance cannot
be achieved. Under Title VII, if EEOC attempts to resolve a
charge and is unsuccessful, it has the option of sending the charg-
ing party on her way with a notice of right to sue. Thus, although
one purpose of both statutes is to eliminate discrimination, the
emphasis under Title VI is to eradicate discrimination in programs
receiving federal assistance, whereas the emphasis under the Title
VII scheme is to resolve, or facilitate the resolution of, disputes
involving employment discrimination.
This raises the question whether informal dispute resolution in-
terferes with the eradication of discrimination. Does the focus on
resolving individual controversies pose the danger of clouding a
pervasive picture of discrimination? Potential claimants may lack
the incentive to discover others who might share their complaint.
In addition, due to the facility of informal procedures, agency offi-
cials might fail to uncover larger patterns of discrimination, the
eradication of which demands governmental intervention.278 If, as
fault settlement procedures and were voluntarily negotiated and agreed to
by charging parties and employers.
Over $16 million in backpay was obtained through litigated suits. Over
$3 million more accrued to individuals as a result of the Commission's
systemic program.
1981 EEOC 16TH ANN. REP. 3 (emphasis added).
The focus may be shifting. A 1984 EEOC press release stated: "The Commission is
confident that the new charge processing procedures better fulfill the agency's mis-
sion - the elimination of employment discrimination." APRIL 16 POLICY STATE-
MENT, supra note 157, at 3 (emphasis added). The Annual Report for fiscal years 1977
and 1978 stated:
In the past, EEOC's two basic case objectives - to resolve individual
charges of employment discrimination and to eliminate systemic discrimi-
nation against entire groups of employees in a company - have often been
merged and confused. The agency tried to accomplish both objectives at
once by combining its investigation of individual charges with its class ac-
tion activities, most often by expanding individual charges to encompass
group concerns without reference to any criteria to assure the effective-
ness of the individual charge as a class vehicle. This approach, unfortu-
nately hindered the achievement of both goals.
1977-1978 EEOC 12TH-13TH ANN. REP. 21.
This conclusion is supported by Professor Herbert M. Hill's comments in 1983: "In
my view, the 1972 amendments should have fundamentally transformed the Agency
from a conciliation agency into a litigation agency. But it did not do so because the
agency never accepted the perspective." 1983 Oversight Hearings, supra note 275, at
23.
277. See Adams Order, supra note 113.
278. See Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFOR-
MAL JUSTICE 267, 289 (R. Abel ed. 1982).
Although this guarantee of confidentiality is justified in the name of pro-
cess, its effect is to isolate grievants from one another and from the com-
munity, inhibiting the perception of common grievances. Without the
possibility of aggregation, of some greater impact, even the most commit-
ted grievant will burn out and "lump" the complaint.... [Those who hear
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suggested above, eradication of discrimination is necessary to the
attainment of justice,279 then concern with justice requires critical
exploration of the use of less formal procedures.
2. Norm Articulation
Another value tied to the notion of justice is the articulation of
norms.280 Courts, as law-making bodies, announce normative
principles to guide future behavior.28' Agencies, too, through
rulemaking and adjudication, make law and announce policy,
thereby articulating normative principles. 28 2 Because these stat-
utes are general in their terms, leaving vast room for confusion
and disagreement over their meaning, norm articulation that ex-
tends beyond the words of the statute is essential.283 Thus, an-
other measure of the justness of a procedure is whether and how
well it clarifies the statute's meaning and articulates standards for
future behavior.
3. Substantive Fairness
Still another dimension of justice is the notion of fairness.2 4 To
the extent our conception of justice derives from the substantive
intent of the statutes, fairness might be defined as a result consis-
tent with that intent. For example, it is not the purpose of Title
VI or Title VII that employers who have not engaged in discrimi-
nation should make reparations. To the extent that informal pro-
cedures might compel settlement of insubstantial charges, they
the complaints may lack an incentive to aggregate. Enormous caseloads
(and the pressure to increase them) generate pressure to move the cases
with the least possible effort.... Informal institutions often lack the
records that would permit the perception of common patterns. The use of
amateur or paraprofessional mediators, who handle disputes infrequently
and display high turnover, also hinders aggregation, for they, like the dis-
putants themselves, experience everyone as a first offender.
Id& (citations omitted).
279. See supra text following note 256.
280. See NATIONAL INST. FOR DIsPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 17.
281. See Edwards, supra note 88, at 679-80.
282. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 100, at 257-373.
283. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639
(1980) (interpreting the Secretary of Labor's promulgation of specific standards in
accordance with the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970).
284. In outlining the components of justice, this Article distinguishes substantive
fairness, that is, a fair or correct result, from procedural fairness. Obviously, the cen-
tral goal of fair procedures is to achieve a fair result, see Rosenfeld, supra note 256
(discussing Rawls' position that a procedure that achieves one's view of justice consti-
tutes "perfect procedural justice"). Judge Newman suggests, however, that our obses-
sion with procedures has hindered our ability to obtain fair results. Newman,
Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643 (1985).
Procedural fairness warrants separate examination. See infra text accompanying
notes 285-89.
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might be less "just" than formal, take-all-or-lose-all litigation or
administrative enforcement proceedings where such an "inno-
cent" party - at least in theory - would prevail.
Similarly, procedures that increase the likelihood of the charg-
ing party achieving what she is entitled to under the statute will
be more substantively fair than procedures less likely to do so.
B. Procedural Fairness
Certainly one justification for ADR is that litigation is too costly
for the segment of our population so often in need of the law's
protection. On the other hand, informal procedures are, as
Anatole France would say,28 5 available to rich and poor alike. Pro-
fessor Richard Abel suggests that this may serve to reinforce the
ways in which our system favors the advantaged over the disad-
vantaged.28 6 If procedures are used tactically, not to achieve a just
result, but rather to wear a party into acquiescence, 287 then they
cannot be viewed as fair.
The procedural fairness of a given dispute resolution mecha-
nism may be measured in various ways.28 8 One may be how the
particular procedure fits into the entire scheme of available proce-
dures. Perhaps the greater the choice that a complainant or re-
spondent has as to what procedure will be used, the greater the
degree of procedural fairness. From this perspective, mandatory
mediation may not be as fair as optional mediation.289 Further, in
judging procedural fairness, one cannot view a procedure in isola-
285. "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread." A. FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95
(W. Stephens trans. 1922).
286. Abel, supra note 278, at 297.
If informalism grants additional offensive weapons to those already en-
dowed with disproportionate legal resources while depriving the legally
disadvantaged of the protection of formal defenses, it also denies the latter
the sword of formality while assuring the former that they can continue to
invoke formality as a shield. For the disadvantaged, informal institutions
are a substitute not a supplement.
Id.
287. This may be true whether the worn down party is disadvantaged generally, or
disadvantaged in relation to the government. The Chairperson of EEOC has said:
In recent years, EEOC's enforcement methods have gone too far and have
become what conservative economist Thomas Sowell calls 'undue pro-
cess'.... The process itself becomes a punishment for employers. We'll
drag you through endless discovery and bankrupt you if you don't do what
we want. I can't go for that kind of blackmail. Even the most discrimina-
tory employer has rights. At the same time, when we find a problem, that
employer should pay whatever penalty is involved and not lollygag
around.
See Prentice-Hall Interview with EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas, New EEOC
Chairman Sees Agency Management Reforms as Way to Improve Basic Civil Rights
Enforcement (Equal Employment Compliance Report Manual Bulletin No. 5, 1982)
(copy on file at the George Washington Law Review).
288. See Rosenfeld, supra note 256, at 781-82.
289. The value of having one's day in court, whether constitutionally mandated or
not, is precious to our system of jurisprudence. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958) (stating that trial by jury serves an essential federal
constitutional function).
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tion, but one must take into account what other procedures will be
available should the particular procedure fail to resolve the mat-
ter satisfactorily. Procedural fairness also involves the protections
afforded the parties by each procedure. Are parties given suffi-
cient notice of their rights and responsibilities? Do they have a
reasoned basis on which to evaluate their options? If another en-
tity or person is rendering a decision, are they given reasons for
that decision?
C. Expedience, Efficiency, and Cost Effectiveness
One of the most commonly proffered justifications for ADR
procedures is that they are faster and less expensive than more
formal alternatives.290 This was a major objective of the rapid
charge procedures initiated in 1979 at EEOC, as well as the ECR
procedures used at OCR. Although the cost and time involved are
legitimate concerns, it does not necessarily follow that the least
expensive, most rapid procedure is to be preferred.291 At least two
questions arise when alternative procedures are introduced to
save time or money or both, or to improve the efficiency of a statu-
tory scheme, for example, by clearing up EEOC's backlog of
uninvestigated charges. Are these savings needed? Do the proce-
dures employed achieve the desired savings?
D. Finality and Enforceability of the Result
Closely related to considerations of efficiency and savings is the
question of whether the chosen procedure is likely to end the con-
troversy or dispute. If attempts at mediating a resolution to a
problem are seldom successful, and the investigative process is
delayed until after such attempts, then the use of such procedures
will increase the time, and likely the cost, involved in resolving
the discrimination complaints. Similarly, even if a mediated
agreement is reached, its value is diminished if it is subsequently
broken, requiring that proceedings be resumed or further avenues
of relief sought. A procedure may be preferred, therefore, if it is
likely to resolve a dispute once and for all.
Moreover, as to those agreements subsequently breached, the
enforcement mechanism available is relevant to measuring the
value of the procedure. If the complainant cannot easily hold the
respondent accountable for breach, or if a breach requires that the
investigatory process begin anew, then the procedure's unenforce-
ability undermines its value.
290. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 73, at 21; NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION, supra note 71, at 1.
291. See Edwards, supra note 88, at 669, 679.
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E. Other Goals
Other values to be considered include the value of a compro-
mise, as opposed to an "all or nothing" resolution,292 the value of
autonomy and individual control,293 the value of amicable solu-
tions, which might facilitate continuing relationships, 294 and the
value of nonconfrontation.295
V. The Cases
In assessing the desirability of the various available procedures,
it will be helpful to have in mind some concrete examples of typi-
cal complaints, or charges, that are filed with OCR and EEOC, as
well as some notion of the practical constraints that must be ap-
preciated and accommodated in the process.
A. Typical Complaints
An appreciation of the range of actionable individual complaints
of discrimination that might be filed with OCR and EEOC is use-
ful for assessing the appropriateness of available procedures. The
following is a limited but representative sample of various types of
cases.
1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Complaints of discrimination under Section 504 might include
(1) an allegation that a hospital worker was fired because he
tested positive for AIDS antibodies; (2) an allegation that a school
refused to admit a blind student because of his disability; or (3) an
allegation that a secondary school failed to make a building physi-
cally accessible to a wheelchair-bound student.
Although each of these three cases arises under Section 504,
each differs markedly. The AIDS example suggests the specter of
irrational fear with which society has not yet come to terms.296
The second example may be based on unwarranted perceptions
about the capability of blind students to participate meaningfully
in a regular academic environment. The third example may be
merely a product of oversight or lack of funding. The same proce-
dure may not be equally appropriate for each type of complaint.297
292. See infra notes 590-92 and accompanying text.
293. See infra text accompanying notes 593-600.
294. See infra text accompanying and following note 601.
295. See infra notes 602-05 and accompanying text.
296. This is manifest in DOJ's recent policy statement on AIDS. Memorandum
from Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Depart-
ment of Justice, to Ronald E. Robertson, General Counsel, Department of Health and
Human Services (June 1986) (suggesting that a person testing positive for AIDS an-
tibodies, without more, is not handicapped within the meaning of Section 504, and,
thus, would have no claim under that section for unlawful termination, even if he
were terminated on the basis of the employer's irrational fear of communicability of
the disease).
297. It is important to bear in mind that there may be alternative ways to resolve
each (assumingly legitimate) complaint. In the third example, it might be acceptable
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2. Title IX
The following complaints might arise under Title IX: (1) an al-
legation that the only woman faculty member of a department
was denied tenure;298 (2) an allegation that a female student was
offered a higher grade if she submitted to her professor's sexual
advances; or (3) an allegation that a female athlete was not al-
lowed to try out for the school's only volleyball team, which was
all male.
The first example presents a conflict: If the allegations are true,
they may reflect the kind of invidious discrimination that calls for
more formal resolution procedures. On the other hand, the par-
ties may wish to continue in an ongoing relationship, making a
more informal, amicable resolution a better alternative.
The second example may call for use of the least formal proce-
dures. In fact, it may be preferable for the college to handle the
matter without any governmental intervention, if possible.299 This
kind of overt problem - as opposed to some of the less obvious
but nonetheless real manifestations of sexual harassment - is un-
likely to be condoned by the educational institution any more than
by the federal agency; thus it may best be approached through in-
ternal grievance mechanisms at the college. On the other hand,
the college may be willing to ignore the problem for the sake of its
(and the teacher's) reputation, thereby necessitating the agency's
involvement.
The third example, if true, would violate Title IX regulations, 300
but the violation may well be unwitting. The school may not have
realized that the regulations required that the female student be
allowed to compete for the team. In such a case, it may be less
important that the resolution be formal. On the other hand, a for-
mal resolution might notify other recipients of their responsibili-
ties in this area and might encourage this school to have its lawyer
advise it of its legal responsibility under the regulations. There
to either install an elevator or rearrange classes so that all of the student's classes are
taught on a ground floor. In many cases, such as this one, there will be little contro-
versy over the facts; the only real issue is how might the school comply given its lim-
ited resources. The availability of alternative solutions may bear on which procedures
are preferable. Under either ECR procedures or in a private suit, the complaining
party would have a substantial say in choosing the remedy. Once the case is under
investigation by OCR, on the other hand, the complainant would have, at best, a con-
sultative role. Ultimately, if OCR finds a violation, the recipient would be able to
choose which measures to take, as long as such measures would resolve the violation.
298. Under current procedures, OCR might well refer such a complaint to EEOC
for investigation. See supra note 43.
299. See Bates Ponders Sexual Assaul4 N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1987, at A46, col. 5 (re-
porting that Bates College held a day-long seminar on sexual harassment after cam-
pus incident).
300. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a), (b) (1986).
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may be no incentive for self-enforcement if the agency exacts no
price for noncompliance.
The choice of procedure is also important from the recipient's
perspective, for example, if the regulations are in fact challengea-
ble as ultra vires the statute. If the price of compliance is minor,
there may be little incentive for a recipient to make an otherwise
appropriate challenge. Do we want the agency to be operating ul-
tra vires its authority? Perhaps the answer depends on how close
the call or how important the issue. For important matters, some
recipients will likely hold out and challenge the regulation or pol-
icy. Perhaps we should be less concerned about the agencies over-
reaching in relatively minor areas than about overburdening the
courts by requiring them to second guess such decisions.
3. Title VI
Title VI complaints might include (1) an allegation that a black
elementary school student was punished repeatedly for fighting
with white classmates while the white classmates, who started the
fights, were not punished or were merely reprimanded; (2) an al-
legation by a black high school student that his classmates called
him "nigger" and his teacher ignored the situation; or (3) an alle-
gation that a school placed a recent Hispanic immigrant in a lower
grade because of difficulty with English, without affording any
special remedial language assistance.
As the first two examples might suggest, it is difficult to identify
examples of individual Title VI complaints that would not have
systemic overtones.30' This is, perhaps, a function of the very na-
ture of racial discrimination. The question becomes whether it is
preferable to use formal procedures, thereby raising the specter of
invidious (frequently subconscious) prejudice, which results in
discriminatory treatment, or whether it is preferable to address
the problem through less confrontational approaches.
The problem is, perhaps, somewhat different in the third exam-
ple. When denial of remedial education results in discriminatory
treatment,30 2 the problem is generally less one of prejudice and
more one of ignorance or lack of resources, as in the example
above on the lack of wheelchair accessibility. A number of ap-
proaches might remedy the problem.303
4. Title VII
Typical Title VII cases might include (1) an allegation that an
employer threatened a female employee with dismissal if she re-
fused to submit to his sexual advances; (2) an allegation that an
301. See infra note 316.
302. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1973) (holding that the failure of the San
Francisco school system to provide English language instruction to students of Chi-
nese ancestry denied them equal educational opportunity, in violation of section 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
303. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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employer fired a black employee for racial reasons; or (3) an alle-
gation that an employer passed over a Hispanic woman for promo-
tion in favor of a less qualified white male.
On one hand, the ability of these individuals to continue in their
place of employment may be jeopardized by formal, confronta-
tional proceedings. On the other, a systemic problem, which may
exist in any of these examples, may require a public airing
through formal procedures.
B. Policy Clarification
Specific cases or complaints under any of these jurisdictional ba-
ses may raise questions of policy or interpretation not yet clarified
by the agency. For many years, OCR struggled over its Title IX
athletics policy. Did it violate Title IX for a university to pour
thousands of dollars into its intercollegiate football team, an in-
come-producing enterprise, while allocating substantially fewer
resources to its athletics programs for women? If a woman
wanted to play football, could the university both bar her from the
men's team and refuse to establish a football team for women?
What was required to assure equal educational opportunity to wo-
men in sports offerings?
While the agency pondered these important and difficult ques-
tions, would it have been preferable to have an informal resolu-
tion of the cases that had arisen, or was there a need for norm
articulation through more formal processes? 30 4 It would have
been far more expedient to resolve these matters before develop-
ing policy - it took OCR years to come up with its athletics policy
while hundreds of cases languished305 - but do we want to en-
courage settlements when there are no norms? Without norms,
there is an inherent likelihood of inconsistent results, creating
worrisome problems of fairness. How does the agency know
whether it is achieving nondiscrimination if it has not yet defined
what constitutes discrimination in this area? There is, of course,
always a possibility that informal agreements may ignore estab-
lished norms;306 however, that problem - assuming it is a prob-
lem - is more easily addressed than the problem of abuse of
discretion when the limits of discretion have not yet been
defined.307
304. Even the issuance of an LOF would require that a policy decision be made.
305. 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 35-36.
306. See, Edwards, supra note 88, at 676-79.
307. For example, OCR has a quality assurance program to monitor the appropri-
ateness of the basis on which a particular case is closed, one aspect of which is
whether any remedy agreed to conforms to the applicable law and policy. See 1985
Hearings on OCIA supra note 70, at 259-60. If policy has not yet been developed, it
would be impossible to assess appropriateness on this basis. The effectiveness of
1987]
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  531 1986-1987
C. Nonviolations - Absolute or Unprovable
One important category of complaints is those which, if the
agency were to make a finding, would result in a finding of nonvi-
olation. This may be divided into two subcategories: the absolute
nonviolation and the unprovable violation. Although one may
doubt whether agency personnel can accurately predict at the in-
take stage whether a given complaint, if investigated through to
finding, would fall within either of these subcategories,308 it is still
a reality that many complaints filed with EEOC and OCR are at
best unprovable as violations and, not infrequently, lack merit.30 9
For example, let us suppose that Cora College files a complaint
with OCR alleging that she was not admitted to Howe University
on account of her race. Let us suppose further that Ms. College is
black; that preliminary inquiry reveals that her grade point aver-
age (GPA) and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores are signifi-
cantly below the average scores of students admitted to Howe
University that year; that Howe University admits into the school
a significantly higher percentage of minorities than exist in the
applicable qualified applicant pool; and that most of the minority
students admitted have GPA and SAT scores substantially higher
than those of Ms. College.
Contrast this with a complaint by Sarah School against Stowe
University, again alleging denial of admission due to race. Sup-
pose Ms. School is also black, and preliminary inquiry reveals that
her GPA and SAT scores, while below the average for Stowe stu-
dents, exceed those of a number of minority and nonminority stu-
dents admitted to the school, and that the number of minorities
admitted to Stowe approximates their representation in the quali-
OCR's quality assurance program, however, has been called into question. See H.R.
REP. No. 458, supra note 70, at 18-22.
308. This assumes, of course, that the complaint states a violation on its face, a
prerequisite to agency jurisdiction under Title VI or Title VII.
309. The following table compares the number of violation LOFs with no-violation
LOFs issued in fiscal years 1980-1984:
Fiscal Year Violation LOFs No-Violation LOFs
1980 349 650
1981 538 1067
1982 338* 852
1983 527* 640
1984 380* 596
* Figures include violation, violation corrected, and violation not
corrected LOFs. See summary print-out data dated June 20, 1985
provided to author by OCR in response to a FOIA request dated
February 14, 1985 (copy on file with the George Washington Law
Review).
What are the implications of mediating or negotiating a settlement to a complaint
that would result in a finding of no violation (or no cause, to use EEOC terminology),
if the agency were to investigate the complaint to finding? Should a distinction be
made between the two subcategories described above? Is it possible that we would
value settlement in the subcategory of cases where there exists suspicion of unprov-
able but nonetheless actual discrimination? Should we ever condone settlement
when discrimination has not in fact occurred, assuming we can ever know with any
degree of certainty? Or, perhaps, does the fallacy of such an assumption render this
point moot?
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fied applicant pool (approximately fifteen percent). Let us sup-
pose further that Ms. School listed on her application to Stowe
that she is a member of a number of black service organizations,
had been the President of the Black Students organization in her
high school, and wrote her application essay on "The Responsibili-
ties of Black Americans to Third World Nations."
In the first case, it appears highly unlikely that Ms. College was
actually denied admission on account of her race, because the
known facts objectively suggest that the actual reason for denial
was that Ms. College did not measure up to the academic stan-
dards of Howe University.
In the latter case, however, we might have a strong suspicion
that racial discrimination was in fact a motivating factor in the
denial of Ms. School's application to Stowe, but in the absence of a
"smoking gun" - for example a statement by the admissions di-
rector that Sarah was not admitted for fear of racial agitation at
their conservative institution - it is highly unlikely, given the sta-
tistical profile of the school, that OCR could ever prove that such
discrimination occurred.310
An additional question, then, as we explore the alternative pro-
cedures and the values they promote or diminish, is whether we
would wish to see different procedures used to resolve these two
different complaints, or, in other words, whether our view of the
merits of a particular case should have any bearing on the proce-
dures used to resolve it.
D. Individual vs. Class Complaints
Another factor that may affect the choice of procedures is
whether complaints are individual or class. Class complaints
might be styled as such, or they might be individual complaints,
the details of which suggest a systemic problem. A complaint may
describe patterns and practices of discrimination resulting, for ex-
ample, in segregated schools, segregated classes within schools (by
race or by handicap), unequal athletic opportunities for men and
women, sex-segregated physical education classes, or, in the case
of employment, differential treatment of women or minorities in
310. The measure of proof referred to is a preponderance of the evidence standard,
the standard that would apply either in court proceedings or in formal administrative
proceedings. It is the standard that OCR requires, at least in theory, to conclude that
a finding is legally sufficient. Cf. 1985 Hearings on OCA supra note 70, at 240-66 (por-
tions of material submitted for the Record by Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Secretary
for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education). The PEER Study found that one
reason OCR equal opportunity specialists liked ECR was because of their frustration
with the formal investigative process and the difficulty they encountered in making
and supporting a finding of discrimination under the formal system. PEER STUDY,
supra note 92, at 69-70.
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salary, promotion, tenure, or job categorization. A class complaint
might suggest a problem that is both systemic and invidious, or
one that is systemic but innocent in nature. In the latter case, the
resolution is unlikely to meet substantial resistance once the en-
forcement agency clarifies the compliance problem. For example,
a rural school with separate classes for physically handicapped
students might not understand that federal law requires schools
receiving federal funding to provide education for handicapped
children in the least restrictive environment;311 upon clarification
of the federal requirements, the school might have no objection to
complying. Another noninvidious, systemic problem might exist
if failure to comply with federal law is due to inadequate funding
or human resources. 312
The question, then, is whether the nature of class complaints
suggests that certain procedures are more appropriate than others.
Should invidious, systemic problems be handled differently than
noninvidious, systemic problems? Should lack of funding cases,
which are generally a function of a legislature's resistance to in-
creased expenditures, receive more formal treatment than other
kinds of noninvidious problems?
Under OCR policy, ECR will not be used for class complaints;
those filed by one individual but implicating systemic allegations
are excluded as well.3 13 EEOC, on the other hand, encourages the
use of its rapid charge process for such complaints. 3 4 Both agen-
cies use different procedures to govern withdrawal of complaints,
depending on whether the complaints are individual or class.315
Virtually any of the class complaints described above might be
filed as an individual complaint; 316 yet it is important to consider
whether guidelines for informal resolution should be different if
only an individual complaint is involved. Should the agency pro-
ceed with an individual remedy if a class problem remains?
E. Retrospective and Prospective Remedies
Many cases require only retrospective remedies for proven vio-
lations, such as damages or the opportunity for a previously ex-
cluded student to try out for a team, either of which may be
implemented immediately. Other remedies, such as desegregation
of schools or classes, making structural changes to a building to
allow access by the physically handicapped, or increasing the
number of women and minorities in the workforce, must be im-
311. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (1986).
312. See, e.g., Yaris v. Special School Dist., 558 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(holding that inadequacy of funds does not relieve a state of its obligation to handi-
capped students).
313. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 2.
314. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 566 (Mar. 1979).
315. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 48-49;
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 341-345 (Sept. 1984).
316. Some individual complaints, such as an allegation that a student was being
educated in a segregated school, depend upon a class violation.
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plemented over time. There may be less concern about breach of
the negotiated agreement in the former case, where compliance
can be promptly verified, than there is in the latter, where ongo-
ing monitoring will be necessary. This may suggest that more for-
mal procedures are preferable when relief is prospective, to
facilitate enforcement upon breach. Whether or not this matters
may depend on the mechanisms in place for enforcement of
whatever form the disposition on the complaint or charge might
take.31 7
Both the type, nature, and specific problems raised by the cases
the agencies investigate add a separate dimension to an apprecia-
tion of the procedures used in their resolution. An understanding
of such cases is necessary for a thorough evaluation of the appro-
priateness of the available procedures in achieving the desired
values.
VI. Testing the Procedures Against the Values
Having identified the procedures available to EEOC and OCR to
resolve discrimination complaints, 318 as well as the values we seek
to achieve,319 this Article will examine the likely success of each
procedure in achieving the desired values. As the previous section
demonstrated, the choice of procedures or goals may vary depend-
ing on the nature of the case.3 20
A. Justice and Statutory Intent
1. Formal Procedures
a. Litigation
On one hand, litigation has been championed as the guardian of
the rights of the underprivileged and oppressed; on the other, it
has been criticized as the enemy of truth and justice. Dean Robert
B. McKay has described courts as "the social conscience in matters
317. In other words, this might not be an issue if we could convince the courts or
the legislatures that ECR and rapid charge agreements should be enforceable by the
agencies under their organic laws. See infra text accompanying notes 554-82.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 169-251.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 252-95.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 289-317. I undertake this analysis mindful
of the appropriate warning in Paths to Justice:
One must be wary of ascribing particular attributes to one or another
method of dispute resolution, however. Litigation is not always final,
although that is a commonly perceived benefit; mediation may not enable
parties to work together in the future, as is often suggested; arbitration
may not always be less expensive than pursuing a case in court.
NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 9; see also id at 30 ("[We
must avoid false comparison between the ideal functioning of one institution and the
actual functioning of another.").
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relating to public education (desegregation, discipline, finance, bi-
lingual instruction, and education of the handicapped), prisons,
mental institutions, environmental concerns, industrial safety,
legislative redistricting, and affirmative action .... -"321 At the 1976
Pound Conference, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham quoted the con-
ference's namesake by stating that "'in discouraging litigation we
encourage wrongdoing * * * of all people in the world we ought to
have been those most solicitous for the rights of the poor, no mat-
ter how petty the causes in which they are to be vindicated.' "322
Recognizing that at the time Roscoe Pound gave his famous ad-
dress there were no major governmental agencies, Judge Higgin-
botham emphasized that the massive expansion of government
created a new imperative for the courts to serve as the watchdogs
over the relationship between expanded government and its citi-
zenry.323 Discrimination against black people was a virtual insti-
tution at the time of Pound's address and for decades thereafter; it
remained in less obvious but no less invidious forms throughout
our nation at the time of Judge Higginbotham's remarks, 324 de-
manding judicial attention. As to this and other forms of discrimi-
nation, Judge Higginbotham criticized the proponents of ADR
mechanisms for failing to realize "that while there is an essential
place for nonjudicial forums in resolving disputes, the cutting edge
of the move to remedy the results of this dehumanization must
have a sharp judicial component."'32
One presumption behind such positions is that courts, especially
federal courts,326 as compared to other institutions, have particu-
lar expertise in and inclination toward protecting the rights of mi-
norities. Historically this has been true. Whether it remains true
today and for the future is less clear given recent judicial trends,
especially under the Supreme Court's lead.3 2 7
321. McKay, Civil Litigation and the Public Interest, 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 355, 369
(1983).
322. Higginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reformr, 70 F.R.D. 134,
135 (1976) (quoting R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 134 (1921)).
323. Id. at 139.
324. See id. at 140-46.
325. Id. at 146; see also Howard, supra note 90, at 11 (suggesting that cases involv-
ing "a fundamental individual right, or powerless or unpopular minorities" should be
resolved by courts); McKay, supra note 321, at 358 (presuming that courts are "guardi-
ans of a valued way of life, standing as buffers between free citizens and their
government").
326. The presumption that state courts do not guard civil rights and liberties as
well as do federal courts may not be as legitimate as it once was. See generally Perlin,
State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The
Last Frontier?, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1249 (1987).
327. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1852 (1986) (striking
down minority preferences in collective bargaining agreements regarding layoffs);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583 (1984) (striking down
court-ordered consent decree on minority preferences during layoffs); Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-74 (1984) (defining narrowly "program or activity" re-
ceiving federal financial assistance for purposes of Title IX coverage). But see
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1457 (1987) (holding that a county
agency can appropriately take into account sex as one factor in determining job pro-
motion); United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1067-70 (1987) (approving one-
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In any discussion on the success of litigation in achieving justice,
a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the only dis-
pute is whether the respondent in fact took the action or engaged
in the practice complained of, and cases in which the question is
whether the defendant's conduct legally constitutes prohibited
discrimination under the Constitution or the relevant statute or
regulations.328 If the inquiry is factual, the issue is whether litiga-
tion is superior to the alternatives as a fact-finding device.329
Judge Marvin Frankel suggests that as a truth-finding device, liti-
gation under our adversary system has serious shortcomings: "If
history can never reproduce the past with total fidelity, one won-
ders often whether we could not miss by margins much narrower
than those marked in courtrooms. '330 In contrast to Judge Hig-
ginbotham's view, Judge Frankel concurs with other scholars that
"'[i]n an ideal adversary system, the less skillful antagonist is ex-
pected to lose, which under the laissez-faire notion is the proper
outcome.' "331 Judge Learned Hand saw litigation as an object of
dread "beyond almost anything else short of sickness and
death, '332 and Judge Frankel refers to Professor Jerome Frank's
focus on "the utter chanciness of factual determinations as the
main reason why lawsuits are gambles too often and routes to jus-
tice more seldom than they should be."333
If the concern is not truth-seeking as much as norm-articula-
black-for-one-white quota requirements to eliminate the effects of long-term perva-
sive discrimination); Local No. 93 of the Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3072 (1986) (upholding consent decree benefitting individuals
who are not actual victims of discriminatory practices); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3034 (1986) (holding that statutory pro-
vision does not prohibit, in appropriate circumstances, court from ordering race-con-
scios relief for past discrimination).
328. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
251-56 (7th ed. 1979) (discussing distinction between questions of fact and questions of
law).
Of course, as with many distinctions, this one is not clean. A case that arises as a
"fact case" may well end up reforming the law.
329. See Edwards, supra note 88, at 680.
330. M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 13 (1980).
331. Id. at 18 (quoting Neef & Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American Legal
System from a Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y.L.F. 123, 162 (1974)). Contrast this with
Dean McKay's explanation of the basic premise of the adversary system:
The concept is that the best device in the search for truth is to test the
opposing views of disputants by putting each to the proof of his or her
claim. Thus, since each litigant is presumed to be equally motivated to
investigate the facts and to present the case through able lawyer spokes-
men, the theory is that truth will emerge to the extent it is discoverable.
McKay, supra note 321, at 361.
332. Address by Judge Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the
Heart of the Matter, Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 17, 1921),
reprinted in 3 ASSOCIATION BAR CITY OF NEW YORK LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS
1921-1922 at 87, 105 (1926).
333. M. FRANKEL, supra note 330, at 19.
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tion, and perhaps norm-development, then the usefulness of the
courts in resolving discrimination cases must be viewed somewhat
differently.334 From the perspective of Professor Fiss, "courts ex-
ist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes."335
Thus, they serve to articulate the norms and the standards by
which we, as citizens of a democratic republic, are expected to gov-
ern our behavior. In cautioning that the purpose of the Pound
Conference was not to suggest that courts get out of the business
of civil rights litigation, Simon Rifkind drew a distinction between
dispute resolution and problem solving, suggesting that, in new
and burgeoning areas of the law, courts were necessary to resolve
disputes concerning "new rights - newly acknowledged and only
recently enjoyed, ' 336 but that courts were not equipped to solve
problems requiring broad formulation of social policy.3 37
Although there is legitimate controversy over the judicial sys-
tem's ability to solve massive social problems,338 there has been
some consensus that the courts are an effective, if not essential,
instrument for the articulation of new and developing individual
rights. 339
To the extent that our focus in achieving justice is to eradicate
prohibited discrimination, we must further distinguish between
litigation brought by the agency itself and private litigation, espe-
cially individual rather than class litigation. Individual private lit-
igation inevitably will focus more on dispute resolution than on
the eradication of discrimination.340
334. See Edwards, supra note 88, at 679-80 (arguing that "[w]e must also be con-
cerned lest ADR becomes a tool for diminishing the judicial development of legal
rights for the disadvantaged.... Imagine, for example, the impoverished nature of
civil rights law that would have resulted had all race discrimination cases in the six-
ties and seventies been mediated rather than adjudicated.... Many cases... may
require nothing less than judicial resolution.").
335. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29 (1979).
336. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts, 70 F.R.D. 96, 100 (1976)
(stating that "[i]f that momentum is to proceed without the artificial impediment of
overladen courts, we must relieve the courts of burdens that do not require their spe-
cial expertise").
337. According to Rifkind,
It is one thing for judges to decide bi-party controversies and, in so doing,
pronounce principles which may contribute to the solution of the underly-
ing problem, or sometimes unhappily become part of the problem. It is
another for the courts to be burdened with the responsibility for the solu-
tion of the problems .... In my perspective I see a great difference be-
tween the two roles. On one side, I see a court which tries to determine:
was Jones unlawfully excluded from the University of State X, and which,
having answered the question in the affirmative, fashions a decree
designed to bring an end to the denial of the plaintiff's rights. On the
other side, I see a court which, bidden or unbidden, undertakes to solve the
problem of unequal education in State X.
Id. at 103-04.
338. See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 376, 439 (1982); Rifkind,
supra note 336, at 103. But see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1313-16 (1976) (suggesting that the traditional concept of
litigation should be modified to accommodate the public law model of litigation).
339. See Edwards, supra note 88, at 679; NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
supra note 71, at 10.
340. For a discussion of private rights of action, see supra note 165 and accompany-
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Litigation provides a context against which the desirability of
informal resolutions may be judged. On one hand, litigated deci-
sions provide the norms by which future behavior is governed, and
the resolution of informal disputes guided.34' In addition, the po-
tential expense and delay of litigation may induce negotiated set-
tlements.342 Thus, once the courts have articulated the relevant
norms, less cumbersome processes may be able to accommodate
the interests of justice.3 43 In the context of civil rights enforce-
ment this means that court resolution may be needed if the law is
not clear, or if a new statutory scheme is involved and the rights it
creates and protects are relatively inchoate. Once the courts fully
establish the principles, some less formal process may suffice.
b. Administrative Enforcement Proceedings
Another alternative is formal administrative proceedings. Do
they serve the interests of justice better than, as well as, or worse
than court proceedings? On one hand, administrative agencies
may have specific expertise. In the case of OCR, however, this is a
less compelling argument than it might be for other agencies.
First, as already discussed, courts have traditionally played a role
in protecting minorities from majoritarian discrimination, and
therefore possess the requisite expertise. Second, the administra-
tive law judges (ALJs) who preside over OCR's formal hearings
are borrowed from other agencies and therefore lack any particu-
lar expertise.3 " Further, given the infrequency of hearings held
by OCR,345 it is unlikely that the ALJs would develop significant
ing text. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1978), the Court distin-
guished the remedy sought by the individual from the interest of the government
when it proceeds against a recipient. Id at 704-06; see also Storey v. Board of Regents,
604 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (finding no private right of action under Title
IX to seek termination of federal financial assistance).
341. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357
(1978). Fuller describes adjudication not merely as a method of settling controversies
or disputes, but rather "as a form of social ordering, as a way in which the relations of
men to one another are governed and regulated.... Even if there is no statement by
the tribunal of the reasons for its decision, some reason will be perceived or guessed
at, and the parties will tend to govern their conduct accordingly." Id
342. See Singer, supra note 74, at 572. But see Edwards, supra note 88, at 678 (stat-
ing that "private settlements are troubling when we have no assurance that the legis-
lative- or agency-mandated standards have been followed, and when we have no
satisfactory explanation as to why there may have been a variance from the rule of
law").
343. See Sander, supra note 253, at 118.
344. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS: STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1976-1978, at 21 (1980); cf.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES 2 n.7 (1974) (noting that the OSHA Review Commission has its own
corps of ALJs).
345. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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expertise. As a group, given that neither their status nor their
remuneration is equal to that of federal judges, it is unlikely that
ALJs would surpass the federal bench in their ability to see that
justice is done.346
Administrative proceedings also play a less significant role in
norm-articulation. Administrative decisions have less preceden-
tial value than those of the federal courts. Moreover, these opin-
ions are not published regularly as court opinions are.347 Because
administrative opinions are not as widely accessible and known to
the public, they are not as likely as court opinions to influence
voluntary behavior, or to form the basis for voluntary resolution
of other compliance problems.
However, in the Title VI scheme, the existence of such proceed-
ings provides a very significant impetus for compliance with the
civil rights laws. Because the sole remedy for a finding of viola-
tion after such a proceeding is termination of federal financial
assistance, 348 the very threat of such proceedings is sufficient
inducement to the vast majority of recipients of federal funds to
comply voluntarily with their statutory and regulatory
obligations. 349
2. Informal Procedures
The two strongest concerns about the effect of informal dispute
resolution mechanisms on the attainment of justice are the ad hoc,
nonsystemic applicability of most informal mechanisms, and the
inability to develop coherent policy through their use.
For an agency whose mission is to eradicate discrimination,
resolving cases through mediation or other informal negotiation is
much like putting out small brush fires without ascertaining what
is causing those fires. Are they caused by a number of unrelated
incidents (or coincidences), or is there an arsonist methodically
setting those fires, the capture and imprisonment of whom would
end the fires more effectively than any other means? When cases
are resolved ad hoc, there is the risk that the individual com-
plaints are not merely a collection of unrelated happenings, but
rather suggest a larger, deeper problem that warrants close and
careful attention and concerted action.350
There is also the question of the "presence" of the enforcement
agency and how that affects, in a preventive way, what happens in
346. Cf. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 100, at 875-78 (suggesting that the
ALJ system "prevents intelligent selection and adequate compensation of the finest
judges, deters voluntary departures of the worst, and erodes incentive all along the
way") (quoting Scalia, The ALT Fiasco - A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 79-80
(1979)).
347. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 344, at
8.
348. This only occurs, however, if the recipient refuses to cease the violative prac-
tice or practices. See infra note 413 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text (discussing Title VI legislative
history); see also Block, supra note 108, at 36-37.
350. See Singer, supra note 74, at 576-77.
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the regulated entity's operation. Knowing that there will be am-
ple opportunity to resolve discrimination compliance problems
quietly, nonconfrontationally, with a minimum of adverse public-
ity, and with no admission or even official accusation of wrongdo-
ing, a school may be less cautious initially in avoiding
discrimination than it would be if it expected a complaint, a full
investigation, and the possibility of formal findings of wrongdoing
with accompanying media attention.351
An additional concern exists when agency policy on a particular
issue is still in a formative, or otherwise transitional, stage. As
discussed earlier, using the development of OCR's athletics policy
as an example, resolving cases in the absence of norms 352 creates a
risk of inconsistent results.353 Without norms, there would have
been greater problems of significant and substantial inconsistency
in what each university was required to undertake. Without
norms, without a definition of discrimination in this context, we
cannot measure whether justice, particularly in the sense of non-
discrimination, is being achieved.
a. Mediation
Unlike some other informal procedures, mediation is perhaps
the least dependent on the existence of external norms. Its thrust
is not to bring the employer, or the school, into compliance with
the civil rights laws; rather it seeks to find a solution that is mutu-
ally agreeable to the complainant and respondent, regardless of
whether the solution would constitute full compliance with the
applicable laws.3M Professor Fuller describes mediation as "di-
rected, not toward achieving conformity to norms, but toward the
creation of the relevant norms themselves.'" 355 He probably did
not have procedures employed by civil rights enforcement agen-
cies in mind. Rather, he most likely was speaking to norms in
terms of mutually acceptable behavior which, if acceptable to the
parties involved in the mediation, might well be acceptable to
others. Such grassroots norm-development may be satisfactory in
some common law areas, but is not appropriate in the develop-
351. Cf 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note 159, at 7 (statement of Commissioner F.
Alvarez) ("We expect that predictable enforcement should promote more compliance
and conciliation.").
352. The word "norm" refers to a standard or principle which, especially in the
context of civil rights enforcement, may or may not reflect a majoritarian view.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 304-07.
354. See L. SINGER & R. SCHECHTER, supra note 50, at 15-16 ("[T]he mediators [in
their age discrimination study] generally did not perceive themselves as hampered by
the ambiguities of the statute, because they saw their role as facilitating settlements,
not deciding right or wrong."); 1985 Hearings on OCR, supra note 70, at 259-60.
355. Fuller, supra note 169, at 308 (citation omitted); see also J. AUERBACH, supra
note 77, at 98 (stating that ADR was a movement toward justice).
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ment of nondiscrimination law and policy in which history has
shown that society, if left unregulated, will not itself move to-
wards nondiscrimination. 35 6
Statistics suggest that agencies that use mediation effect some
change for more complainants than agencies that do not.35 7 With-
out knowing the merits of the claims in such cases, however, it is
impossible to assess whether justice is being achieved merely be-
cause more persons obtain change through mediation than
through more formal procedures. It does seem apparent that in-
troducing mediation into an enforcement agency's repertoire
tends to transform the nature of the agency from one of law en-
forcement into one of dispute resolution.358 This may undermine
Congress's intent in establishing the agency and its mission. OCR
was charged with enforcing Title VI not to satisfy every individual
who perceives herself wronged, but to insure that institutions that
receive federal funds operate in a nondiscriminatory manner. An
agency that focuses on resolving such disputes may fail to aggres-
sively and affirmatively pursue and resolve systemic problems of
discrimination.
This concern has already emerged at EEOC, largely in response
to the aggressive rapid charge process implemented by former
Chairperson Eleanor Holmes Norton.359 Early on in the imple-
mentation of rapid charge processing, former Vice Chairperson
Daniel E. Leach, while proudly describing the success of the pro-
gram in terms of achieving substantial relief for numerous com-
plainants in record time, acknowledged concerns that rapid charge
might cause the agency to lose sight of its mission to eradicate en-
demic discrimination.360 Several years later, in response to such
concerns, current Chairperson Clarence Thomas criticized the au-
tomatic use of rapid charge procedures and announced new policy
and procedures to require the full investigation of more charges.361
A related concern is that mediated agreements may exact con-
356. See Edwards, supra note 88, at 677.
357. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 89-97; cf. 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note
159, at 58-59 (prepared statement of Nancy Kreiter, Research Director, Women Em-
ployed Institute) (noting a dramatic decrease in the number of charges settled since
the decline in use of rapid charge procedures).
358. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 9-10 (concluding that increased use of me-
diation may, over time, change the basic focus of the agency from law enforcement to
dispute resolution).
359. See id. at 7.
360. Speech by Daniel E. Leach, Eighth Annual Institute on Equal Employment
Opportunity Compliance (PLI), New York City (March 27, 1979).
361. See APRIL 16 POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 157, which states:
The rapid charge process encourages quick settlement. It does not neces-
sarily eliminate all vestiges of discrimination or secure full relief for vic-
tims of discrimination....
Despite the benefits of the rapid charge process, it was felt the agency
became too reliant on this method and it had compromised the Commis-
sion's principal role as a law enforcement agency.... The change is best
characterized as a shift of emphasis.... [M]ore charges will now undergo
a full, comprehensive investigation.
Id. at 2.
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cessions from respondents who in fact have not discriminated.
This was one of the primary criticisms in a General Accounting
Office (GAO) report on EEOC presented to Congress in 1981.362
An earlier GAO report, issued in 1976, had faulted EEOC for its
inordinate backlog of cases.363 In response, EEOC instituted its
rapid charge process, which it claimed had been successful in
resolving fifty percent of the charges filed with the agency.364
GAO's assessment of the cases that EEOC had resolved through
rapid charge was that EEOC had obtained numerous settlements
without a reasonable basis to believe that the charges were true.
In addition, many of the so-called settlements had little if any sub-
stance; therefore EEOC's statistics on the changes obtained were
misleading.365 As a result, both employers and charging parties
felt they were pressured into settlements that failed to accord jus-
tice - employers because they believed they made concessions in
the absence of cognizable wrongdoing; charging parties because re-
ceiving some settlement led them to believe that their charges
must have merit, but that the settlement was inadequate.366 GAO
recommended to Congress that EEOC not settle cases that would
be closed as no cause absent a settlement.367 EEOC's response was
that one does not know whether a charge has merit until a full
investigation has been conducted, that the purpose of rapid charge
was to avoid the necessity of a full scale investigation, and that
instances of pressured agreements were rare and the agency
would take measures to minimize such incidents even further.368
GAO's criticisms have not gone unheeded by EEOC Chairper-
son Thomas, who has accused the rapid charge system of being
unfair to employers and employees alike.3 69 The changes previ-
ously described in EEOC practice and procedure appear to be
geared towards resolving the concerns expressed by GAO.3 70
362. 1981 GAO REPORT, supra note 181, at 11-19; see also Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission Update: Policies on Pay Equity and Title VII Enforcement"
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm on Government Operations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1985) [hereinafter EEOC Update Hearings] (statement of Clarence
Thomas, Chairperson, EEOC) ("The [rapid charge] system also made a sham of the
notion that our ultimate goal is to address and remedy discrimination.").
363. 1981 GAO REPORT, supra note 181, at 6.
364. Id at 8.
365. Id. at 12-15. GAO found that 31 of 120 sample charges in one district office
appeared to lack reasonable cause. The report describes in some detail the specific
cases involved and how GAO concluded that no cause existed under Title VII. Id.
366. Id. at 17-19.
367. Id. at 26.
368. Id at 15, 27.
369. See EEOC Update Hearings, supra note 362, at 73.
370. Although he makes no explicit reference to the GAO reports, the criticisms
offered by Chairperson Thomas in the statements previously discussed, as well as the
solutions proffered to resolve those criticisms, appear to echo many of the criticisms
and suggestions made by GAO. See 1981 GAO REPORT, surpa note 181, at 26-29. How-
1987] 543
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  543 1986-1987
An inevitable downside to mediation before investigation and
findings is that one cannot know the appropriateness of the settle-
ment as measured against the applicable laws without knowing
the strengths and weaknesses of both sides' cases. Assuming
equality of bargaining power and sophistication, this might not be
a handicap; one could assume the parties would competently bring
out the competing strengths and weaknesses of their respective
arguments. But such equality can hardly be assumed in the typi-
cal discrimination complaint situation. On one hand, there is the
risk that a respondent who has engaged in no wrongdoing may
agree to a settlement for nuisance value.37 1 On the other, there is
the very real danger that a charging party with a legitimate com-
plaint of unlawful discrimination may settle for far less than that
to which she would have been entitled had the matter gone
through investigation, findings, and resolution.37 2 Whether the
gains warrant the risks involved is similar to, but not the same as,
the approach to answering such questions for private disputes in
general. Lawyers regularly apply cost/benefit analyses to deci-
sions on whether and for how much to settle a case.3 73 Questions
of the protection of basic human rights, however, which look not
only backward to past events, but forward to the goals of a nondis-
criminatory society, do not lend themselves to purely economic
evaluation. It is the responsibility of the civil rights enforcement
agency to insure that such goals are kept in focus.
This was one conclusion of a study commissioned by OCR in
1979 to evaluate its pilot ECR program to make recommendations
on expanding the program to all ten regions, abandoning it, or
modifying it. 374 The independent study was undertaken by the
Project on Equal Education Rights (PEER), an offshoot of the Na-
tional Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education
Fund.3 75 PEER observed that although some cases resolved
through ECR produced remedies comparable to what might have
been expected after an investigation finding discrimination, others
produced little or no remedy, and a few produced a remedy sub-
stantially below what could have been expected after investiga-
tion.3 7 6 In addition, PEER found that a few complainants who
refused settlement offers would have fared better if they had ac-
cepted the offers because the investigation of their complaints
ended in a finding of no discrimination.37 7 PEER also concluded
that in the studied cases, mediation provided adequate relief more
ever, GAO was not the only source of such criticism. See 1983 Oversight Hearings,
supra note 275, at 10 (prepared statement of Professor Herbert Hill) (concluding that
EEOC functions as a claims adjustment bureau and not as an enforcement agency).
371. See EEOC Update Hearings, supra note 362, at 73.
372. Id.; see also Speech by Daniel E. Leach, supra note 360.
373. See, e.g., 1 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 109 (1954) (discussing economic aspects
of decisions to settle).
374. PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 1-2.
375. Id. at i.
376. Id. at 51.
377. Id.
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often on class issues than it did for the individual complainants
who claimed to be personally aggrieved.378 Unlike the GAO study,
PEER made no attempt to assess the merits of the cases consid-
ered. Rather, it based its evaluation on what remedy would likely
have been obtained had the allegations of the complaint been sus-
tained as true.37 9
As to whether the procedure furthered the goal of justice and
nondiscrimination, PEER's primary concern was that widespread
use of mediation would distort agency priorities and cause the
agency to lose sight of one of its primary missions, the eradication
of discrimination among educational recipients of federal financial
assistance. PEER recognized that remedying individual instances
of discrimination was only one of several goals of OCR's enforce-
ment program and feared that individual dispute resolution, if ex-
panded, would take precedence over all other agency goals.380 It
feared that the tool of planned compliance reviews would be uti-
lized too infrequently to compensate for the loss of a comprehen-
sive complaint investigation process.381 Further, PEER was
concerned that ECR would deprive the agency of the raw informa-
tion that evolved through investigations necessary for the develop-
ment of broad policy,38 2 and that the loss of publicized findings of
discrimination would mean the loss of an effective tool against dis-
crimination by parties other than the respondent in the case at
issue.383 In addition, PEER echoed the concerns expressed in the
GAO report: When complainants get something even though
their charges lacked merit, "this cannot be considered success by
any standard of justice based on the merits of the charges. ' '3 4
There is a substantial question whether ECR is consistent at all
with OCR's obligations under Title VI and the Adams Order.38 5
378. I& When OCR expanded ECR to all 10 of its regions, it specifically excluded
class complaints from those categories of complaints for which ECR was available.
OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 2.
379. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 20; cf. id at 51.
380. PEER identified the goals of OCR as follows: (1) to remedy instances of indi-
vidual discrimination; (2) to reduce and prevent discrimination generally; (3) to pro-
mote actively nondiscriminatory practices; and (4) to insure that federal funds do not
support institutions that discriminate. Id. at 124.
381. See i&l at 72. PEER voiced the additional concerns that by using ECR, OCR
lost opportunities to remedy class discrimination and that the failure to get at the root
of the discrimination problem might mean "the proliferation of identical charges
against the same respondent," each addressed only on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 129.
382. IML at 135.
383. Id. at 136-38.
384. Id at 144.
385. H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70, at 27-29 ("OCR's current use of ECR may be
illegal, may not protect the rights of complainants, and may jeopardize future litiga-
tion involving violations of civil rights laws."). The House Committee noted that long
after DOJ and OCR's quality assurance staff had raised concerns, OCR established a
task force to review the legality of its ECR procedures. Id at 28-30. Nonetheless, it
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Upon receipt of information that discrimination has occurred,
OCR is required to investigate the allegations, reach a determina-
tion, and, if discrimination is found, attempt to negotiate volun-
tary compliance. If such attempts fail, OCR is obligated to
commence administrative enforcement action or refer the matter
to the Department of Justice to commence suit in federal district
court. 386 Nothing in either the statutes or the regulations for Title
VI, Title IX, or Section 504 - in contrast to the regulations
promulgated under the Age Discrimination Act of 1975387 - con-
templates anything like mediation to resolve complaints. The
pressure to meet the Adams timeframes and alleviate its backlog
of old cases encouraged OCR to use procedures short of full inves-
tigation of every complaint that alleged discrimination.3s8 Noth-
ing Congress has said or done, however, has suggested its
acquiescence in such an approach.3 9 Certainly Adams v. Richard-
son,390 which removes any discretion from OCR in deciding
whether to pursue a complaint,391 may be read as precluding an
approach that fails to ascertain and fully remedy any underlying
discrimination. Thus, if OCR is viewed as having not only the
right to investigate complaints of discrimination - which it
forgoes upon successful mediation - but the responsibility to in-
vestigate, then the whole premise of OCR-conducted mediation
through its ECR program is on shaky legal grounds.392
b. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance Before Findings
If the analysis above is correct, OCR lacks authority to resolve
any complaints without a full investigation; any informal proce-
dure short of negotiation after investigation and findings would
violate its mandate. Even assuming no legal bar to the use of such
procedures, however, features of some alternatives are less condu-
cive to attaining justice than are others. From this perspective,
perhaps the most troublesome of all the alternatives is OCR's use
recommended "that OCR develop guidelines to be used to ensure that such settle-
ments are in accord with civil rights laws and [Department of Education] regulations."
Id. at 33.
386. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
387. 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.43, 91.43 (1986).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
389. See H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70.
390. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
391. Id. at 1163.
392. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) (1986). A somewhat more conservative position is
taken by Robert Silverstein, whose legal opinion supplements the PEER Study. He
concluded that mediation was "neither per se consistent nor inconsistent with the...
statutory frameworks." PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at B21 (Silverstein addendum).
However, he concluded that once OCR knows sufficient facts to establish that a viola-
tion has occurred, it can accept nothing short of a full remedy in an agreement be-
tween the complainant and recipient. Id. at B21-23, B28.
Regardless of the merits of these legal arguments, Judge Pratt, in his oversight of
the Adams Order, has done nothing to prevent OCR from using informal procedures
as long as the procedures used do not delay the entire process if they prove unsuccess-
ful. See supra note 133.
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of negotiated voluntary compliance before findings which, unlike
ECR, occurs after the commencement of the investigation.
As discussed previously, OCR's published rules and policies do
not discuss negotiated voluntary compliance before findings.393
Nonetheless it may occur during the course of the investigation if
the complainant is persuaded to withdraw her complaint because
of some change offered by the respondent or for some other rea-
son. One other reason may be, though there is no empirical data
to prove it, that the investigator or Equal Opportunity Specialist
(EOS) has persuaded the complainant that the investigation will
end in a finding of no discrimination, and that the complainant
might prefer to withdraw rather than have this occur, especially if
there are other forums in which the complainant might seek
relief.
From the perspective of achieving justice this tactic raises
problems of the lack of accountability and assurance that the
EOS's discretion is not in fact abused. The authority to decide
whether or not a violation has occurred has not been delegated to
the EOS. To the contrary, the EOS conducts an investigation, dis-
cusses the results with his supervisor and the agency attorney,
and, if consensus is obtained, makes a recommendation to the re-
gional director as to whether or not a violation exists. A finding of
no violation may be approved by the regional director; a finding of
violation must be approved by the Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights in headquarters. 394
Yet it is the EOS, and frequently the EOS alone, who has per-
sonal contact with the complainant and the recipient. The EOS is
pressured to close cases in a timely fashion and will be evaluated
accordingly, thereby creating an incentive to find shortcut solu-
tions to resolving cases. If the complainant withdraws her com-
plaint during the course of the investigation, the EOS need not
write an investigative report; his chances of closing the case within
the ninety days provided under the Adams Order are greatly en-
hanced. Although OCR does not officially sanction these proce-
dures as ways to expedite cases, such incentive creates strong
pressure to act outside of the dictates of OCR's published rules.395
A related type of predetermination closure may occur when
OCR determines that the issues raised in the complaint have been
resolved satisfactorily prior to a determination and the complain-
393. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
394. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 60.
395. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 108-09. PEER finds that mediation offers
a number of advantages over these kinds of informal procedures which tempt the
investigator to cut a deal or to cut down the amount of record-keeping, thus eluding
quality control. I& at 109.
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ant agrees to withdraw the complaint.396 OCR procedures provide
that "[i]f the complaint raises systemic issues, the resolution
achieved must provide a remedy for all injured parties, including
those unnamed or unknown." 397 Once again, however, this proce-
dure does not require the preparation of an investigative report.
Although the concurrence of an agency attorney is required to as-
sure "that the resolution meets minimal OCR compliance stan-
dards, ' 398 it is questionable whether the attorney, without the
results of a thorough investigation, could determine that the reso-
lution fully resolves the issues raised.
In our hypothetical involving Sarah School, for example, 399 sup-
pose that Stowe University, during the pendency of the investiga-
tion, agrees to accept Sarah for admission, and that Sarah agrees
to this resolution. If Sarah's complaint had alleged that she, as an
individual, had been denied admission on the basis of race, there is
little question that this resolution would meet "minimal OCR
compliance standards" and that the case would be closed by the
agency. If Sarah had alleged that the school was discriminating
against blacks in general, OCR would be required to seek more
action from the school. Without a thorough investigation, what
would be appropriate? A statement that the school would not dis-
criminate on the basis of race in admissions? Obviously, the
school is already under an obligation not to discriminate. Without
an investigation, it cannot be determined whether such discrimi-
nation exists and, if so, what its dimensions may be. Our hypo-
thetical established that blacks were adequately represented from
a statistical perspective in the Stowe University student body.
Suppose that the school's policies operated to exclude only blacks
who might be considered political or racial activists. How could
this be determined without an investigation? Additionally, if the
school had not discriminated at all, but agreed to admit Sarah
solely to avoid the nuisance of a full investigation and possible ad-
verse administrative findings, how is justice served by accepting
this resolution?
Unlike OCR, which recognizes a clear demarcation between its
ECR procedures and the investigative process, 400 the procedures
used by EEOC tend to merge mediation and investigation.40
Rapid charge processing takes place initially in the context of a so-
called fact-finding conference, the very name of which suggests a
process designed to ascertain the probative value of the charge. If
attempts at resolving the complaint are unsuccessful at this junc-
ture, EEOC will continue to encourage a negotiated resolution at
396. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 49.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See supra text preceding note 310.
400. If mediation fails and an investigation is undertaken, facts uncovered during
the course of ECR are not made available to the OCR investigator. See supra notes
212-14 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
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every stage of the investigation that follows, up until the actual
findings.40 2 Before findings, EEOC will accept any resolution to
which the parties may agree as a basis for terminating the investi-
gation of the charge.40 3
Although EEOC procedures, which are officially sanctioned, af-
ford some assurance that the agency's devices for monitoring its
staff's compliance to ensure quality performance will serve as
some check on the abuse of discretion by the investigative staff,
there is reason for concern that the potential for abuse in OCR's
prefinding closure procedures is not absent here.404 The parties
might be pressured into settlements inconsistent with what their
legal rights should dictate. The difference between a negotiated
prefinding resolution and a true mediated resolution is that in the
former all parties are likely to know more about the strengths and
weaknesses of their respective cases than in the latter. It is not
entirely clear if this is an advantage or a disadvantage in moving
towards a just resolution. In the hands of a competent investiga-
tor, additional information may yield a more realistic assessment
of the eventual outcome of the case if it proceeds to findings. He
also may be more competent in identifying both the dimensions of
that violation and, consequently, an appropriate remedy. If this
assessment is used to encourage the parties to settle for something
resembling what the eventual outcome would be, the cause of jus-
tice will not be impaired any more than if other informal proce-
dures were used - perhaps less so. The question then becomes
whether negotiated voluntary compliance before findings is more
advantageous than a procedure that results in a finding of cause or
no cause.
c. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Informal
Findings
As stated earlier, EEOC recognizes no procedure such as negoti-
ation after informal findings. In other words, EEOC acknowl-
edges a shift in its responsibilities upon the determination of cause
- it will then accept no remedy short of a full resolution of the
402. See generally EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 521-533 (Sept. 1984), 545 (Oct.
1984).
403. However, EEOC itself will not be signatory to any agreement that contains an
unlawful provision. See id 548 (Mar. 1987). After findings, EEOC is constrained to
accept a resolution only if it will be a complete remedy to any discrimination found.
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(e) (1986) (providing that EEOC may dismiss a
charge if the respondent makes a settlement offer that the complainant refuses to
accept, if the settlement offer would afford full relief); cf PEER STUDY, supra note
92, at 109.
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charges. 405
OCR, on the other hand, has undertaken a major initiative to
attempt to resolve compliance problems before formal findings.
This informal procedure is different than mediation or negotiation
before findings in that there is no longer uncertainty as to
whether a compliance problem exists - at least as far as the re-
gional office is concerned. If the completed investigation reveals
no violation, OCR will send a letter so stating and will close the
case. If the investigation reveals a violation,40 6 OCR will call in
the recipient before sending the letter of findings and will attempt
to resolve the case at that juncture.
The primary thrust of this procedure is to avoid the antagonism
and confrontation that frequently accompanies the formalization
of the process. In theory, OCR will accept nothing less than full
compliance, the same standard that would have governed if OCR
had sent a letter of findings. Only full compliance by the recipient
will avoid an enforcement recommendation. Whether this is true
in practice - and, once again, no empirical proof is available - is
questionable. First, the regional office may be concerned that
headquarters will reject its finding. This may consciously or un-
consciously encourage the region to accept a resolution short of
what might be required if headquarters were to endorse the re-
gion's findings. Second, the recipient may challenge the findings;
since the agency is not yet formally committed to its findings, it
may be more likely to acquiesce in the recipient's position than
otherwise. This is not necessarily undesirable if the recipient's po-
sition has merit. But it is possible that the recipient's powers of
advocacy may sway the agency negotiator more than the merits of
the "defense" objectively would warrant.40 7 If the findings have
been reduced to a written, public communication, that concern is
alleviated.
d. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Formal Findings
A negotiated resolution after the issuance of formal findings -
whether in the form of a cause determination by EEOC or a letter
of findings by OCR - still qualifies as an "informal" procedure
when compared to litigation and administrative enforcement.
Nonetheless, because it requires a complete remedy to identified
discrimination, it is more effective in achieving justice than the
other informal alternatives.
If this procedure falls short of ensuring a just resolution, it is
405. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.20, .24 (1986).
406. The investigation reveals a violation if the investigative report substantiates a
compliance problem to the satisfaction of the EOS, his supervisor, the attorney as-
signed to the case, and the regional director. In fact, only the regional director need
reach such a determination, but it is rare that he would find a violation in the absence
of the concurrence of the other staff involved in the investigation and determination.
407. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70, at 17. The House Committee criticized
then-OCR Director Harry Singleton for accepting a remedy offered by a school dis-
trict that fell short of OCR compliance standards. Id.
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because the savvy respondent can anticipate a long road between
the agency's official finding and judicial affirmance of that finding.
Before EEOC's relatively recent change in policy,408 the employer
with the financial means might have resisted the findings of
EEOC, knowing that except in the most egregious case, EEOC
would do no more than confer upon the charging party the right to
file her own action in court, a right that was clearly expensive to
enjoy.40 9 Even if EEOC did pursue the matter, any ultimate deter-
mination may be years away,410 during which time the employer
might hope for a change in the administration's philosophy that
would lead EEOC to abandon the lawsuit, or for some other hap-
pening that would affect the employer's exposure.411
The recipient who receives a letter of findings from OCR and
refuses to settle may well believe that the agency's position lacks
merit and that the agency will not prevail upon review in a formal
forum.412 Or if the remedy is of sufficient consequence, the recipi-
408. See EEOC, STATEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY (Sept. 11, 1984) (providing
that all cases in which conciliation has failed will be considered for litigation).
409. This problem was noted by critics in 1983. See, e.g., 1983 Oversight Hearings,
supra note 275, at 12 (prepared statement of Prof. Herbert M. Hill) (criticizing
EEOC's failure to utilize the litigation powers granted by Congress in 1972); see also
1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note 159, at 3 (1985) (remarks of Rep. Gunderson) ("[I]f
the Commission's policy [to litigate individual cases of employment discrimination] is
seen as one of certainty and predictability in acting on cases, many more respondents
will be willing to participate in a conciliation as they know litigation happens to be a
real threat.").
410. Cf. Oreskes, Human Rights Panels Are Faulted in Survey, N.Y. Times, July
14, 1986, at B1, col. 5 (finding that the deterrent value of state civil rights commissions
is reduced because of enormous backlogs and delays which make settlement negotia-
tions on behalf of a complainant almost impossible).
411. An example of such a change in political philosophy occurred when the Rea-
gan Administration attacked affirmative action plans that had been formulated dur-
ing previous administrations to redress past discrimination. See Justice Dept Presses
Drive on Quotas, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1985, at A16, col. 1 (announcing DOJ's position
that "56 cities, counties and states must modify affirmative action plans so as to end
the use of numerical goals and quotas designed to increase employment of women,
blacks or Hispanic Americans"). For a discussion of this development, see Rosenfeld,
Affirmative Action, Justice and Equalities: A Philosophical and Constitutional Ap-
praisal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 846-47 (1985). This attempt has been frustrated by the
Supreme Court. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); United
States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local No. 93 of the Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters
v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in
other cases that have rejected DOJ's position. See, e.g., United States v. NAACP, 779
F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding the district court's ruling ordering prospective
rather than make-whole relief to minority and female police officers and firemen),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3333 (1986); Massachusetts Ass'n of Afro-American Police v.
Boston Police Dep't, 780 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1985) (denying police officers' motion to inter-
vene in a Title VII case attacking a decree that contained affirmative action provisions
designed to increase the number of black officers promoted to sergeant), cert denied,
106 S. Ct. 3334 (1986).
412. On the other hand, a recipient might yield to OCR even if it believes it has not
violated the law in order to avoid cut-offs of federal funds. See Caulfield v. Board of
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ent may choose to forestall the inevitable. At any stage of the ad-
ministrative process, or upon subsequent action by DOJ, a
recipient may avoid termination of federal financial assistance
through compliance; there is no punitive or retroactive operation
of the sanction.413
However, most OCR - and many EEOC - respondents accept
the agencies' findings and agree to a remedy at this stage.414 Thus,
these concerns do not prevent negotiation after formal findings
from being compatible with the pursuit of justice.
This procedure serves the ends of justice by officially pronounc-
ing the existence of discrimination. When the enforcement
agency takes a formal position that there exists a violation of the
law, it proclaims not only that a problem exists, but that the en-
forcement agency is prepared to solve that problem, albeit prefer-
ably through informal means. It may cause public embarrassment
to the respondent, but that embarrassment has in large measure
been earned by actions taken - or not taken - inconsistent with
the respondent's legal obligations to ensure a nondiscriminatory
program or activity. It reminds the relevant community, includ-
ing other employers or other recipients of federal financial assist-
ance, that such actions are illegal and will not be tolerated. It
ensures that the agency will accept nothing less than full compli-
ance with the law, not only from the respondent who has been
"caught," but also from others within the agency's jurisdiction.415
B. Procedural Fairness
1. Formal Procedures
a. Litigation
The elaborate system of procedural rights established by the
Due Process Clause and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
one of the virtues of our adversarial system of litigation,416 as well
Educ., 449 F. Supp. 1203, 1221 (E.D.N.Y.) (Caulfield 1) (stating that the Board of Edu-
cation had no realistic choice but to agree to Memorandum of Understanding in the
face of massive cut-offs of federal financial assistance), rev'd on other grounds, 583
F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978).
413. Although a recipient in formal administrative proceedings might face deferral
of new funds, this power has been used infrequently in recent years.
414. See infra text accompanying notes 507-17.
415. Recently, EEOC reaffirmed its commitment to provide complete remedies
through the process of conciliation:
The Commission does not believe that the statutory requirement of concil-
iation requires the agency to abdicate its principal law enforcement re-
sponsibility. Thus, conciliation should not result in inadequate remedies.
The possibility of pre-litigation conciliation does not constitute cause for
unwarranted or undeserved concessions by a law enforcement agency
when one of the laws it enforces has been violated.... Conciliation should
be pursued with the goal of obtaining substantially complete relief
through the conciliation process. Any divergence from this goal must be
justified by the relevant facts and the law.
EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES AND RELIEF FOR INDIVIDUAL CASES OF UN-
LAWFUL DISCRIMINATION § 5 (Feb. 5, 1985).
416. M. FRANKEL, supra note 330, at 6-7.
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as one of the primary reasons why alternatives are sought in order
to expedite the process of dispute resolution. More procedures,
however, do not necessarily mean more procedural fairness. 417
The inevitable problem of inequality of power arises when one
party lacks the resources or sophistication of the other party.
Some complainants would rather pursue administrative remedies
than litigate in federal court, for fear that the respondent - gen-
erally an institution - will have astute counsel who will practice
procedural calisthenics, including lengthy and costly discovery
and interlocutory motions, perhaps legitimate under the federal
rules, but directed to tire the weary complainant rather than to
ascertain "truth."418 Such concern may or may not be compen-
sated by the hope that the judge will protect the underrepresented
(or unrepresented) plaintiff, thus equalizing the parties'
leverage.419
These observations bear little relevance, however, to litigation
between the agency and the employer or the recipient of federal
funds. Generally, the inequality of resources will not be an issue.
Occasionally, the government's virtually limitless staying power in
litigation might wear down a resource-limited defendant. Or, if
counsel for the defendant is somewhat green in civil rights litiga-
tion, she might be at a tactical disadvantage in an adversarial con-
test with expert, specialized government counsel.420 Usually, each
side will be represented and funded adequately to sustain the ad-
versarial contest.
In private litigation, class actions frequently present concerns
involving the fairness to parties not actually participating in the
litigation. The issues and the approaches to resolving those issues
are generally no different in civil rights litigation than in any
It may be perceived almost a priori - and there is a beginning of empiri-
cal data to demonstrate - that some fairly elemental needs are satisfied
by the adversary process. The right to be heard, the fact of being reckoned
with, being considered and respected, are all part of the satisfactions.
However much they are separate from, or merely reflective of, the service
of crasser interests, spiritual demands like these add significantly to the
values of the structured contest between professionally represented
combatants.
Id.
417. See Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94
YALE L.J. 1643 (1985).
418. See, e.g., A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RE-
SPONSIBILITY (Federal Judicial Center Education and Training Series, 1984).
419. See supra text accompanying notes 321-24.
420. Sometimes, however, the reverse will be true, and the government runs the
risk of being worn down by sophisticated and expensive private counsel. Always pres-
ent in our adversarial system is the risk that one counsel will be less competent than
another, although this problem occurs less frequently when large corporate interests
are involved.
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other kind of litigation where different class members may have
competing concerns and interests.421 In an article on Title VII
consent decrees, Professor Maimon Schwarzschild discusses the
problematic dichotomy between Title VII class action litigation
and Title VII cases in which EEOC is the plaintiff.422 In the for-
mer, class members are afforded a "fairness hearing" before the
court approves any consent decree. When EEOC is the plaintiff,
there is no assurance that the purported beneficiaries of the action
will have an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, because Title VI
enforcement actions are between the government and the recipi-
ent, there is no assurance that the agency or the court will con-
sider the competing or inconsistent interests of the original
complainant, other affected beneficiaries of the federal financial
assistance, or other affected groups, such as unions in cases of
teacher reassignment.423
b. Administrative Enforcement Proceedings
Although the procedures available under section 554 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and Title VI regulations for the con-
duct of formal administrative proceedings are somewhat more
relaxed than under the rules governing federal litigation, the ben-
efits and detriments of the adversarial process are rather similar.
Differences such as the relative informality of some proceed-
ings,424 the admissibility of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evi-
dence,425 and the lack of subpoena power,42 6 are unlikely to
present serious problems of procedural unfairness when, as here,
the parties involved are the government and the recipient of fed-
eral financial assistance.
421. See, e.g., Bustop v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 66, 70, 72, 137 Cal. Rptr. 793,
795-96 (1977) (discussing intervention requirements for party whose interest would
not otherwise be represented). This is not, however, to suggest that other distinctions
are absent in settling civil rights discrimination cases as contrasted with other kinds of
suits. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 30 (1983) (discussing a study that revealed that 31% of litigants
with discrimination problems sought "justice" as well as compensation through litiga-
tion; the same was true of only 4% of litigants with "serious problems" and 2% with
neighborhood problems).
422. Schwarzschild, supra note 111, at 914; see also Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note
185 (examining the dichotomy between public and private interests in consent decree
settlements).
423. Nor is there any requirement that complainants be allowed to participate as
parties in administrative proceedings brought against recipients of federal financial
assistance. See supra text accompanying note 241; cf. Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583
F.2d 605, 612-15 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting district court's holding that intended benefi-
ciaries be allowed to participate in the process of fashioning a remedial compliance
agreement).
424. See Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25
ADMIN. L. REV. 9, 31 (1973).
425. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971).
426. See Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460,470-71 (1912); DeLong v. Hampton,
422 F.2d 21, 25 (3d Cir. 1970). But cf. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 8.05 (3d
ed. 1972) (stating that due process may be violated if strong prejudice results to a
party as a result of lack of subpoena power).
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2. Informal Procedures
Generally, the lack of elaborate procedures allows informal dis-
pute resolution mechanisms to resolve matters more efficiently
and expeditiously than their due process-laden counterparts.
Whatever the procedures are, however, it is an important goal that
they be fair, that they not work to the benefit of one party over
another, and that they assure that an individual is aware of her
rights and how to vindicate them.
a. Mediation
One advantage mediation has over some of the informal alterna-
tives is that its methodology and goals are clearly articulated: to
bring the parties together, in an informal arrangement, with a
neutral third party who will attempt to facilitate a mutually
agreeable resolution. When offered as a purely voluntary option
to parties of substantially equal sophistication and bargaining
power,427 with full disclosure of the risks and benefits of the pro-
cess,428 mediation affords a reasonable measure of procedural fair-
ness. Unfortunately, in the typical EEOC or OCR mediation, one
or more of these elements is missing.
To the extent that procedural fairness hinges on notice to the
parties of the procedures to be followed, there is no particular
problem with either EEOC or OCR procedures. EEOC particular-
izes its procedures in its Compliance Manual,429 a public docu-
ment, and includes them on the notices sent to the charging party
and the respondent. 430 Although OCR's Investigation Procedures
Manual is somewhat less readily available because it is not in most
law libraries, OCR requires that each party acknowledge in writ-
ing that she has read and understood the ECR procedures.431
Another component of procedural fairness is the ability of the
parties to make an informed choice on whether to attempt to set-
427. Disparities in bargaining power between parties can be reduced by providing
advocates and technical experts. See Singer, supra note 74, at 576.
428. Advising parties of their legal rights under the applicable substantive law,
however, poses a different ethical question. See id. at 581 (stating that such advice
may facilitate or prevent a settlement). The PEER Study found that civil rights en-
forcement agencies seldom apprise complainants of what would constitute a full rem-
edy if a violation were found after investigation. PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 120.
A report on the use of mediation in age discrimination cases found that neither the
community conciliators employed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS), nor the FMCS mediators "considered it appropriate to provide... informa-
tion [on the parties' rights under the law] within the mediation context." L. SINGER&
R. SCHECHTER, supra note 50, at 15.
429. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 521-556 (Sept. 1984) (outlining the proce-
dures for rapid charge processing and negotiating settlements).
430. Id. 535 (Nov. 1984).
431. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J.
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tle a dispute and, if the attempt is made, on whether to settle and
for how much. Under that criterion, there is less assurance that
either agency's mediation procedures are fair.
EEOC neither gives the parties the choice of whether or not to
attempt mediation, nor requires the parties to reach a mediated
agreement. Rather, by incorporating mediation into the investiga-
tive process, EEOC encourages the parties to reach agreement be-
tween themselves. If the determination is made that a fact-
finding conference is warranted, the parties are required to at-
tend.432 The Commission determines whether settlement is to be
discussed at the conference. 433 OCR's early complaint resolution
process is purely voluntary. If one or both of the parties choose
not to participate, no mediation is attempted.434
OCR's stated procedures require that the mediator inform the
parties of their rights and responsibilities, and of the complete vol-
untariness of the procedure. 435 Nonetheless, as with EEOC, there
is seldom equality of bargaining power between the parties. A
complainant may be "persuaded" to attempt mediation and fur-
ther "persuaded" to agree to a mediated solution, without ade-
quate appreciation of her legal rights and the remedies that might
be available if OCR were to conduct a full investigation and issue a
finding of violation.
This may occur because of the ambivalence of the OCR media-
tor. On one hand, the mediator's goal is to obtain a settlement of
the case. On the other, because of the inherent inequality of bar-
gaining power between the parties, the OCR mediator may view
her job as requiring that she look out for the interests of the com-
plainant, so that the complainant does not "get a completely raw
deal."436 If the complainant perceives the mediator to be protect-
ing the complainant's rights, she may be vulnerable to accepting
the mediator's suggestions regarding settlement.437 It is also diffi-
cult to ensure that the mediator, who will get credit if a successful
agreement is reached, will apprise the complainant fully of the
remedy that would be available if an investigation determines that
a violation has occurred. Rather, the mediator may stress that
control of the result rests with the parties during mediation, but
that if OCR commences an investigation, the agency, not the par-
ties, will decide the investigation's content and results. This warn-
ing may cause an individual concern about the autonomy she
might sacrifice if mediation fails.
Both agencies' mediation procedures provide for notification to
432. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 530 (Sept. 1984), 535 (Nov. 1984).
433. Id. 530 (Sept. 1984).
434. In contrast, the regulatory scheme OCR enforces under the Age Discrimina-
tion Act requires the parties to submit to conciliation efforts through the Federal Me-
diation and Conciliation Service for up to 60 days prior to investigation. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 90.43(c)(3) (1986); L. SINGER & R. SCHECHTER, supra note 50, at 8-9, 11-14.
435. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 5-6.
436. PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 56.
437. Id.
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the parties of their right to have counsel present at the mediation
sessions. The attorney may counsel the client during the sessions,
but may not speak on the client's behalf.438 The presence of coun-
sel is likely to mitigate the effects of the complainant's lack of so-
phistication and inequality of bargaining power. The risk is
substantial, however, that the employer/recipient will be accom-
panied by an attorney and the complainant, with limited re-
sources, will not.439 This may exacerbate an already unbalanced
situation to the complainant's detriment. The requirement that
the parties must speak for themselves may partially offset such
concerns, but is inadequate to ensure that the imbalance will not
create procedural unfairness.
The agencies' ability to prolong the investigative process, how-
ever, may create a "procedural" burden on the em-
ployer/recipient, thereby compelling it to acquiesce in a
settlement to terminate the process. It is, then, not the mediation
process itself, but mediation in the hands of a powerful enforce-
ment agency, that may result in procedural unfairness.440
b. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance Before Findings
For EEOC there is virtually no difference between procedural
fairness in the process used at the commencement of the investi-
gation and that used in subsequent stages of the investigation.
The investigator will continue to attempt to persuade the parties
to reach a compromised solution. The only difference is that the
longer the investigation proceeds, the more likely the investigator
will have an assessment of the merits of the case. This, in turn,
may influence her to suggest a more or less substantial remedy to
the respondent, depending on her evaluation of the likelihood that
the case will result in a cause finding. Similarly, if the charging
party's case does not appear to be strong, she may attempt to per-
suade the charging party to agree to minimal relief. Whether or
not we believe this to be "fair" may well depend on the degree of
faith we have in the frontline personnel of the agency to accu-
rately assess the merits of the case. The issue, then, concerns jus-
tice rather than procedural fairness.441
OCR has no formally recognized process for negotiating the res-
olution of cases during the pendency of the investigation.
Although OCR recognizes such "predetermination" closures, its
438. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 535 (Nov. 1984); OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PRO-
CEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 5-6.
439. L. SINGER & R. SCHECHTER, supra note 50, at 18.
440. These concerns have, in part, motivated the current EEOC to modify its use of
the rapid charge process. See EEOC Update Hearings, supra note 362, at 73.
441. See supra text accompanying and following notes 400-04.
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manual gives little guidance as to the procedures to be used in ob-
taining such prefinding resolutions.442 The lack of articulated pro-
cedures for obtaining negotiated agreements prior to agency
findings causes serious concern about what procedures the agency
is using and whether the parties might be pressured inappropri-
ately into accepting settlements.443 For these reasons, there is less
guarantee of procedural fairness here than there is among any of
the alternatives. 444
c. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Informal
Findings
The OCR complainant is virtually shut out of the negotiations at
this stage.4 5 OCR has reached a conclusion that a violation has
occurred, and the respondent is called in to discuss how the viola-
tion may be cured by the least confrontational of approaches. This
process affords the respondent the greatest degree of flexibility in
fashioning a remedy and perhaps even persuading the agency
either that its finding was erroneous, or that the extent of its find-
ing should be tempered due to circumstances either unknown to
or not considered by the agency. At this juncture the respondent
may - and generally will - be represented by counsel. 446
The concept of "procedural fairness" is different at this point.
Fact-finding has been accomplished and the agency has deter-
mined that a violation of law exists. This is the remedy phase and
procedural fairness consists of the opportunity to participate in
fashioning an appropriate remedy and drafting the agreement. By
442. The Investigation Procedures Manual provides:
Pre-determination settlements may occur after the initiation of the inves-
tigation and prior to the review of the draft Investigative Report by the
Regional Director. At some point in the investigative process, a resolution
of the complaint issue is achieved which is satisfactory to the complainant
and meets minimal OCR compliance standards. At this point, the investi-
gation can be terminated and the complaint closed if the complainant also
withdraws the complaint.... OCR's determination that the resolution
meets minimal OCR compliance standards should be reviewed by the At-
torneys' Unit.
OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 49.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 393-95.
444. Compare this lack of procedures to what EEOC provides:
The Role of the EOS - It is important that the EOS maintain a neutral
position during settlement discussions. The EOS should thoroughly ex-
plore settlement possibilities, while keeping the parties fully informed of
all potential outcomes of continued administrative processing of the
charge should a negotiated settlement not be reached. Under no circum-
stances should attempts be made to coerce either party to settle the mat-
ter(s) at issue ....
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) $ 546 (Oct. 1984).
445. OCR's procedures require only that "OCR ... consult with the complainant as
necessary to obtain information needed to develop an appropriate remedy," OCR,
1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 63, and that "OCR will
maintain contact with the complainant during the negotiation process to keep the
complainant informed of the status of the negotiations as they apply to the remedy
being sought for correction of the violation (see Adams Order, Part II-B, 10)." Id. at
64.
446. See id. at 65.
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this definition, the recipient's rights are fully protected. The com-
plainant will be notified of the content of the remedy, but her abil-
ity to have meaningful input into its content and design is
substantially limited by OCR procedures.
d. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Formal Findings
One component of procedural fairness is a written decision by
the decisionmaker, supported by a statement of reasons.4 7 In this
regard, the procedures of EEOC and OCR in achieving compliance
after formal findings appear to be satisfactory. EEOC's determi-
nation letter" s and OCR's letter of findings" 9 explain the factual
and legal basis for each conclusion.
If EEOC has determined that there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a violation of Title VII has occurred, it issues a cause
letter of determination to the parties and begins its conciliation
process.450 The procedures to be followed are explicitly set forth
in the Compliance Manual.451 The charging party must be notified
that the remedy sought is to be coextensive with what a federal
court might order upon successful litigation,452 that the charging
party retains the right to sue if she does not accept the relief
agreed to by the respondent and found sufficient by EEOC,45 3 and
that EEOC will be a signatory to the agreement.4M Both the
charging party and the respondent have opportunities to influence
the content of the conciliation agreement.4 55
The OCR complainant, on the other hand, is not a formal party
in the postfinding negotiation phase.456 The procedures at OCR
differ from efforts at voluntary compliance after informal findings
only in that at this juncture OCR will have sent a formal letter of
findings to the recipient and to the complainant. Even though the
complainant is not included in the negotiations, OCR procedures
provide that she be consulted "as necessary to obtain information
needed to develop an appropriate remedy. '457 Further, if the com-
plainant is dissatisfied, she may pursue any other available legal
remedies.458
447. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
448. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 256 (Sept. 1984), 1064 (Nov. 1985).
449. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 54.
450. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b) (1986); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) $T 1061-1064, 1070
(Nov. 1985).
451. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) $t 1221-1298 (Jan. 1986).
452. Id. 1 1265 (Mar. 1979).
453. Id. 1 1283 (Mar. 1979).
454. Id. 1 1298 (Jan. 1986).
455. d 11 1265-1267 (Nov. 1979), 1293-1297 (Jan. 1986).
456. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, suipra note 124, at 63.
457. Id.
458. Id at 66.
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In sum, although the degree of procedural fairness varies among
the informal dispute resolution techniques, fewer concerns exist
when the agencies clearly and publicly articulate the procedures
they use. Although procedural protections under such alterna-
tives are limited in comparison to formal procedures, procedures
with clearly understood governing rules are preferable to proce-
dures employed ad hoc. Even though procedural fairness is not
the value that would justify the use of informal procedures,
neither would it necessitate their abandonment.
C. Expedience, Efficiency, and Cost-Effectiveness
1. Formal Procedures
a. Litigation
Saving time and money is seldom considered an attribute of liti-
gation.459 To the contrary, the move towards ADR processes has
been, in large measure, a direct response to our overburdened
court systems and to the time and delay facing litigants.460 The
well-worn adage that justice delayed is justice denied is no less
true in civil rights enforcement than in any other type of litiga-
tion. It is perhaps more true when the plaintiff seeks affirmative
relief than when eventual monetary relief may provide complete
redress. Monetary compensation five or ten years later will not
sufficiently compensate a fifteen-year-old handicapped student
who is denied an appropriate educational program; nor will Stowe
University adequately compensate Sarah School 461 by paying her
damages for denying her admission and forcing her to attend an
institution that lacked the prestige and quality of Stowe. In addi-
tion, the prohibitive costs of most litigation prevent it from being a
viable alternative for most civil rights complainants. 462
Similarly, a cost/benefit analysis is unlikely to justify litigation
by EEOC or OCR of any particular controversy. The attractive-
ness of a litigation approach will rarely be that it is more expedi-
ent or less costly than the alternatives. The agency's limited
resources, like those of the individual, will affect its ability and
459. See NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPuTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 11.
460. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 88, at 676 (quoting address by Chief Justice War-
ren E. Burger, Minneapolis, Minnesota 4 (Aug. 21, 1985)) (stating that" 'there is some
form of mass neurosis that leads many people to think courts were created to solve all
the problems of mankind' "). Commentators, however, take issue with the purported
truism that litigation has mushroomed and that the courts are overwhelmed by op-
pressive case loads. See D. TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FELsTINER, H. KRITZER & A.
SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT FINAL REPORT pt. A, at S-17 (1983)
[hereinafter CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT]; Galanter, supra note 421, at 62;
see also Estreicher & Sexton, A Mlanagerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsi-
bilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 811-12 (1984) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court's docket is poorly managed and that the Court is not overburdened
with an unmanageable caseload).
461. See supra text preceding note 310.
462. See Block, supra note 112, at 12 (arguing that given these burdens of de novo
litigation, more use should be made of civil rights contract actions).
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willingness to litigate.463 However, the ultimate cost-effectiveness
of litigation, as opposed to an alternative approach, cannot be
judged merely by looking at the discrete case.464 One lengthy
piece of litigation, clarifying and establishing norms and rights
generally, will expedite the subsequent resolution of similar cases
in less formal forums. Consider, for example, the result of North
Haven Board of Education v. Bell,465 which established that Title
IX prohibits employment discrimination in programs and activi-
ties receiving federal financial assistance.466 Although the litiga-
tion spanned many years and may have cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars - arguably far in excess of the value of the
particular controversy involved - it saved the time and cost of
subsequent argument and debate over Title IX's coverage.
The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has at
times employed a procedure whereby its attorneys would file a
signed consent decree along with a complaint in federal district
court.467 Obviously, a consent decree entered into at the com-
mencement of litigation and subsequently endorsed by the court
has many of the advantages of a judicial decree without the disad-
vantages of excessive costs and delays.468 Any complete analysis
of the cost effectiveness of litigation would entail a separate exam-
ination of cases that resulted in judgment 46 9 and those that re-
sulted in postfiling settlements, taking into consideration the stage
of the proceeding at which the agreement was reached.
b. Administrative Enforcement Proceedings
It is difficult to justify formal administrative proceedings under
an efficiency analysis. Depending on the outcome of the hearing,
463. EEOC's revised policy to consider for litigation all cases in which conciliation
fails to obtain complete and full relief has generated concern that the agency's effec-
tiveness may diminish. See, e.g., 1985 EEOCHearings, supra note 159, at 35 (statement
of William Robinson, Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law) ("EEOC simply doesn't have the capability of litigating every case in which rea-
sonable cause is found and conciliation has failed. That is obvious from the number of
cases that they are litigating now, or that the agency has ever been able to litigate.");
id. at 26-28 (remarks of Rep. Henry) (stating that he feared that if the situation was
such that one could not negotiate informal settlement agreements, then everything
could be forced into formal litigation).
464. See Resnik, supra note 338, at 416, 422.
465. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
466. Id. at 535-36.
467. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 744 F.2d 1300, 1301 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985); United States v. South Bend Community School
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (N.D. Ind. 1981), affd, 692 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1982).
468. See Schwarzschild, supra note 111, at 894-95.
469. Cases might be divided further according to whether or not an appeal is taken
by the losing party. An analysis of the time and cost involved in litigation is well
beyond the scope of this Article. For a more detailed discussion of this area, see CIVIL
LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 460, pt. A.
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and assuming a finding of noncompliance, the time spent reaching
a final resolution, given the numerous layers of review, may ex-
ceed the time spent on a case initiated in district court.470
Although some of the transactional costs may be reduced due to
the somewhat lower level of formality involved, attorneys' fees,
witnesses' fees, and discovery costs are still substantial. Further,
there may be less likelihood of cost-saving norm articulation when
a case is resolved through the administrative process; administra-
tive determinations have less precedential import471 and are sub-
ject to a narrow scope of judicial review.47 2 As with litigation,
administrative cases settled early will fare better under a
cost/benefit analysis than those that proceed to judgment; the
case's cost-effectiveness will depend on the stage at which it is ulti-
mately resolved, whether through settlement or otherwise.473
2. Informal Procedures
The values of efficiency and cost-effectiveness are most fre-
quently touted to recommend informal over formal procedures.
An informal procedure may well resolve a particular dispute in a
fraction of the time required for formal procedures. A compelling
force behind the adoption by EEOC and OCR of some of their less
formal procedures was the desire to resolve matters expeditiously,
thereby alleviating backlogs and freeing up resources for other
purposes.
a. Mediation
EEOC instituted rapid charge procedures to reduce the inordi-
nate backlog of cases for which the agency suffered much criti-
cism. 474 This streamlined process was directed towards resolving
discrimination disputes in the shortest possible time while utiliz-
ing the fewest resources.
From this perspective, EEOC enjoyed considerable success.
While still in its pilot phase, rapid charge processing resolved from
65% to 75% of the charges filed in the regions where it was used.475
In fiscal year 1980, the first year of full operation of the rapid
470. Cf. Resnik, supra note 253, at 959.
471. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
472. A court's affirmation of an agency action that is supported by substantial evi-
dence or that is not arbitrary or capricious, or otherwise contrary to law, is likely to
have less precedential value than a determination made de novo in a judicial forum.
473. This analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For agency-by-agency and
government-wide statistics on federal administrative law judge hearings, see ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
HEARINGS: STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 1976-1978 (1980).
474. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
475. 1977-1978 EEOC 12TH-13TH ANN. REP. 17. Even GAO's generally critical re-
port on the EEOC acknowledged the remarkable changes brought about through the
rapid charge process: Between July 1, 1972 and March 31, 1975, negotiated settle-
ments constituted 11% of the resolutions that occurred and took an average of about
two years to achieve. From January 29 through September 30, 1979, 50% of 8,819
charges closed were negotiated settlements; resolutions took an average of 44 days.
1981 GAO REPORT, supra note 181, at 8-9.
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charge process, EEOC resolved Title VII charges in an average of
four months, compared to a previous average of more than two
years.476 EEOC was able to reduce its backlog in fiscal year 1980
by 65%, closing 10,000 more cases than it received that year.477
This success accelerated in fiscal year 1981, when EEOC closed
34% more Title VII cases through rapid charge processing than it
had the year before, and continued to reduce its backlog substan-
tially.478 By the end of fiscal year 1982, only 7% of the original
backlog of 99,000 cases remained.479 There is concern among some
critics of the current EEOC administration that the policy an-
nounced in December 1983 to route fewer cases through the rapid
charge system will increase the agency's backlog of cases.480
A primary reason for undertaking a mediation approach at OCR
was the hope that an experience similar to that at EEOC might
occur.48 1 When OCR began experimenting with ECR, it also had a
large backlog of cases and was under court order to eliminate the
backlog and to keep its investigations current under the terms of
the Adams Order.4 2 During its pilot project, however, OCR,
through other means, substantially reduced its backlog, so that by
the time the decision was made to implement ECR throughout the
regions, the backlog could no longer serve as justification for the
decision.48 3
476. 1981 EEOC 16TH ANN. REP. 3.
477. Id. at 3, 5. This included 31,744 new charge closures and 17,609 backlog clo-
sures for a total of 49,353 in 1980, id. at 5, compared to 39,915 in 1979, 1979 EEOC 14TH
ANN. REP. 26.
478. 1981 EEOC 16TH ANN. REP. 8.
479. 1982 EEOC 17TH ANN. REP. 3. But see PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 101-02
(suggesting that a number of major changes were instituted at EEOC simultaneously
with rapid charge processing, so that it is difficult to assess the impact of mediation
techniques alone).
480. According to Nancy Kreiter, Research Director, Women Employed Institute,
the current administration has actually reversed the pace of reduction of the backlog.
"There were 33,417 backlogged cases remaining in fiscal year 1982; by fiscal year 1984,
there were 36,903 cases backlogged. Moreover, the EEOC itself currently estimates
that it will have 65,474 unresolved charges in fiscal year 1986 - a 96 percent increase
in four years." 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note 159, at 59.
481. See, e.g., 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 16 (proposing that ECR would
eliminate the need for an OCR investigation by providing complainants with an early
opportunity to resolve complaints voluntarily).
The PEER Study had concluded that ECR, when successful, saved a great deal of
time, and when unsuccessful caused the whole process to take longer. Nonetheless,
the study found that approximately two-thirds of the cases in which ECR was at-
tempted resulted in agreements, so that overall, the process was cost effective. PEER
STUDY, supra note 92, at 60-61, 81-83, 105-06. The study does raise one quandary, how-
ever. To the extent that mediation turns out to be much less expensive per case, it
may cause problems in the budget process. "The budget process assumes that the
least cost method is the best, and provides funds accordingly." Id. at 140.
482. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 8, 41; H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70, at
6.
483. The PEER Study emphasizes that OCR had a huge backlog when it first un-
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The elimination of the backlog can in no way be attributed to
the ECR experiment. In fact, the number of complaints received
by OCR plummeted after fiscal year 1980.484 The receipts in fiscal
year 1982 represented a 47% decline from the 1980 receipts,48 5
which themselves were lower than previously.486 As of October 1,
1979, OCR had a pending caseload of 1,401 complaints.48 7 The
pending caseload five years later, as of September 30, 1984, was
861.48 On the other hand, the number of cases being closed each
year by OCR reflect no dramatic increase.48 9
dertook its pilot mediation program, but that within two years, the backlog was elimi-
nated and the case load per investigator was quite manageable. PEER STUDY, supra
note 92, at 104. As of March 1980, OCR had only 259 "backlogged," or "carryover,"
complaints, most of which were being held up for lack of policy. "Thus, mediation
makes sense for OCR only if the agency feels that mediation offers some critical val-
ues for the agency clientele that cannot be secured through traditional means, and
that those values outweigh the likely losses." Id. at 187.
484. The expected number of receipts at OCR for fiscal year 1980, based on experi-
ence, was 5,855 complaints. Annual Operating Plan (AOP) for 1980, 44 Fed. Reg.
76,864, 76,865 (1979). The actual number of complaints received was 3,497. 1980 OCR
FIRST ANN. REP. 21. Statistics obtained by the author through a FOIA request (on file
at the George Washington Law Review) indicated 3,381 complaints received.
Although there are some discrepancies between the figures in the published reports
and those furnished through the FOIA request, the discrepancies do not affect the
conclusions to be drawn. Where the numbers differ, they will be indicated thus:
(3,381-FOIA). The number of expected complaints for 1981 was 4,090. AOP for 1981,
46 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5036 (1981). Actual complaints received totaled 2,876 (2,890-FOIA).
AOP for 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 9900, 9901 (1982); see also 1981 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. ANN.
REP. 77. But see 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 17 (indicating that 2,887 com-
plaints were received in fiscal year 1981). The expected number of receipts for fiscal
year 1982 was 3,592. AOP for 1982, supra, at 9902. In fact, OCR received only 1,840
complaints (1,841-FOIA). 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 17.
485. 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 17.
486. This phenomenon prompts some explanation. EEOC has experienced no sim-
ilar dramatic decline in charge receipts. Since 1980, EEOC receipts have climbed from
45,343 to 56,228 in 1981, 54,145 in 1982, 70,252 in 1983, and 63,874 in 1984. See summary
data prepared by EEOC in response to author's FOIA request (copy on file at the
George Washington Law Review). Although EEOC has experienced occasional de-
creases in charge receipts, the comparison to OCR's experience is striking. State and
local human rights commissions continue to receive more cases than they can com-
fortably handle. See Oreskes, supra note 410, at B4, col. 3. Although some might be
tempted to credit the differences to a decrease in discrimination in educational pro-
grams, it appears more likely that the decrease reflects a perception on the part of
potential OCR complainants that they will be unlikely to obtain a satisfactory remedy
by filing with the current OCR. See Letter from former Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights Cindy Brown to Marjorie A. Silver (Aug. 27, 1985) (copy on file at the George
Washington Law Review). The United States Commission on Civil Rights has been
hesitant to venture an opinion on the decline. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
AND PERFORMANCE 211 n.24 (Nov. 1983) [hereinafter FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS COMMIT-
MENTS].
OCR complaint receipts stabilized somewhat after 1982. In 1983, OCR received
1,950 complaints. 1983 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. ANN. REP. 97. In 1984, the number of
complaints received was 1,928. AOP for 1985, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,599, 48,600 (1984); see
also 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 22. An increase has occurred in the past two fiscal
years. In fiscal year 1985, OCR received 2,199 complaints, the highest number since
1982. AOP for 1986, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,624, 48,625 (1985). OCR received 2,648 complaints
in 1986, AOP for 1987, 54 Fed. Reg. 45,935, 45,936, a substantial increase over 1985.
487. AOP for 1980, supra note 484, at 76,865.
488. AOP for 1985, supra note 486, at 48,602. The pending caseload rose to 1,009
cases by the end of fiscal year 1985, AOP for 1986, supra note 486, at 48,625, but de-
clined again to 887 by the close of 1986. AOP for 1987, supra note 486, at 45,936.
489. The agency closed 2,877 cases in fiscal year 1980 (2,712-FOIA). 1980 OCR
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In fact, because of the declining numbers of complaints received
over the period of time in which OCR attempted a number of pro-
cedural innovations, there existed no dramatic need for alterna-
tives to the traditional procedures, certainly not as compared to
the need that had existed at EEOC when it instituted the rapid
charge process. One problem with the traditional procedures,
however, was the inadequacy in many cases of the time allowed
for complaint processing under the terms of the Adams Order.
Thus, no matter how manageable the number of cases might be,
the demand that a case be investigated and a finding made within
105 days of receipt created an impetus to short circuit the
process.490
ECR, implemented system-wide in fiscal year 1982, was one
such approach.491 A case resolved through ECR created no Adams
problems. Of course, if the agency attempted ECR and failed, the
time already passed would make compliance with the Adams
timeframes that much more difficult. To address this problem,
OCR specified a period of time during which ECR might be at-
tempted. Day-by-day procedures were set forth,492 and efforts at
ECR were to be terminated after the twenty-fifth day from receipt
of the complaint, unless the regional director granted a maximum
ten-day extension.493
Available data suggest that ECR has had little impact on achiev-
ing the goals of expedience and cost effectiveness. In OCR's An-
nual Report for fiscal years 1981 and 1982, the agency stated that
initial analyses showed that in more than half the cases in which
ECR was attempted, the parties reached a voluntary agreement.494
FIRST ANN. REP. 2. It closed 3,329 in 1981 (3,303-FOIA), 1981 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.
ANN. REP. 77; 2,267 in 1982 (2,272-FOIA), AOP for 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 1789, 1792 (1983);
2,273 in 1983 (2,263-FOIA), 1983 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. ANN. REP. 97 (1984); 1,976 in 1984
(1,964-FOIA), AOP for 1985, supra note 486, at 48,600; and 2,040 in 1985, AOP for 1986,
supra note 486, at 48,625. 1986 may be an exception; the agency closed 2,788 in that
year. AOP for 1987, supra note 486, at 45,936. OCR reported that the average age of
pending complaints had decreased impressively, from a high of 1,297 days at the close
of 1982 to 229 days at the close of 1984. 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 22.
490. See 1985 Hearings on OCRA supra note 70, at 120-21. During a question and
answer session between Representative John Conyers and Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights, Harry Singleton, Mr. Singleton claimed that despite a surplus of funding
and adequate resources, it was impossible for OCR to consistently meet Adams
timeframes because such timeframes "are just unworkable." Id. at 121. According to
some agency officials, OCR personnel have resorted to backdating documents to make
it appear that they had complied with the Adams timeframes. Kurtz, supra note 133,
at Al, col. 4. As a result, a House subcommittee has asked DOJ to investigate the
matter. Williams, Meese Investigation of Education Dept. Requested N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1987, at A19, col. 1.
491. See AOP for 1982, supra note 484, at 9901.
492. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at
10-11.
493. See id. app. J at 11.
494. 1981-1982 OCR SECOND ANN. REP. 17. In its 1983 Final Annual Operating
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In fiscal year 1983, OCR reported that the parties agreed to at-
tempt ECR in 62% of the cases in which the agency offered it and
that 64% of those reached successful resolution.495 No informa-
tion, however, was given as to the number of complaints in-
volved.496 For fiscal year 1984, OCR reported that it offered ECR
in 246 complaints; it was accepted in 175, and successful in 104.4 97
The report gave no information as to the duration of the pro-
cess. 498 Nonetheless, the number of complaints for which resolu-
tion was even attempted through ECR procedures is a small
fraction of the number of complaints handled annually by OCR.499
It is probably fair to assume that if the ECR effort were signifi-
cantly valuable in achieving the goal of cost-effectiveness, the
agency's reports would so indicate.
b. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance Before Findings50 0
Compared with the more formal alternatives, a case that is suc-
cessfully resolved during the pendency of an investigation will
save time and resources. But for such informal resolutions, OCR
would probably have more difficulty in meeting its obligations
under the Adams Order. 0 1 The frequency of negotiated voluntary
compliance, however, is difficult to assess. Because a case closed
in this manner does not require an investigative report or letters
Plan, which apparently was issued before the 1981-82 Annual Report, OCR boasted a
95% success rate during the first three months that ECR had been implemented, with
an average duration of 22 days per complaint. AOP for 1983, supra note 489, at 1792.
495. AOP for 1984, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,588, 57,590 (1983).
496. Id. Another source indicates that ECR was offered in approximately 10% of
all complaints received. 1983 U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc. ANN. REP. 98. Additionally, 66% of
all ECR starts were mediated successfully, an 8% increase over the fiscal year 1982
figures. Id. Summary data provided to this author in response to a FOIA request
showed that ECR was offered in 204 cases in fiscal year 1983, that it was accepted in
135, and of those was successful in 83, that is, in 61.5% of the cases in which it was
offered.
497. AOP for 1985, supra note 486, at 48,602; 1984 OCR FOURTH ANN. REP. 47.
Again, these figures vary somewhat from those provided in response to this author's
FOIA request. (In 1984, ECR offered in 240 cases, accepted in 170, and successful in
112). The Annual Operating Plan for 1986 reported that for 1985, ECR was offered in
238 cases, accepted in 138, and successful in 101. AOP for 1986, supra note 486, at
48,625. The Annual Operating Plan for 1987 reported that for 1986, ECR was offered
in 177 cases, accepted in 94, and successful in 61, AOP for 1987, supra note 486, at
45,935, thus evidencing a greater decline in the success of ECR than in any previous
year.
498. The information OCR provided in response to the FOIA request states that
the average length of a case resolved through ECR was 21 days in fiscal year 1983 and
17.5 days in fiscal year 1984.
499. In 1986, for example, OCR received 2,648 complaints. This resulted in ECR
being offered in only 6.7% of all complaints received, attempted in 3.5%, and success-
ful in 2.3% See supra note 497. For suggested reasons as to why attempts at ECR fail,
see PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 46.
500. As for EEOC, since its "mediation" procedures and its "negotiated compliance
before determination" are merged in its rapid charge procedures, see EEOC Compl.
Man. (CCH) 11 542, 545 (Oct. 1984), no separate analysis as to cost-effectiveness of
efficiency is warranted.
501. Under the Adams Order, OCR has 105 days from receipt of the complaint to
complete its investigation and make a formal determination of compliance. See supra
note 113. Thus, any resolution reached during the investigation will assist in meeting
the Adams timeframes.
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of findings, there inevitably will be a savings in the agency's time
and resources.5 02
c. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Informal
Findings
OCR has presented no statistics to demonstrate the cost-effec-
tiveness of its pre-LOF negotiation procedures. 0 3 Again, if the
agency achieves a resolution at this stage, rather than after it is-
sues an LOF, some time and perhaps some money will be saved. If
OCR fails to achieve a resolution, the entire process will take
longer; after the informal negotiations break down, OCR will send
out an LOF and recommence negotiations to attempt voluntary
compliance.50 4 By the terms of the Adams Order, OCR has only
105 days from receipt of the complaint to make a final determina-
tion. If OCR's investigation uncovers a violation, OCR must at-
tempt its pre-LOF negotiations; and, if such negotiations fail, issue
a violation LOF, all within the same 105 days.50 5 Understandably,
OCR has considerable difficulty in accomplishing this task within
such a short period of time.50 6 Thus, its pre-LOF negotiation pro-
cedures are, at best, of negligible value in improving the efficiency
of its case processing.
d. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Formal Findings
Again, it is a reasonable assumption that negotiating compliance
502. This does not suggest that the approach used by OCR is necessary to fulfill the
agency's legal obligations, and, as the previous discussions on justice and fairness sug-
gest, this approach may well be counterproductive towards those ends.
503. The Annual Operating Plans for 1985 and 1986 discuss the results of the ECR
initiative, but say nothing about the success rate of pre-LOF negotiations. Data pro-
vided in response to the author's FOIA request, see Table 2, infra note 506, suggest
that most cases in which a violation is found are now being resolved before sending
the LOF. However, for those cases that are not resolved at this stage, the amount of
time that passes before the issuance of an LOF can be counted in years rather than
days. Although OCR's statistics for 1985 show distinct improvement in the age of
cases on the LOF issuance date, the average age of cases is still far in excess of what is
required by the Adams Order.
504. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 57.
505. Once the LOF is sent, OCR has another 90 days to attempt voluntary compli-
ance with the recipient. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. These time
frames may seem skewed; they are under current procedures. They were designed to
accommodate the pre-1982 approach when OCR sent out a violation LOF upon com-
pletion of an investigation, before any attempts at negotiating voluntary compliance.
OCR's attempts to persuade the court to adjust the timeframes to reflect the new
procedures have been unsuccessful. See supra note 133.
506. OCR has difficulty meeting these timeframes in all cases in which LOFs are
sent, whether they result in findings of no violation, violation, or violation corrected.
The following tables, extrapolated from summary data provided by OCR to the author
in response to a FOIA request, demonstrate that although the average (median) age of
all cases approaches the requisite Adams timeframes, the average (median) age of
cases in which LOFs are issued is much greater.
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after formal findings, when successful, is more cost effective than
litigation or formal administrative enforcement, and less cost ef-
fective than successful attempts at negotiating resolutions before
findings. Both statutes mandate that the agency engage in this
process, but is there justification from a cost/benefit perspective
for such requirements? That is, if such attempts were to fail more
often than not, perhaps it would be more cost effective for the
agency to proceed to formal litigation or administrative enforce-
ment immediately upon findings of violations.
In fiscal year 1977, EEOC made 6,419 cause determinations, suc-
cessfully conciliated 2,108 cause findings, and failed to conciliate
4,390.507 Thus, approximately one out of every three cases in
which EEOC attempted conciliation was resolved successfully. In
the following fiscal year, EEOC made findings of cause in only
2,560 cases; conciliation was successful in 1,425 cases and failed in
Table 1: Average Age of All Cases at Closure
Average
Fiscal Year No. of Cases Age at Closure
1980 2,712 93 days
1981 3,303 116 days
1982 2,272 148 days
1983 2,263 147 days
1984 1,964 105 days
Table 2: Average Age of Cases When LOFs Are Issued
FY 1980 No. of Cases Average Age
no violation 650 120 days
violation 349 259 days
FY 1981 No. of Cases Average Age
no violation 1067 153 days
violation 538 329 days
FY 1982 No. of Cases Average Age
not classified 3 1399 days
no violation 852 189.5 days
violation 303 425 days
violation corrected 34 386.5 days
violation not corrected 1 1760 days
FY 1983 No. of Cases Average Age
no violation 640 211 days
violation 25 1254 days
violation corrected 465 288 days
violation not corrected 37 962 days
FY 1984 No. of Cases Average Age
no violation 596 140 days
violation corrected 356 175.5 days
violation not corrected 24 603.5 days
Note that the average age listed in Table 1 is until closure; the age in
Table 2 is until LOF issued, which, for violations not corrected is not
the end of the process.
507. 1977-1978 EEOC 12TH-13TH ANN. REP. 58.
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806.508 Thus, in fiscal year 1978, the ratio flipped; conciliation was
successful in more than three out of five cases. 0 9 From the time
the rapid charge system was instituted in fiscal year 1979, through
fiscal year 1984, however, successful conciliations under Title VII
have never approached the number of unsuccessful conciliations;
in fact, the number of successful conciliations never exceeded
27.5% of the total attempts.510 There are, however, a number of
reasonable explanations for this result. Apart from the vagaries
of how agency statistics are maintained,511 the number of cases re-
solved through predetermination procedures grew enormously be-
tween fiscal years 1977 and 1983, with only minor exceptions.5 2 In
508. I&
509. I have discovered no explanation, reasonable or otherwise, for the 1978
statistics.
510. Table 3 shows the number of Title VII conciliation attempts, successful and
unsuccessful, and the percentage of attempts that were successful by fiscal year:
Table 3
Fiscal Year Total Successful Unsuccessful % Success.
1977 6,498 2,108 4,390 32%
1978 2,231 1,425 806 64%
1979 2,105 480 1,635 19%
1980 1,520 308 1,212 20%
1981 2,020 500 1,520 25%
1982 1,469 338 1,131 23%
1983 2,178 403 1,775 18.5%
1984 1,906 525 1,381 27.5%
See EEOC Annual Reports for years 1977-1983; summary data in response to FOIA
request; EEOC Public Affairs transmittals entitled "Compliance Activities 1976-1984."
511. Comparing the data reported in EEOC's annual reports is frequently frustrat-
ing. For example, in fiscal year 1978, EEOC included withdrawals without settlement
in its totals for predetermination closures. For all other years reported, such with-
drawals were treated as administrative closures. It is frequently unclear whether re-
ported statistics pertain to all jurisdictions enforced by EEOC, or only its Title VII
jurisdiction. Complaints alleging multiple bases for jurisdiction are sometimes re-
ported as Title VII complaints, sometimes under the other jurisdictions, sometimes
under both.
512. Table 4 shows the number and percentage of predetermination closures com-
pared to the total number of closures, for all jurisdictions:
Table 4
Predetermination
Fiscal Year Total Closures Closures 0
1977 48,922 3,216 6.5%
1978 52,715 7,425 14%
1979 39,915 9,663 24%
1980 49,225 15,780 32%
1981 71,690 20,719 29%
1982 67,052 19,705 29%
1983 74,441 19,474 26%
1984 55,034 11,460 21%
See supra note 510.
Note the decline in numbers in 1984. A likely explanation is that the shift in em-
1987]
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  569 1986-1987
no year since fiscal year 1977 has the number of cause determina-
tions approached the 1977 level.513
Since the advent of rapid charge processing, the number of un-
successful conciliations each year has ranged from 25% to 40% of
the number of unsuccessful conciliations that occurred in fiscal
year 1977.514 It is therefore likely that the rapid charge system
reduced the number of cases formerly resolved only after a cause
finding. Available statistics demonstrate that although the
number of predetermination resolutions has decreased greatly
since the December 1983 change in policy,51 5 there has been a less
dramatic increase in the number of cases successfully
conciliated. 16
In general, OCR boasts extremely impressive statistics in resolv-
phasis away from the use of rapid charge processing towards fuller investigation has
resulted in fewer predetermination closures as well as fewer total closures. 1984 is
the first year since 1977 that the number of receipts exceeded the number of closures;
in fact, by a far wider margin than ever before, as demonstrated by Table 5:
Table 5: Comparison of Total Receipts to Total Closures
Fiscal Year Total Receipts Total Closures (+/-)
1977 57,562 48,922 + 8,640
1978 37,390 52,715 - 15,325
1979 35,279 39,915 - 4,636
1980 45,382 49,225 - 3,843
1981 56,228 71,690 - 15,462
1982 54,145 67,052 - 12,907
1983 70,252 74,441 - 4,189
1984 68,874 55,034 + 13,840
See supra note 510.
513. In fact, the percentage of cause determinations in 1977 is 3.5 times greater
than the average percentage of cause determinations in the other seven fiscal years
for which there is data. Table 6 demonstrates the number and percentage of cause
determinations as compared to total closures under all jurisdictions:
Table 6
Total Cause
Fiscal Year Total Closures Determinations %
1977 48,922 6,498 13%
1978 52,715 2,231 4%
1979 39,915 2,115* 5%*
1980 49,225 1,520* 3%*
1981 71,690 2,020* 3%*
1982 67,052 1,970 3%
1983 74,441 2,565 3%
1984 55,034 2,128 4%
* Since EEOC has not furnished statistics on the total cause determinations for the
years in question, these figures represent the sum of successful and unsuccessful con-
ciliation attempts, which approximate, but are in all likelihood less than, the total
number of cause determinations.
See supra note 510.
514. See Table 3, supra note 510.
515. Although Table 3, supra note 510, shows only a 5% to 11% decrease in prede-
termination closures as a percentage of total closures in FY 1984, Table 4, supra note
512, demonstrates that the total number of closures dropped dramatically in FY 1984.
516. See Table 3, supra note 510. EEOC successfully conciliated between 25 and
213 more cases in fiscal year 1984 than in any other year since the aberrant year 1978;
the percentage of successful conciliations compared to the total number of cases in
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ing compliance matters without formal processes. Most cases in
which a violation is found are resolved by this stage. 517 However,
while few cases necessitate additional processes, from the time of
the filing of the complaint through the resolution of a case in
which a violation LOF has been issued, frequently years have
transpired.5 18
One may make some general observations about the cost effec-
tiveness of informal administrative procedures as opposed to that
of the formal alternatives. A complainant faced with the choice of
filing a private right of action under Title VI or a complaint with
OCR,519 most likely will choose the latter, largely because she an-
ticipates that the process will be far less costly than litigation.
Given the variety of informal mechanisms available to the agency
to resolve the complaint prelitigation, it will also likely take less
time than if she were to litigate.520
D. Finality and Enforceability of Result
1. Formal Procedures
a. Litigation
It is perhaps axiomatic that the most enforceable of all dispute
resolutions is the judicial decree.521 Finality is bounded only by
the right to appeal to a higher court,522 and enforceability is
bounded only by the solvency of the defendant. Thus, cases that
which conciliation was attempted increased by 2.5% to 9% over the previous four
years.
517. Until the advent of pre-LOF negotiations, most violations were corrected at
this stage. For example, the U.S. Department of Education reported that voluntary
compliance was achieved in 368 out of 377 complaints in which initial findings of viola-
tion were made, a 98% success rate, which the Department considered to be "in ac-
cordance with administration objectives." 1981 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. ANN. REP. 77; see
also 1983 OCR THIRD ANN. REP. 21 ("[V]ery few investigations result in termination
of funds or referral to DOJ. Most cases are voluntarily settled by negotiated compli-
ance agreements."). The bulk of violation cases are now resolved at the pre-LOF
stage. See Table 2, supra note 506.
518. See Table 2, supra note 506.
519. This choice is not available to the EEOC complainant who must first exhaust
her administrative remedies, see supra text accompanying note 177, although after the
expiration of 180 days, she may choose to have EEOC continue its investigation, or
obtain a notice of a right to sue, see supra text accompanying note 145.
520. It is quite likely that the average complainant, if the administrative mecha-
nisms were unavailable, would choose the option of not making a claim or "lumping
it," to use Professor Galanter's term. Galanter, supra note 169, at 134. In fact, studies
indicate that informal mechanisms tend to attract new cases rather than to divert
cases from the traditional processes. See Singer, supra note 74, at 577.
521. This is not, however, meant to minimize the difficulty plaintiffs and courts
face in monitoring and enforcing structural injunctions. See Lottman, Paper Victories
and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93, 98-104
(V. Bradley & G. Clarke ed. 1976).
522. See Resnik, supra note 253, at 865-70.
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end in judgment further the values of finality and enforceability
better than any other procedural alternative.
The same is not necessarily true for consent decrees, as is illus-
trated by the Supreme Court's controversial decision in Firefight-
ers Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts 523 and the cases that have
followed. In Stotts, the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's decision
that the strong policy favoring voluntary settlement of Title VII
actions permitted encroachment on an otherwise valid seniority
system.524 The issue was whether minorities that were recently
hired pursuant to a consent decree could validly be protected
against last-hired lay offs under the seniority system provided for
in the collective bargaining agreement. 525 The majority suggested
that if any of the recently hired minorities had been specifically
identified in the consent decree 26 as victims of past, intentional
discrimination, that might have been sufficient to override the
seniority system as to lay offs. 527 Justice Blackmun's dissent em-
phasizes the paradox of the majority's position:
The whole point of the consent decree in these cases - and in-
deed the point of most Title VII consent decrees - is for both
parties to avoid the time and expense of litigating the question
of liability and identifying the victims of discrimination.... Any
suggestion that a consent decree can provide relief only if a de-
fendant concedes liability would drastically reduce, of course,
the incentives for entering into consent decrees. Such a result
would be incongruous, given the Court's past statements that
"Congress expressed a strong preference for encouraging volun-
tary settlement of employment discrimination claims. '528
The Court's recent decision in Local No. 93 of the International
Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland5 29 limits the reach
of the Stotts decision. It holds that a court is not barred from ap-
proving a consent decree that resolves a Title VII compliance
problem merely because the decree provides for remedies - in
this case promotional goals for minorities - that may be broader
than what the court could have ordered after trial.530
In addition to the problems raised by collateral attack of consent
decrees by nonconsenting parties, 531 the finality and enforceability
of the decrees may be compromised by the parties to the original
action. Professor Fiss suggests that the court is at a loss when the
original parties return to court seeking modification of the consent
523. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
524. Id. at 578.
525. Id. at 566-68.
526. Because there was no trial, there were no findings of fact. Id at 579.
527. Id. (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-76 (1977)).
528. Id. at 615-16 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14
(1981)).
529. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
530. Id. at 3077. The court made clear, however, that the "consent decree does not
purport to resolve any claims the Union might have," either under the Constitution or
by contract. Id. at 3080.
531. See United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1517-18 n.16 (11th Cir.
1983); Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 185, at 165-68.
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decree: "[The judge] has no basis for assessing the request. He
cannot, to use Cardozo's somewhat melodramatic formula, easily
decide whether the 'dangers, once substantial, have become atten-
uated to a shadow,' because, by definition, he never knew the
dangers."532
According to Professor Fiss, although the plaintiff may return
to court to seek a contempt citation, charging that the defendant
abridged the decree, courts are reluctant to invoke the draconian
remedy of contempt. "Courts do not see a mere bargain between
the parties as a sufficient foundation for the exercise of their coer-
cive powers."533 Thus, questions concerning finality and enforce-
ability of consent decrees - as with all the informal procedures
discussed below - are not insubstantial.
b. Administrative Enforcement Proceedings
If an administrative determination, made after opportunity for a
hearing, was appealed through all available levels of review, both
administrative and judicial, the results would be as conclusive and
as enforceable as a judicial decree. If OCR terminated federal fi-
nancial assistance, and the recipient had not availed itself of all
avenues of review but nonetheless sued to enjoin the termination,
it is unlikely that the court would consider the merits de novo; the
doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and collateral
estoppel would likely bar further consideration of the merits.534
Thus, we have little reason to prefer litigation over administrative
enforcement if our concerns are finality and enforceability of the
result 535
532. Fiss, supra note 89, at 1083 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106,
119 (1932)).
533. Id. at 1084. Nonetheless, the remedy of civil contempt has been used for viola-
tions of consent decrees. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3033 (1986); United States v. Board of Educ. 744 F.2d 1300, 1308
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
534. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 491 (1971). A parallel issue arises
when a complainant, who loses before the agency, then elects to pursue her private
right of action in federal court, when she has fulfilled the exhaustion requirement or
when there was no exhaustion requirement. The Supreme Court is increasingly will-
ing to apply preclusive effect to the administrative determination, thus barring fur-
ther litigation on the discrimination charge. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 106 S.
Ct. 3220, 3224-27 (1986) (holding that unreviewed state administrative proceedings are
entitled to preclusive effect for reconstruction civil rights statutes claims but not for
Title VII claims); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-85 (holding that
state court review of administrative determinations is entitled to preclusive effect),
reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1133 (1982); see also Resnik, supra note 253, at 978 ("Kremer
suggests a future in which agencies, not courts, will issue decisions that bar future
litigants.").
535. Nonetheless, our concerns regarding expedience and efficiency might move us
in the direction of preferring litigation. See text accompanying note 470.
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2. Informal Procedures
Finality and enforceability of the result of any informally nego-
tiated resolution to a civil rights complaint are critical concerns in
evaluating the desirability of one procedure over another. No
matter how just, fair,5 36 or expedient a mechanism may be, most, if
not all, of the benefit gained through the procedure will be lost if
the result can be ignored and has no effect in a court of law, or if
either party continues to pursue the matter in other forums.537
When the remedy is purely retrospective or capable of being im-
plemented immediately (for example, back pay or allowing a fe-
male student to try out for a team), the issues of whether an
agreement is enforceable, where it is enforceable, and by whom,
are of far less concern. The reason is not because the case is less
important, but because the likelihood of breach is less when the
remedy can be implemented immediately. In many civil rights
cases, however, a component of the remedy will take effect over
time - such as desegregation of classes or schools, or the making
of structural changes to a physical plant for wheelchair accessibil-
ity. The question of enforceability then becomes critical. The is-
sue arises as to whether such resolutions, which are far more
susceptible to breach, suggest the use of formal agreements to pro-
mote enforceability. Or, can the question of enforceability be sep-
arated from the procedures used to reach a negotiated agreement?
Would it be sufficient to require that informal agreements be re-
duced to writing and signed by all parties, including the enforce-
ment agency, and to make the agreements enforceable by the
agency upon breach in federal court? Might formal procedures
discourage subsequent breaches more than informal procedures?
Would employers and universities be more likely to gamble -
given limited resources and the necessity of setting priorities -
that there would be fewer suits for breach of informal settle-
ments, where there had been no actual finding or determination
of discrimination by the agency, than for breach of decisions or
agreements derived from the formal process? 53 8
Both EEOC and OCR have suffered substantial criticism for in-
adequate monitoring of cases they have resolved.539 The agencies'
536. Of course the parties' perception that the procedures used were fair might
well result in more willing acceptance of the outcome and therefore finality. See NA-
TIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71, at 17.
537. See Resnik, supra note 253, at 854-55.
538. This raises the question of whether we want government enforcement of
agreements where there exists no actual finding of discrimination and, therefore, rea-
son to be concerned that perhaps there was no provable discrimination. See supra
text following note 284.
539. See 1981 GAO REPORT, supra note 181, at 36. The report mentions that
although EEOC was required to monitor compliance with conciliation agreements and
consent decrees, the procedures used were inadequate for assessing employer compli-
ance. Id. at 38. In 1983 EEOC again came under criticism for failure to monitor con-
ciliation agreements. See 1983 Oversight Hearings, supra note 275, at 12 (prepared
statement of Professor Hill). EEOC recognizes the need for close monitoring of the
expected increase in conciliation agreements under the December 1983 revised policy.
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limited resources and the pressure to eliminate backlogs and keep
current with incoming cases give monitoring a low priority.540
When the original complainant or another specific party is injured
by the respondent's perceived breach, that person usually will
bring the matter to the agency's attention.
If complainant and respondent have entered into an agreement,
the aggrieved complainant would have a common law action for
breach to enforce the agreement or contract in state court,
whether or not the agency is a party to the agreement. However,
for the same reasons that many complainants go to the agency in
the first place, namely limited resources and hope of an expedi-
tious resolution and expert assistance, the common law action will
seldom be a satisfactory solution.541 Thus, the critical inquiry is
what action, if any, the agency will take on behalf of the
complainant.54 -
a. Mediation
If an agreement between the complainant and the respondent is
consensual, noncoerced, and thus acceptable to both parties, there
arguably will be a greater likelihood of compliance with its
terms.54 Were mediation to succeed in achieving this end - espe-
cially in complicated civil rights cases that might otherwise be the
subject of ongoing structural injunctions-" - the finality that
would result would go far in recommending it as an alternative
procedure. Nonetheless, concern remains regarding available
remedies for breach of the agreement.545
See EEOC, GUIDANCE ON MODIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE PROCESS,
reprinted in 1985 EEOC Hearings, supra note 159, at 11, 14.
As to OCR's monitoring of such agreements, see H.R. REP. No. 458, supra note 70,
at 31-32, 33-34; Block, supra note 112, at 14.
540. See FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITMENTS, supra note 486, at 33-35.
541. An action may exist in a small claims court, but it is unlikely that the jurisdic-
tion of a small claims court would extend beyond rather limited monetary relief; fre-
quently, if not usually, the complainant will seek relief in excess of the maximum
jurisdictional amount of the small claims court. Moreover, the relief sought may be
injunctive in nature. See R. SPURRIER, INEXPENSIVE JUSTICE 16-19 (1980); cf F.
SANDER, supra note 77, at 3-9.
542. Similar issues arise when there is an agreement between the agency and the
respondent but no specific agreement between the complainant and the respondent,
for example, with an OCR negotiated voluntary resolution occurring after commence-
ment of the investigation. Again, the issue is what options are available to the agency,
and what action the agency actually will take.
543. See generally NATIONAL INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 71.
544. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 338, at 393-95.
545. Compare Parsons v. Yellow Freight Sys., 741 F.2d 871, 874 (6th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a party to a settlement agreement cannot seek enforcement in state
court without again exhausting Title VII procedures through EEOC) with Eatmon v.
Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that
there is no exhaustion requirement for enforcement of conciliation agreements and,
therefore, either EEOC or the aggrieved parties may go directly to court).
1987]
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  575 1986-1987
A number of recent cases have addressed whether an agreement
reached through EEOC's rapid charge procedures is enforceable
by the agency in federal court under Title VIJ.s4 6 Although EEOC
conciliation agreements have generally been held enforceable
under Title VII, the enforceability of negotiated settlements under
rapid charge has been somewhat controversial. In 1982, in EEOC
v. Pierce Packing Co.,547 the Ninth Circuit rejected EEOC's claim
that an employer's breach of a settlement agreement was enforce-
able just as a conciliation agreement would be, holding that the
process of charge, notice, investigation, and determination of rea-
sonable cause were prerequisites under Title VII to any action
brought by EEOC.5 48 Two years later, in EEOC v. Henry Beck
Co.,549 without specifically rejecting the holding in Pierce Pack-
ing,550 the Fourth Circuit held such an agreement to be enforcea-
ble. The court could find no satisfactory reason for distinguishing
between the enforceability under Title VII of a conciliation agree-
ment and a negotiated settlement, finding that "[b]oth promote
the statutory goal of voluntary compliance and neither subverts
other provisions of Title VII."'551 According to the Fourth Circuit,
Enforcement of the settlement agreement in this case will not
involve litigation of the underlying unfair employment practice
charge; it will be limited to issues of contract law. Federal juris-
diction is extended to this case not because it involves a violation
of Title VII but because it is essential to preserving the EEOC's
function as an efficient conciliator, a function that is central to
Title VII's statutory scheme. 552
Thus, the Fourth Circuit recognized that enforceability legiti-
mates the process under Title VII and, concomitantly, that the
process of voluntary resolution without enforceability would un-
dermine the congressional scheme of Title VII to eradicate, and
compensate for the effects of, employment discrimination.
In EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,553 the Fifth Circuit described
one of the ways in which nonenforceability might undermine the
Title VII scheme. Although the decision addressed the enforce-
ability of a conciliation agreement, it speaks to issues that are also
546. See, e.g., EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 305-06 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding
that EEOC may enforce voluntary agreement by filing suit in district court under
Title VII); EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982) (ruling
that EEOC may not seek judicial enforcement of agreement without independent in-
vestigation and reasonable cause determination); cf. Parsons, 741 F.2d at 874.
547. 669 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982).
548. Id. at 608.
549. 729 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1984).
550. Id. at 305.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 306; cf. EEOC v. Liberty Trucking, 695 F.2d 1038, 1044 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982)
(stating that the court did not decide whether "a distinction should be made between
conciliation agreements, which are statutory creatures and which follow an EEOC
investigation and determination of reasonable cause, and settlement agreements
which are a device created by the EEOC to resolve complaints prior to investigation").
The court based its holding of enforceability on "the voluntary nature of conciliation
agreements and not upon any administrative finding of reasonable cause." Id.
553. 714 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
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true of prefinding negotiated resolutions. The employer, Safeway
Stores, argued that EEOC's only cause of action was to sue to es-
tablish the underlying charge of discrimination. The court noted
that the essence of this argument was that the conciliation agree-
ment entered into by EEOC was without legal effect, and could
therefore be violated with impunity.
Were we to accept Safeway's position, an employer would be
free to enter into a conciliation agreement, bide its time for so
long as it benefited from doing so, and then breach the agree-
ment with no fear of sanction. The employer would have lost
nothing. It would then face only the same prospect of suit on
the underlying discrimination charge it would have faced prior
to its entering the conciliation agreement. The EEOC and the
aggrieved employees, on the other hand, would have suffered
serious prejudice. The suit would be possible only after the
Commission learned an employer or a union would not fulfill its
obligations. Suit undertaking to prove discrimination would
have been substantially delayed. Such delay would potentially
result in difficulty in proving other violations of the Act. Wit-
nesses might no longer be available, memories would have
faded, and crucial documents might not have been preserved.
Conciliation, instead of being a means of enforcing the law,
could well become a dilatory tactic which could be used to make
enforcement of Title VII less effective. s54
The court in Safeway, however, drew a critical distinction be-
tween the enforceability of the conciliation agreement, and the le-
gitimacy of a provision of that agreement that frustrated collective
bargaining agreement provisions regarding seniority.555 Echoing
the Supreme Court's holding in W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local
Union 759,556 the Fifth Circuit held that absent consent by the
union,55 7 a conciliation agreement entered into among the agency,
the employer, and the charging parties could not alter the enforce-
ability of a valid collective bargaining agreement. 58 In Grace, the
union had declined an invitation to participate.5 9 Nonetheless,
the Court held that nothing short of a judicial decree could alter
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement without the
union's consent.560 However, the Court in Grace did not invalidate
554. I& at 573 (footnote omitted).
555. Id at 576-80.
556. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
557. The union had been invited to participate in the negotiations, but had de-
clined. 714 F.2d at 570. It maintained that retroactive seniority, in contravention of
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, could be ordered only over the
union's objection if the union had the opportunity to participate in litigation to decide
whether a Title VII violation had occurred. Id. at 577.
558. Id. at 579-80.
559. 461 U.S. at 759.
560. Id at 771.
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any terms of the conciliation agreement; rather it held merely
that the employer should bear the financial exposure of answering
both to the charging parties under the conciliation agreement, and
to the displaced employees whose seniority rights were infringed
under the collective bargaining agreement.561
In Safeway, the court accepted the union's argument that terms
of the conciliation agreement that conflict with a valid collective
bargaining agreement cannot be enforced over a union's objection,
unless the union has had the opportunity to participate in an adju-
dication to determine whether a Title VII violation has oc-
curred.5 62 The court emphasized the voluntary nature of the
conciliation process:
Conciliation is, by its own terms, a voluntary process. The in-
volved parties are free to agree, and conversely, free not to
agree. If they choose to agree, then the goal of voluntary com-
pliance has been achieved. If they choose not to agree, then
"conciliation" cannot alter the terms of a collective agreement.
To do so, there must be an adjudication that discrimination has
occurred.563
The concerns articulated by the courts concerning the rights of
third parties are even more compelling when there has not been
an agency finding of cause or discrimination. Thus the "finality"
of any negotiated settlement is necessarily limited by its legiti-
macy, and its legitimacy is affected by any attempt to alter or in-
terfere with the rights of individuals not parties to the
agreement.564
The third-party concerns are clear in the case of the union and
its collective bargaining agreement but are less clear when there is
no union or other group specifically protected by national policy
such as that articulated by the National Labor Relations Act.5 65 In
the latter case, the rights of individuals not parties to the agree-
ment are nonetheless affected 6 6 This is perhaps one of the rea-
561. Id. at 767.
562. 714 F.2d at 577.
563. Id. at 580.
564. See generally Goldstein, Robbing Peter To Pay PauL The Conflict Between the
Title VII Conciliation Process and Collective Bargaining, 3 DET. C.L. REV. 647 (1983)
(discussing union participation in settlements to prevent the injustice of not allowing
an affected party to participate in decisions that may deprive it of its rights). But cf
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1852 (1986) (holding invalid a collec-
tive bargaining provision providing for preferential treatment of racial minorities
even though ratified by union membership).
565. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
566. The tension between the goal of voluntary compliance and the concern that
affirmative action without a finding of discrimination will violate the constitutional or
statutory rights of nonvictims is manifest in cases such as Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Local 93 of
the Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); and
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). This tension infuses the
current debate over the legitimate role of civil rights enforcement in the United
States today. See supra note 57. Of greatest concern is voluntary action without at
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sons OCR declines to attempt ECR in cases involving class
complaints or with class implications. However, even a mediated
resolution of an individual complaint may have negative repercus-
sions for nonparties. For example, a resolution that guaranteed an
individual victim of alleged sex discrimination the next available
supervisor position would mean that other persons, perhaps
equally or even more qualified, would not receive a position that
they might have attained but for the mediated agreement.
The controversy over the enforceability of EEOC negotiated
agreements arises as a matter of interpreting Title VII law and
purpose, rather than because of any absence of finality or commit-
ment by the agency to the negotiated agreement. As discussed
earlier, an EEOC negotiated agreement is written and signed by
the parties and usually by an EEOC representative.5 6 7 Upon re-
ceiving information of a breach of the agreement, EEOC has dis-
cretion to reopen the case on its merits or to take administrative
or judicial action to correct the breach.568
This is not the case under OCR's early complaint resolution pro-
cedures. OCR does not commit itself to monitor or to enforce any
mediated agreement. Its manual provides explicitly that upon al-
leged breach, the complainant shall be informed that he may file a
least an administrative finding of discrimination, whether before any administrative
attention has focused on the legitimacy of the practices of the entity in question, or
whether during an administrative investigation. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 ("[W]e
have never approved preferential classifications in the absence of proved constitu-
tional or statutory violations."). And yet, voluntary action is the goal of the federal
civil rights scheme. As Justice Brennan stated in Bakke:
Indeed, the requirement of a judicial determination of a constitutional or
statutory violation as a predicate for race-conscious remedial actions
would be self-defeating. Such a requirement would severely undermine
efforts to achieve voluntary compliance with the requirements of law.
And our society and jurisprudence have always stressed the value of vol-
untary efforts to further the objectives of the law. Judicial intervention is
a last resort to achieve cessation of illegal conduct or the remedying of its
effects rather than a prerequisite to action.... Indeed, Titles VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 put great emphasis on voluntarism in reme-
dial action.
438 U.S. at 364 & n.38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Weber, 443 U.S. at 204 ("It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's
concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who
had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long,' 110 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey), constituted the first legislative prohibition of all volun-
tary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation
and hierarchy.").
The debate is still very much alive. See Wygan4 106 S. Ct. at 1855 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part) (requiring public employers to find illegal discrimination before
engaging in affirmative action programs would severely undermine employers' incen-
tive to voluntarily meet civil rights obligations); id at 1863 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that formal findings of past discrimination are not necessarily predicate to the
adoption of affirmative action policies).
567. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 1262 (Mar. 1979).
568. Id q 552 (Sept. 1984).
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new complaint and that OCR will investigate the allegations of
discrimination rather than the allegation of a breach of the ECR
agreement. 569 The only concession made by OCR is that it will
calculate the 180-day timeframe within which a complaint is to be
filed from the date of the alleged breach, rather than from the
date of the alleged act of discrimination.570 In fact, OCR's proce-
dures do not even suggest that the complainant would have a com-
mon law action against the recipient for breach.571
Thus, OCR's mediation procedures fail miserably under any en-
forceability analysis. If unenforceable, as the Safeway court's de-
cision suggests, the incentives to abide by the terms of a mediated
resolution are minimal, and the temptations to breach are sub-
stantial. Whether this has in fact created a problem of finality is
less clear; no data exists to indicate whether recipients are breach-
ing mediated agreements with any frequency57 2
b. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance Before Findings573
The problem of enforceability and finality of resolutions
reached during the pendency of an OCR investigation is similar to,
and may be greater than, the problem under OCR's early com-
plaint resolution procedures. It may be greater because of the lack
of official recognition of such procedures. Although ECR proce-
dures specify how to calculate the 180-day filing period in the case
of an alleged breach of a mediated agreement,57 4 no formal policy
speaks to calculating time periods when a complaint is filed by a
complainant who had earlier withdrawn a complaint based on the
recipient's written or verbal promise. Although the agency may
waive the 180-day rule on the basis of "good cause" in such a situa-
tion,5 75 the lack of clarification of such a policy invites abuse.57 6
569. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 9;
see also PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 32-33.
570. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 9;
see also PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 32-33. It is unclear how OCR justifies this
approach in calculating the date of the alleged discrimination when it refuses to view
a breach itself as an instance of such discrimination, but OCR apparently has not yet
been called to task on its approach.
571. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at 9;
PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at B29-30 (Silverstein). Although an action based on
contract may nonetheless exist, it is unlikely that many complainants would have the
resources to bring such an action.
572. See, e.g., PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 51 (noting that several complainants
surveyed felt that the institutions had not kept the settlement agreements). Since
OCR assigns a new complaint number to complaints alleging that an ECR agreement
has been breached, OCR has no way of tracking the incidence of breach.
573. The discussion concerning enforceability and finality of EEOC's mediation
procedures is incorporated under this section.
574. OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, at 10.
575. The agency may waive the 180-day rule if: (1) the complainant could not rea-
sonably be expected to know within the 180 days that the act was discriminatory; (2)
illness or other incapacitating circumstances precluded filing within 180 days; (3) an-
other civil rights enforcement agency failed to act where a similar complaint had been
filed; (4) complainant shows good cause for failing to file in a timely manner (e.g.,
perceived changes in OCR's jurisdictional authority). Id at 11.
576. OCR may reopen a "predetermination closed investigation": when the com-
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c. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Informal
Findings
Under OCR's procedures, the agency must incorporate into a
letter or statement of findings any agreement reached after infor-
mal findings.577 The letter or statement should state the compli-
ance problems and the steps the recipient has taken and has
promised to take to correct the problems.578 The finality and en-
forceability of a resolution reached at this stage should be no dif-
ferent from the finality and enforceability of a resolution reached
after formal findings.
d. Negotiated Voluntary Compliance After Formal Findings
This Article has addressed, in the discussion of the enforceabil-
ity of negotiated agreements, the cases upholding EEOC enforce-
ment of conciliation agreements.57 9 In EEOC v. Liberty Trucking
Co., 5 0 the Seventh Circuit explored the legislative history of the
statutory provision for conciliation and concluded that while am-
biguous, it supports the conclusion that Congress intended the fed-
eral courts to have jurisdiction to enforce conciliation
agreements.581 The courts that have considered the question ap-
pear to be unanimous in concluding that without enforceability in
federal court of conciliation agreements, the statutory purpose of
eradicating discrimination would be seriously undermined.582
There remains, of course, the problem of EEOC's limited re-
plainant decides to allow OCR to release her name to the respondent; when the com-
plainant decides to cooperate with OCR in the investigation; or when the
complainant, whom OCR could not locate, contacts OCR after the complaint closure
and requests reopening of the investigation. OCR procedures make no provision for
reopening complaints when allegations that had been resolved become unresolved.
Id at 50.
577. Id at 54.
578. Id at 55-57.
579. See supra text accompanying notes 547-68.
580. 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
581. I& at 1041-44. The court first recites the ambiguous statutory history, which
reveals that the original bills provided the courts of appeals with jurisdiction to en-
force conciliation agreements, but that a substitute bill shifted jurisdiction to the dis-
trict courts and greatly simplified the original jurisdiction provisions. The substitute
bill, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), provided for federal jurisdiction over
"actions brought under this title" and did not refer specifically to conciliation agree-
ment enforcement actions. The Seventh Circuit concluded that despite the ambiguity
of this phrase, "[n]othing in the debates or reports indicates that the substitute bill
was meant to change the original proposal which explicitly provided for federal court
jurisdiction over EEOC actions to enforce conciliation agreements." 695 F.2d at 1041.
The court found that after the 1972 amendments, conciliation remained the most im-
portant function of EEOC. Id. at 1042 (citing EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530
F.2d 590, 596 (4th Cir. 1976)).
582. E.g., EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1040 n.5, 1043
(7th Cir. 1982).
1987]
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  581 1986-1987
sources, which may affect its ability to bring suit in every instance
of breach.5 3 Nonetheless, within the bounds of this problem,
there is indisputable jurisdiction.5 84 Liberty Trucking sends a
clear message to an employer contemplating a conciliated agree-
ment, or contemplating breach of one, that EEOC stands ready
and able to seek judicial redress and has no obligation to prove its
case of underlying employment discrimination, as it would have to
do if no conciliation agreement existed.
The Title VI regulations provide that OCR may request DOJ to
bring suit to enforce recipients' contractual obligations.585
Although the case law is limited, it supports the conclusion that
the government can enforce, under Title VI, a negotiated agree-
ment entered into after a formal finding of nondiscrimination, and
need not prove the underlying discrimination.586 A related issue is
583. Cf. supra note 540. EEOC's regulations provide for a written conciliation
agreement, signed by the parties and EEOC, and proof of compliance with Title VII in
accordance with the terms of the agreement before a case is closed. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.24(a), (c) (1986). The agreement contains a provision that EEOC may review
compliance with the terms of the agreement, including examination of relevant wit-
nesses and documents. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1276 (Mar. 1979). Neither the
regulations nor the Compliance Manual mention procedures upon breach of concilia-
tion agreements. Although the revised procedures recognize the need for monitoring,
see supra notes 539-40 and accompanying text, critics fear the Commission's change in
enforcement policy will cripple already overtaxed resources. See 1985 EEOC Hear-
ings, supra note 159, at 33, 49, 59-60.
584. But see Calleros, Reconciling the Goals of Federalism with the Policy of Title
VI. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Judicial Enforcement of EEOC Conciliation
Agreements, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 257, 267 (1985). Professor Calleros argues that de-
spite his endorsement of a broad interpretation of Title VII, id. at 257 n.*, there is no
federal jurisdictional basis for enforcing Title VII conciliation agreements. Id. at 267.
He suggests that requiring an employee to use a state rather than federal forum will
have little influence on whether an employer will breach an agreement. Id. at 296,
305-06. Thus, he ignores the resource problem and the availability of a federal court
suit by EEOC for the employer's breach. See ic Although he suggests possible con-
current jurisdiction as an alternative thesis, id. at 289, he never addresses whether
EEOC might sue the employer in state court, see id. at 279-80.
585. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a) (1986) ("If there appears to be a failure or threatened
failure to comply with this regulation, and if the noncompliance or threatened non-
compliance cannot be corrected by informal means, compliance with this part may be
effected by... (1) a reference to the Department of Justice with a recommendation
that appropriate proceedings be bought to enforce any rights of the United States ...
or any assurance or other contractual undertaking ...." (emphasis added)).
586. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 722 (1979) (White, J., dis-
senting) ("The 'other means' provisions of § 602 include agency suits to enforce con-
tractual antidiscrimination provisions.. . ."); United States v. Tatum Indep. School
Dist., 306 F. Supp. 285,288 (E.D. Tex. 1969) (stating that specific performance exists as
a contractual remedy for breach of a voluntary desegregation agreement). In Cannon,
Justice White relied upon the remarks of Senator Ribicoff: "'For example, the most
effective way for an agency to proceed would often be to adopt a rule that made the
nondiscrimination requirement part of a contractual obligation on the part of the re-
cipient... or ... the agency would have authority to sue to enforce compliance with
its own regulations.'" 441 U.S. at 772 n.9 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7066 (1964)); see
also United States v. Marion County School Dist., 625 F.2d 607, cert. denied, 451 U.S.
910 (1981); United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319 (M.D. Ala. 1968). Additional sup-
port for this conclusion is furnished by Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 613
(2d Cir. 1978) (Caulfield 1) (a challenge by third parties to the validity of a voluntary
agreement between OCR and the New York City Board of Education to resolve find-
ings of discrimination in the hiring and assignment of minority teachers). In Caul-
field I, the court held that the voluntary agreement "to effect compliance was
precisely the type of action contemplated by Congress in using the phrase 'voluntary
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whether the beneficiaries of such an agreement are able to enforce
it in federal court.587 Unlike a conciliation agreement under Title
VII where the parties to the agreement generally include the
charging party as well as the employer and EEOC, the complain-
ant is not a party to a negotiated agreement under Title VI. None-
theless, the complainant or class of beneficiaries whose rights are
protected by the agreement usually have a direct interest in its
enforcement. Although the problem of sufficient resources will
often prevent a beneficiary from pursuing such litigation, allowing
such actions may alleviate the problems of the government's lack
of resources, change in policy, or intergovernmental dispute pre-
cluding the agency or DOJ from pursuing such litigation.5 8 An
action to enforce such an agreement, whether brought by the gov-
ernment or by the beneficiaries, is consistent with the policies that
motivated the Supreme Court in Cannon; specific enforcement of
the agreement focuses on remedying the discrimination rather
than on terminating federal financial assistance.58 9
The enforceability of voluntary agreements, whether pursuant
to mediation or after agency findings of discrimination, will raise
many of the same obstacles as raised by the original litigation.
Limitations on resources will frequently preclude either the
means.'" Id. at 614. Although this case was not a suit to enforce the agreement, but
rather an attempt to invalidate it, the reasoning of the court would point in the direc-
tion of enforceability. See also Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981) (Caulfield I1) ("The argument for upholding
the voluntary affirmative action plan is even stronger in this case than it was in the
Weber case, for here HEW itself initiated the investigation and notified the Board of
alleged Title VI and Title IX violations."); supra note 564 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the effects of such agreements on the rights of third parties).
587. See Block, supra note 112, at 16. It is Block's view that, especially in this era of
lack of commitment to civil rights enforcement in the federal government, allowing
such third-party actions promotes the purposes of the civil rights laws and is consis-
tent with case law that recognizes the rights of private individuals to bring actions
under Title VI to enforce contracts of assurance furnished by recipients. Id. at 16-17
(citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) and Tatum Indep. School Dist., 306 F. Supp.
at 288) (recognizing the government's right to enforce compliance agreements); see
also D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying a
third-party beneficiary action under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act). The court
in D'Amato held that the analysis of whether a third-party action should be allowed
should parallel the analysis of whether a private right of action exists under the statu-
tory scheme; the court distinguished the case before it from what would ensue if the
third-party action were brought under Section 504, for which a private right of action
has been recognized. Id. at 1481-82.
588. OCR is powerless to bring litigation on its own, see supra note 182 and accom-
panying text; it can only refer appropriate cases to DOJ which, not infrequently, will
refuse to bring suit as requested.
589. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-05 (1979). In dissent, Jus-
tice White quoted Senator Ribicoff's explanation of the purpose of allowing the De-
partment of Justice to bring suit to specifically enforce contractual or legal
obligations: "'All of these remedies have the obvious advantage of seeking to end the
discrimination, rather than to end the assistance.'" Id. at 722 n.9 (quoting 110 CONG.
REc. 7066 (1964)).
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agency or the individual from suing for breach of informally-
agreed-to remedies. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the procedures
and the likelihood that the procedures will produce agreements
that resolve the underlying dispute with finality are likely to be
affected by the official recognition that the agreements will be en-
forceable, if not enforced, upon breach. The greater the likelihood
that the agency will take measures to enforce a breached agree-
ment, and that such measures will embarrass the recipi-
ent/employer economically or otherwise, the greater the
likelihood that the recipient/employer will not breach. When the
disincentive that enforceability would provide is absent - such as
in the case of the ECR mediated agreement - the likelihood that
breach will occur is increased. Thus, finality, though not depen-
dent on enforceability, is likely affected by it.
E. Other Values
1. All or Nothingness
Judicial adjudication, as we know it, is a winner-take-all propo-
sition.5 90 Both the risks and the possible gains are greater than for
alternative procedures. This is similarly true for cases tried
through administrative enforcement proceedings. If there is value
in all parties giving up something and concomitantly gaining
something, then litigation through judgment - whether judicial
or administrative - is not to be preferred. Such "all or nothing-
ness," however, is not an especially helpful concept in assessing
the desirability of litigation brought by the agency. Once either
agency has made a determination that a violation of the law has
occurred, it is obligated to seek a complete remedy for that viola-
tion. Although it is obligated to use informal means to resolve the
compliance matter voluntarily, any resolution obtained must com-
pletely cure the violation, and a compromise of differences be-
tween the parties would be prohibited under either statutory
mandate.591
When a complainant files a private right of action under Title
VI, or a charging party, having received notice of right to sue from
EEOC, files an action under Title VII, neither is likely to know
with any degree of certainty whether the plaintiff will prevail, or,
if he does, how much he will recover. Thus, there is a great deal of
uncertainty in calculating whether to risk judgment or accept set-
tlement. It might well behoove a private individual to settle a case
prejudgment.592 A case resolved through mediation or negotiation
590. See Susskind & Madigan, supra note 169, at 180.
591. See supra text accompanying notes 405-13.
592. The calculation is somewhat different from the point of view of the recipient
of federal funds who refuses to comply voluntarily and is then faced with fund termi-
nation proceedings, either administrative or judicial. When the purpose of the pro-
ceeding is to seek termination of federal financial assistance, the parties know with
some degree of certainty the risks of losing and the gains of winning. This is, how-
ever, complicated somewhat by the question of which programs are infected by the
discrimination. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-74 (1984) (holding
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at the agency level, or a prejudgment consent decree, avoids the
risk of losing all.
2. Individual Control and Autonomy
Related to, but nonetheless distinct from, procedural and sub-
stantive fairness is the quality of individual autonomy and control.
The power to control one's own lawsuit, while costly, insures a
greater measure of autonomy than is available to a complainant
before an administrative enforcement agency.
A private right of action under Title VI empowers a plaintiff to
affect the course and conduct of a proceeding 93 which is likely
unavailable to her if she files a complaint with OCR. Once a com-
plaint is filed, if ECR is either rejected or never offered, and an
investigation begins, the scope of the investigation, the framing of
the issues, the ultimate finding, and the remedy negotiated are all
within OCR's control. Thus, a complainant who desires not to re-
linquish such control may prefer the route of private litigation.
The loss of control under Title VI is as great in an administrative
hearing commenced by the agency as it is in other phases of the
administrative process. It is arguable, but not at all clear, that if
the agency, through DOJ, were to pursue the case to federal court,
the court might be compelled to allow the individual to intervene
as of right.594 Nonetheless, as discussed previously, the interests
of the government - fund termination or other systemic relief -
and the interests of the complainant - individual remedy - are
quite different.595
that nondiscrimination obligation extends only to a program or an activity receiving
federal financial assistance, not to an entire institution); Board of Pub. Instruction v.
Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969) (ruling that if federal funds "support a
program that is infected by a discriminatory environment, then termination of such
funds is proper").
593. Professor Auerbach suggests, however, that a plaintiff's autonomy in litiga-
tion may be surrendered to either his counsel or the court:
Once an adversarial framework is in place, it supports competitive aggres-
sion to the exclusion of reciprocity and empathy. Litigation can be as bi-
zarre as Alice's Wonderland.... As a litigant tumbles down the slippery
slope into dense procedural thickets, familiar landmarks recede. The jour-
ney may even resemble a sudden regression to childhood.... Although a
lawyer can provide reassuring guidance, in loco parentis, the price of pro-
tection is still dependence. Even as a dangerous adversary is fended off,
the judge looms as a menacing authority figure, empowered to divest a
litigant of property or liberty. Autonomy vanishes as mysteriously as the
smile of the Cheshire cat.
J. AUERBACH, supra note 77, at vii-viii.
594. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
595. The differences in relief sought would suggest that if intervention were to be
allowed at all, it would be permissive under rule 24(b) rather than as of right under
rule 24(a). Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (concluding
that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 "authoriz[es] an implied private
cause of action for victims of prohibited discrimination").
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The complainant, however, may maintain autonomy and control
should she (and, necessarily, the recipient) choose to attempt me-
diation through the ECR process. In fact, OCR promotes this as
one advantage of ECR.596 At least in theory, the OCR representa-
tive remains a neutral third party allowing the complainant and
recipient mutually to resolve the matter as they see fit. Were the
complaint to proceed to investigation the complainant would lose
the opportunity to control the ultimate findings and resolution;597
furthermore, it is not inconceivable that even if the agency were
to find a violation, the complainant might receive no individual
remedy at all.598 Thus, mediation, the least formal of the informal
alternatives, ensures a measure of autonomy similar to what is
available to an individual who decides to file a private lawsuit
rather than file a complaint with OCR.
Loss of autonomy from using the agency's informal procedures
is less of an issue for a Title VII complainant. A putative plaintiff
in a Title VII action is required to exhaust her administrative rem-
edies before bringing a private right of action. However, the
charging party maintains a far more active role in EEOC's pro-
ceedings than if a comparable complaint were filed with OCR.
Although the individual may not play any role in determining
whether there is cause to believe Title VII discrimination has oc-
curred, once such cause is found, she participates in fashioning an
appropriate remedy.599
Whether the agency uses the rapid charge process, or whether it
makes a finding and attempts conciliation, the complainant re-
tains the right to accept or reject the proffered settlement.
Although both methods contemplate an agreement among the
charging party, the employer, and the agency, EEOC's procedures
allow for situations where the agency believes the employer has
proffered an adequate settlement, and the charging party dis-
agrees. 600 The charging party may sacrifice the advantage of
agency processes and litigation support in such circumstances, but
596. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 124, app. J at
16 ("Questions and Answers about Early Resolution - A Guide for Mediators"); see
also PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 80.
597. See Block, supra note 112, at 10-11.
598. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
599. See supra text accompanying note 166.
600. When the charging party is satisfied by the employer's offer, and EEOC re-
mains unsatisfied that compliance problems have been remedied, EEOC may continue
to investigate. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 1 550 (Mar. 1987) (negotiated agree-
ments). The agency may decide alternatively to close a limited class case where full
relief has been offered and the charging party is not satisfied. Id.; see also id. 11 1281
(Mar. 1979), 1284 (Mar. 1979) (stating that the agency may accept conciliation agree-
ment offering full relief without charging party approval). The Compliance Manual
does not state whether during conciliation efforts the charging party and the em-
ployer may reach an agreement that is insufficient to remedy fully the charge and
therefore unacceptable to EEOC. It is likely that such a situation would be treated
pursuant to paragraph 550, and that conciliation would either proceed further or be
deemed to have failed. See id. 11 1311-1318 (Mar. 1979) (conciliation failure). If EEOC
and the employer reach a conciliation agreement without the agreement of the charg-
ing party, the latter will be issued a notice of right to sue. Id. % 1283 (Mar. 1979).
VOL. 55:482
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  586 1986-1987
Civil Rights
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
she will retain the right to bring an action in federal court, thus
preserving subsequent autonomy and control.
3. Continuing Relationships
Mediation may be more conducive to the continuation of amica-
ble relationships than any of the alternatives, formal or infor-
mal.6 0 ' Formal adversarial processes are least compatible with
such ongoing relationships; mending entrenched differences after
a win-or-lose, take all-or-nothing, resolution to a controversy
breeds resentment and distance, rather than harmony and com-
patibility. If a charging party desires to continue an employment
relationship with his employer, or if a student intends to continue
as a student at her institution, a resolution agreed to by the parties
will more likely ensure the opportunity for conflict-free continua-
tion, than would litigation or some of the other alternatives. Once
the agency has made a cause finding, or a finding of discrimina-
tion, the adversarial nature of the process becomes somewhat en-
trenched. If the parties reach a resolution during the course of the
investigation, the opportunity for a harmonious relationship
would be less impaired than if they reach resolution after the con-
clusion of the investigation. Also, a resolution reached after infor-
mal findings may jeopardize a relationship less than one reached
after formal communication of those findings. But of all the pos-
sibilities, successful mediation will best assure that each party has
heard and understood the concerns of the other, and has accepted
a mutually agreeable solution that is conducive to future dealings.
4. Nonconfrontation
The value of nonconfrontation is linked to ensuring the con-
601. See M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 117-18 (1980); L. SINGER & E. NACE, ME-
DIATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: TWO STATES' EXPERIENCES 15 (1985) (noting that a
key to success of the use of mediation in resolving special education placement dis-
putes was the continuity in relationships); Sander, supra note 253, at 120.
Both agencies acknowledge the advantages of the mediated approach when ongoing
relationships are involved. See OCR, 1985 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL,
supra note 124, app. J at 1; APRIL 16 POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 157, at 1-3. As
Professor Anthony Amsterdam stated at the 45th Judicial Conference of the D.C.
Circuit:
Professor Auerbach finds that in closed communities of purpose unlike
our society, mediation and conciliation may bring the strong and the weak
together on terms of relative equality, since the interests and powers of
both are subordinated to their common acceptance of a transcendent need
to reconcile differences, and there exists a shared commitment to common
values as a framework of reference for the reconciliation. But in our own
materialistic, individualistic and competitive culture, alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms find and leave the parties with all the chips in the
hands of the stronger.
105 F.R.D. 251, 291 (1984).
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tinuity of relationships, but focuses on the respondent rather than
the complainant. A recipient or employer may be more receptive
to changing its processes and practices if the change is presented
in the form of advice rather than edict.60 2 An employer or univer-
sity may prefer to avoid the negative publicity that attaches to a
lawsuit or the agency's public announcement of compliance
problems.60 3 Therefore, a procedure that diminishes confronta-
tion may facilitate an expeditious and appropriate resolution.
Although the merits of a nonconfrontational approach are debata-
ble, it is clearly an important goal of the current administration.60 4
Mediation achieves the goal of nonconfrontation, as does every
informal process used by OCR short of a formal LOF. Early com-
plaint resolution, however, which avoids an investigation and the
confrontational environment that accompanies it, promotes non-
confrontation more than the other informal, but nonetheless in-
vestigative, procedures. 60 5
Conclusion
A number of factors complicate the evaluation of formal and
informal procedures. First, many valued goals are mutually in-
compatible. The resolution with the greatest deterrent effect may
not be the most cost-effective. The most cost-effective resolution
may provide the fewest procedural safeguards. The resolution
with the most procedural safeguards may not promote harmony in
a continuing relationship between the parties. Second, the con-
straints imposed in the statutory scheme add further complica-
tions. Cost-effectiveness, interpersonal harmony, and personal
autonomy may not be relevant to promoting the goals of Title VI
and Title VII. The goals of Title VI may not be coextensive with
those of Title VII; thus, it may be inappropriate to base the devel-
opment of alternative procedures under Title VI on those devel-
oped under Title VII. Finally, our ability to evaluate the
effectiveness of the various procedures against any number of the
identified values is substantially impaired by lack of controlled,
empirical data, and opportunities for comparison. Nevertheless, I
venture some observations and recommendations.
602. On the other hand, school officials sometimes will desire formal administra-
tive findings (at the least) as a basis to convince constituents that funding must be
allocated to address the compliance problem.
603. A survey of recipients who participated in the ECR pilot program shows sup-
port for this conclusion. See PEER STUDY, supra note 92, at 100. The contraposition
to this, which was recognized by some of the respondents surveyed, is that ECR de-
prives respondents of public and official exoneration of charges where findings would
be in their favor. Id. at 123. However, one recipient spokesperson, who acknowledged
that his institution had been in violation, noted that ECR had enabled the institution
"to tidy up an error at modest cost." Id. at 76.
604. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
605. EEOC's processes prior to a cause finding are similarly nonconfrontational,
unlike the process once cause is determined or when litigation is pursued.
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A. Litigation
The most formal alternative, litigation, has numerous character-
istics that facilitate achieving justice. The articulation of norms or
guiding values and the opportunity to clarify poorly understood or
vaguely written statutory commands recommend litigation most
forcefully in complex cases. Whether or not adversarial litigation
is the preferred method for adjudicating facts, it is the most influ-
ential tool for clarifying and applying the law.
Similarly, litigation's procedural safeguards ensure greater pro-
cedural fairness than do any of the less formal alternatives,
although the balance of power among the parties will influence
the success of procedural rules in ensuring fair hearing. The gov-
ernment - EEOC, or DOJ on recommendation from OCR - is a
fair adversary against a defending corporate or governmental en-
tity in a suit to enforce the 1964 Act. But when the plaintiff is an
individual, the defendant's greater resources and concomitant
staying power may impair the ability of fair rules to produce fair
results.
Litigation may be the best alternative in promoting finality and
guaranteeing enforceability of the results, but it is probably the
weakest in expedience and cost-effectiveness. The expense, time,
and public resources that litigation consumes have fueled the
movement towards procedural alternatives.
B. Formal Administrative Enforcement
The benefits and burdens of formal administrative adjudication
in civil rights enforcement are troublesome. The influence and
precedential value of administrative determinations are more lim-
ited than those of the courts. Although the need for agency exper-
tise and the desire to clear court dockets are persuasive reasons
for shifting adjudication away from the courts to administrative
forums, the administrative law judges who preside over the adju-
dicatory hearings at OCR 606 tend not to be experts in Title VI.
And because virtually every case in which an ALJ recommends
termination of the recipient's funds is appealed through several
layers of review, including appeal to the federal court, the time
consumed by such hearings is frequently as extensive as that con-
sumed during litigation. In addition, the infrequency of such for-
mal administrative proceedings to terminate funds - whether
because of lax enforcement policy or because of recipients' reluc-
tance to gamble on the loss of needed federal funds - does little
to recommend such alternatives to court litigation.
606. EEOC does not use formal administrative adjudication.
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C. Mediation
The types of mediation practiced by OCR and EEOC differ
markedly from each other and must be distinguished in-any dis-
cussion of their qualities and drawbacks. If such procedures are
utilized to free scarce agency resources for the eradication of sys-
temic discrimination, they may serve a worthwhile function. If,
however, resources are not scarce, or are not made available to
fight discrimination, the use of mediation by a civil rights enforce-
ment agency, whether passive or active, is problematic. Mediation
may result in a complainant gaining less than she would if the
agency investigated and made findings; conversely, it may pres-
sure an employer who had not discriminated into making conces-
sions. Mediation may resolve individual disputes but cause the
agency to overlook patterns and systems of discriminatory prac-
tices. The current use of ECR by OCR is at best unnecessary, 60 7
and at worst antagonistic, 608 in ensuring nondiscrimination by re-
cipients of federal funds.
Mediation in the private sector is indisputably helpful and gen-
erally inexpensive and expedient in resolving disputes between in-
dividuals. 60 9 This is especially true when such individuals either
desire to, or must, continue in a relationship with one another. In
mediation between two individuals who have substantially equal
resources, sophistication, and bargaining ability, the opportunity
to compromise their differences with the assistance of a neutral
third party can reduce conflict and promote harmony and
reasonableness.
But when such mediation occurs between individuals or institu-
tions of disparate bargaining ability and resources, concerns re-
garding fairness and justice abound. Mediation owes no allegiance
to established norms, and one party's sophistication may prejudice
the other party in achieving a just or fair result.
My preference is for an optional forum for mediation of differ-
ences outside the structure of the enforcement agency, preferably
within the parties' own community,610 with ultimate resort when
607. See supra text accompanying notes 483-89.
608. See supra text accompanying notes 380-84.
609. I agree with OCR that mediation of civil rights disputes is inappropriate for
the resolution of class complaints.
610. For example, see the study prepared for the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution. See L. SINGER & R. SCHECHTER, supra note 50. This study examines the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service's (FMCS) mediation of complaints under
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1982), pursuant to government-
wide regulations promulgated by HEW in 1979,45 C.F.R. § 90.43 (1986). This use of an
outside mediation agency without its own enforcement powers is unique in federal
practice. The decision to have FMCS conduct mediation rather than the agency itself
was based on the belief that there was some virtue to separating the mediator from
the adjudicating agency. See L. SINGER & R. SCHECTER, supra note 50, at 8.
The authors of the study were hesitant to draw many conclusions, because of the
limited data available. Nevertheless, they found that community mediators hired by
FMCS tended to have more success than the FMCS professional mediators, id. at 13,
and community conciliators tended to take a more active role in alleviating imbal-
ances of bargaining power between the parties, id. at 15. In addition, community con-
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necessary to the enforcement agency or courts.611 Provided there
is appropriate counseling to aid complainants and others in decid-
ing whether it is advisable to participate in mediation,6 12 a
noncompulsory opportunity to mediate would preserve the proce-
dure's advantages without sacrificing the proper mission of the
civil rights enforcement agency. It would further resolve concerns
regarding biases of agency personnel, due to either a preference
for quick resolution, or a potentially premature assessment of the
merits of the case.
Such an approach also would largely resolve the problems con-
cerning enforceability of results. A problem with OCR's early
complaint resolution is that there is little disincentive to breach
the ECR agreement. When a recipient breaches an ECR agree-
ment, the complainant must begin anew by filing a complaint with
OCR, which will then commence an investigation. There is a dif-
ferent problem with EEOC's enforcement of a rapid charge agree-
ment upon breach. The agency is enforcing an agreement reached
between the parties in the absence of any actual finding that the
employer in fact violated Title VII, a potentially unjust and inap-
propriate posture for an agency charged with enforcing the law. If
the mediation process rested within the community and the par-
ties were made aware of both its limitations and its virtues, the
agency would be free to focus on the problem of discrimination,
rather than on dispute resolution. Nevertheless, if mediation is to
remain in the hands of the enforcement agency, the law - either
the legislature or the judiciary - should recognize a meaningful
right to enforcement of the agreement.61 3
D. Negotiation Before Findings
I find little, if any, reason to sanction negotiation pending inves-
ciliators articulated concern about the fairness to both parties of the agreement
reached, a concern not shared by the professional mediators. Id. Neither the profes-
sional nor the community mediators were particularly concerned with ambiguities in
the statute or with ensuring that the parties were apprised of their rights under the
statute. I& at 15-16.
611. Edwards, supra note 88, at 682.
612. For example, an impartial assessment of the complaining party's case might
suggest that it would be extremely difficult to prove a violation. See supra note 291
and accompanying text. A handicapped employee might seek advice as to whether he
might be more likely to negotiate the specific kind of accommodation he desires if he
engaged in mediation rather than submitting a complaint to OCR. The employer
might seek advice as to whether or not the practice complained of constituted a viola-
tion of the applicable law. Obviously, the providers of such assistance should be
neutral.
613. By "meaningful" I mean that the agency itself should be charged with bring-
ing suit to enforce the agreement; the resource problem, which initially recommended
use of the agency processes, would likely still be a problem at the point of breach of
the agreement.
1987]
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  591 1986-1987
tigation as practiced by OCR. Even with mediation, I have con-
cern about premature assessment of the merits of the complaint
affecting the negotiations. This concern becomes increasingly
stronger as the investigation progresses. During the investigatory
process, there are few external controls or checks to ensure the
justness of an accepted compromise. If the procedures for such
negotiations were clarified and codified, some of these concerns
might diminish. EEOC's procedures at least are made available to
the parties in advance of the agency's fact-finding conference. 614
Nevertheless, the incremental value that might be gained by mini-
mizing the expenditure of resources does not justify allowing an
enforcement agency employee to facilitate a negotiated agreement
when she is charged with the duty to investigate impartially and
make findings on the allegations of the complaint.
E. Negotiation After Informal Findings
For somewhat different reasons, I see no compelling justifica-
tion for OCR's current practice of attempting negotiation before
official notification to the complainant and the recipient of its
findings. The proffered value of furthering nonconfrontational
resolution of compliance problems is unpersuasive. The proce-
dure has fueled legitimate concern that the Reagan Administra-
tion is soft on discrimination. Ex parte secret negotiations with a
recipient found to have discriminated imply that OCR frets more
about its relationship with such lawbreakers than it does about
eradicating and deterring discrimination. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the procedure has improved OCR's ability to expe-
dite resolution of compliance problems. A resolution reached pur-
suant to such a procedure is no more final or enforceable than a
resolution reached after a letter of findings is sent. Legitimate
grounds for endorsing such a procedure remain unclear.
F. Negotiation After Formal Findings
EEOC's recent shift away from rapid charge mediation towards
fuller investigation of charges with an eye towards litigation
causes concern that EEOC may not be able to handle the plethora
of found charges that will result. The agency's renewed commit-
ment to demand a full remedy likely means that many more cases
will require litigation. EEOC appears ill equipped to handle its
current caseload, let alone such an increase.615
Regardless of the value of litigation in creating and legitimatiz-
ing legally acceptable standards and promoting justice and fair-
ness, a scheme that provides no means of eradicating
discrimination short of litigation would prove unworkable and
counterproductive. The procedures most consistent with address-
ing compliance problems short of litigation or formal administra-
614. See supra text accompanying notes 429-30.
615. See supra note 480 and accompanying text.
VOL. 55:482
HeinOnline -- 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  592 1986-1987
Civil Rights
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tive enforcement are those originally built into the statutory
schemes in 1964. Upon finding discrimination both EEOC and
OCR are to accept no resolution short of complete compliance.
Thus, in theory, if not in practice, there is no inconsistency be-
tween their responsibilities as civil rights enforcement agencies
and their responsibilities to attempt to conciliate, or achieve vol-
untary compliance, before commencing formal proceedings.
This is not to suggest that there is no need for litigation to fur-
ther the goal of justice, to establish norms, or to ensure finality.
Cases will arise that will not be capable of informal resolution, for
example, if there is a dispute as to what the law requires, or if the
costs of compliance are too great to permit the recipient or the
corporate employer to acquiesce without a judicial decree. The
cases that require a judicial airing - be they individual or class -
will have a judicial airing, as long as the agencies are true to their
mandate.
A more difficult issue is the degree and manner to which a com-
plainant or charging party should be involved in the agency's
postfinding negotiations. Such involvement furthers the com-
plainant's autonomy and individual interest in justice and fairness.
But such involvement also creates a risk that the agency's obliga-
tion to eradicate discrimination may be compromised by a focus on
dispute resolution, a problem with which EEOC has been grap-
pling in its reevaluation of rapid charge processing.
Generally, there need be no conflict between the interests of the
individual and those of the institution in ensuring nondiscrimina-
tion. Sarah School wants admission to Stowe University.616 If
OCR finds a violation, admitting her is not inconsistent with the
goal of bringing Stowe into compliance with Title VI. However,
her admission will probably not be sufficient; to comply with the
mandate of Title VI, OCR may require Stowe to develop and ad-
here to certain procedures to ensure that such discrimination will
not occur again. Conversely, it may be possible for Stowe to avoid
termination of federal funds without admitting Sarah; perhaps she
is no longer competitive with current applicants regardless of
race. 617 Nevertheless, if Sarah was discriminated against because
of her race, she has a statutory, if not constitutional, right618 to
have that discrimination redressed. The discriminatory act should
be fully redressed, if possible, within the framework of postfind-
616. See supra text preceding note 310.
617. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3049 & n.45
(1986).
618. This would depend on whether Stowe was a state school or otherwise pro-
moted policies of the state. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). But see Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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ing negotiations. It makes no sense to require Sarah to go through
the expense and delay of then seeking an individual remedy
through litigation or otherwise. If a conflict arises between the
interests of the individual and those of the agency, OCR could ad-
dress that conflict by providing for procedures to segregate Sa-
rah's claim from Stowe's general compliance problems.619 But
since the vast majority of cases present no such conflict, OCR
should amend its regulations to include complaining parties and
their representatives in postfinding negotiations.620
G. The Roles for Congress, the Courts, and the Agencies
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,621 the Supreme Court admonished the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for its display of
judicial activism in requiring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to use additional rulemaking procedures beyond those specified in
the Administrative Procedure Act.622 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, reviewed the legislative history of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act and concluded "that Congress intended that
the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be exer-
cised in determining when extra procedural devices should be em-
ployed. ' 62 3 The courts' inability to impose additional procedures
on the agencies does not support the conclusion that the agencies
have license to transform their statutory missions by the use of
less stringent procedures and methods.
If one administration chooses to use more formal procedures
than those specifically mandated by statute, subsequent adminis-
trations are not bound to follow suit. Nonetheless, the burden of
justifying any changes lies with the agency.6 24 If a litigant could
show that OCR's or EEOC's use of mediation or other informal
procedures had frustrated the discovery and termination of sys-
temic discrimination, the courts would be justified in striking
down their use.
If Congress chooses to encourage civil rights enforcement agen-
cies to utilize procedures less formal than those used traditionally,
it should do so explicitly. My recommendation is that any efforts
by Congress to encourage the use of less formal procedures should
isolate dispute resolution from the enforcement of nondiscrimina-
tion obligations.
619. A procedure similar to that employed by the EEOC might suffice. See EEOC
Compl. Man. (CCH) 11 1281-1284 (Apr. 1985).
620. If the agency fails to do so, Congress should amend Title VI to provide for
such participation. In addition to protecting the rights of the individual, including
him in these negotiations would diminish any tendency by the agency to accept less
than full compliance with the law.
621. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
622. Id. at 548; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
623. 435 U.S. at 546.
624. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
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Further, regardless of the stage at which a mediated or negoti-
ated agreement is obtained, the agreement, if obtained under the
auspices of the enforcement agency, should be enforceable in fed-
eral court by the agency and by the affected individual. Enforce-
ment costs should not burden the complainant, and the benefits of
breach should not outweigh the cost of breach to the school or
employer. Congress should amend Titles VI and VII to grant ex-
plicitly such rights of action.
Although it is undoubtedly preferable for Congress to speak to
these issues explicitly, the courts may continue to play an impor-
tant role by ensuring that agencies act true to the mandates of
their organic statutes and that informal resolutions to compliance
problems are enforceable under these statutes.
Yet the agencies need not wait for either Congress or the courts.
In spite of political and fiscal pressures, agencies such as OCR and
EEOC should reexamine their procedures to assure that they ac-
complish as well as possible the eradication of unlawful discrimi-
nation, consistent with the mandates of Title VI and Title VII.
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